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2ABSTRACT
Cost-effectiveness analysis is increasingly being used to support decisions about the
allocation of resources in health systems. However, decisions based on cost-
effectiveness are usually made under imperfect and incomplete information. This
thesis examines the value of understanding and characterizing heterogeneity for
decision-making in healthcare. It proposes a methodological framework for a
systematic cost-effectiveness subgroup analysis, providing guidance for
identification and selection of subgroups. It suggests that the value of heterogeneity
should be examined considering two dimensions: the value of making different
decisions in different subgroups with current information (here termed static value);
and the value of resolving parameter uncertainty conditional to a particular level of
heterogeneity (here termed dynamic value). Finally, it provides empirical
demonstration of such a framework through its implementation with a real case
study.
The study of heterogeneity for decision-making led to an examination of the policy
agenda for individualization of care. This thesis also presents a conceptual
framework to address two aspects of the implementation of individualized decisions.
First, the implementation of unrestricted choices for treatment responds to a positive
value judgement, which is based on the expected health loss (or gain) associated to
it. This chapter presents a novel analytical approach to estimating this magnitude,
based on the characterization of the joint distribution of potential outcomes. Second,
it is acknowledged that implementing individualized decisions also requires a
normative judgement. This refers to a broader question in economic evaluation in
health, which is the type of values that society seeks to maximise. Three categories
are proposed here (paternalist, altruistic and welfarist) that define alternative
normative positions. The positive and normative elements of this framework are
illustrated with a real case study.
In conclusion, this thesis is a contribution to the development of methods for
economic evaluation in healthcare, in particular, for understanding, characterizing
and accounting for heterogeneity between members of the population.
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The Value of Health Technology Assessment and Economic
Evaluation of Healthcare Interventions: An overview of the
motivation of this thesis
1.1. Introduction
“Better health is of course the raison d’être of a health system, and unquestionably
its primary or defining goal: if health systems did nothing to protect or improve
health there would be no reason for them.”
The World Health Report (2000)
Health is the primary goal of a healthcare system. The aim of social planners in the
health system is to make decisions such that limited resources can be allocated
consistently with the maximization of health. However, this is not an easy task,
primarily because the health market has some particularities that impose barriers for
an optimal performance requiring governmental regulation (Dolan and Olsen, 2002).
These barriers include demand and supply side market failures and most of the
efforts undertaken in the field of health economics are an attempt to solve them.
From a consequentalist point of view, any better understanding of these failures and
methods to address them represents additional value to the system because they can
be expressed in terms of potential health gains. The research undertaken in this thesis
is focused on some particular elements of the demand side for healthcare, the further
understanding of which might impact positively on the goals of the healthcare
system.
In principle, people demand health from the healthcare system. However, people
cannot demand health directly but only the inputs to produce health; this is what we
call healthcare (Grossman, 1972). The demand for inputs requires knowledge about
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the disease process and the alternative courses of action available for particular
conditions - something that people usually do not have at the moment they need
healthcare. In other words, people demand healthcare in conditions of uncertainty.
This lack of information is a key characteristic of the functioning of a healthcare
system (Arrow, 1963). Patients do not have comparative information about
diagnostic tools and treatments, which force them to trust the health professional as a
main source of information in order to make their decisions. Thus, a better
functioning of the health market assumes, on one side, a fully informed health
professional and, on the other side, a perfect principal-agency relationship between
patient and doctor. The latter avoids any asymmetry of information so that patients
can make decisions fully informed (Dolan and Olsen, 2002). This type of uncertainty
can be called ex-post because it occurs when patients have a disease. Another type of
uncertainty in the healthcare market is the ex-ante uncertainty. This is present when
people are at risk of having a disease but they are not ill yet. It arises from the need
of health systems to implement programmes for financial protection of the
population. Where several insurance plans are available, people need to make
choices from them with limited information. In the case of a single insurance system,
information is even more important because it will define the inputs that should be
included in a coverage set. Thus, the interaction of the individuals and the healthcare
system is surrounded by uncertainty, whatever the point in time. This implies that the
demand for healthcare is intimately associated with demand for information about
healthcare.
Health technology assessment (HTA), of which economic evaluation of healthcare is
part, is a scientific process created in response to the need for better information for
decision-making in healthcare. This chapter presents an overview of HTA and
economic evaluation in their role of supporting decision-making in heath care. The
objective is to offer a broad context of the role of HTA and, in particular, of
economic evaluations in their capacity for exploring value in terms of health
outcomes. The reader will find in this chapter some basic definitions that will be
referred to in the subsequent chapters in this thesis. Finally, this overview
contextualises the motivation of this thesis in pursuing a better understanding of the
value of heterogeneity for healthcare decision-making and implications for the
individualization of care.
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1.2. Health technology assessment for healthcare decision-making
It has been argued that if the objective of the healthcare system is to produce the
maximum amount of health with the limited resources defined exogenously, the
aggregation of the demand of the healthcare system is a rational policy (Culyer,
1990). Three elements need to be considered to respond this policy. First, health
systems should pursue efficiency as a goal. Second, decision-makers need more
information about health needs and health outcomes. And third, financial protection
schemes (i.e. insurance) should be centralized. In this section, it is argued that a HTA
process, including economic evaluation, is consistent with the idea of a collective
expression of demand through the specification and regulation of the needs of the
population.
HTA has been defined as a “multidisciplinary field of policy analysis. It studies the
medical, social, ethical, and economic implications of development, diffusion, and
use of health technology” (INAHTA, 2012). Its main role is to provide decision-
makers with high quality information resulting from a systematic and comprehensive
process of evaluation of the available evidence. The implementation of a centralized
HTA process, for example a national agency, is consistent with an adequate
characterization of the demand for healthcare of the population (EunetHTA Work
Package 8.). Throughout this process, a central authority is able to define the needs
of the population and the alternative courses of action for each situation that
maximises the health of the population. In this respect, Culyer (1990) says: “I
contend that all of the major ideological strengths of the NHS relate to the
characteristics of demand. The job of the supply side is simply (!) to be cost-effective
at meeting whatever demands are placed upon it by the demand side……The supply
side is not judged by ideological but by practical criteria.” (page 12).
A centralized process of HTA is efficient because it uses the best capacity of a
jurisdiction1 to undertake the evaluation instead of leaving it to doctors and patients.
1 The term jurisdiction has been defined as the geographical region governed by a health authority
able to make independent decisions about adoption or rejection of health technologies as well as their
implementation (Drummond et al., 2009).
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Doctors are not expected to assess the evidence as a centralized HTA process2, but
even if they were able, the process would be repeated several times, becoming
inefficient. Neither would it take into account costs falling on others and benefits
received by others. In addition, if the health system has monopsony power, HTA
offers an opportunity for national (or jurisdictional) negotiation of price and
alternative coverage schemes, since the assessment process allow analysts to identify
the price that the system is willing to pay (Walker et al., 2012). If no monopsony
power exists, HTA has value in informing the inputs of healthcare that should be
included in a plan of financial protection. Finally, a less acknowledged effect of
HTA is on innovation. The HTA process can identify need for innovation and
provide the incentives for the development of technologies aligned with the needs of
the population.
An indisputable element of the HTA process is the evaluation of effectiveness and
safety. The analysis of these elements has followed the principles of evidence based
medicine which are grounded on the epidemiological paradigm (Straus et al., 2011).
This approach responds to the judgement as to whether a particular estimate of
treatment effect can be considered a causal effect. As a consequence, the approach
adopts a rather conservative position with respect to uncertainty from the viewpoint
of a decision-maker. Conclusions such as more evidence is needed or the results are
insufficient to conclude in favour of one of the treatments are useless for policy
makers, who need to make a decision under conditions of uncertainty. Even when
the decision is to postpone the decision, social planners need to justify this in terms
of the opportunity costs that such delay might impose on society (Phillips, 2001,
Griffin et al., 2011). In this context, economic evaluation becomes a central part of
the HTA process. The fundamental and main methods for healthcare economic
evaluation are presented in the next section.
1.3. Economic evaluation in health technology assessment
Neoclassical theory in welfare economics indicates that where markets work well,
individuals will express their preferences making choices that lead to an optimal
2 A central agency not only should be able to conduct a high quality assessment of the evidence but
also should have access to more and more detailed information than single individuals (patients and
individual doctors).
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allocation of resources. In contrast, when markets fail, central authorities must
intervene regulating private choice (Boardman et al., 2006). Economic evaluation is
a tool used to support decision-makers in the allocation of resources on the basis of
an efficiency criterion. It has been defined as the “comparative analysis of
alternative courses of action in terms of both their costs and benefits” (Drummond et
al., 2005) (page 9) and their different approaches are used across different areas of
the economy.
The earliest version of economic evaluation is cost-benefit analysis (CBA). CBA is
founded on the grounds of neoclassical welfare economics, where social welfare is
understood as the sum of individual welfares measured as individual utilities3.
Further, CBA provides results consistent with the Pareto principle, i.e. social welfare
increases only if the utility of at least one individual increases, and no one else’s
falls. Given the restrictions of meeting the Pareto criterion in practice, the potential
Pareto criterion has been suggested as more feasible. This is based on the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion, which states that an intervention increases welfare, if those who gain
benefits can fully compensate those who lose and still increase their welfare
(Boardman et al., 2006). Classical descriptions of CBA emphasize the use of
monetized individual outcomes to undertake this analysis. It has been argued that
where markets do not exist, such as in healthcare, the estimation of the outcomes in
terms of both the maximum willingness to pay (WTP) in the case of winners and
willingness to accept (WTA) in the case of losers provide an appropriate valuation of
utilities (Donaldson, 1999, Klose, 1999). A positive net benefit in CBA analysis is
consistent with a potential Pareto criterion. Some of the criticisms of this approach
are that values are affected by ability to pay, it ignores the initial health endowment,
and the comparisons are restricted to uncompensated gains or losses (Brouwer et al.,
2008, Dolan and Olsen, 2002). Although defenders of CBA suggest that economic
evaluation of healthcare should not be different from other sectors (Pauly, 1995),
several authors have criticized the adoption of a welfarist approach, not only to
3 The utility derived from one good or state is a representation of satisfaction. In addition, neoclassical
welfare economics assumes individual sovereignty (i.e. individuals are the best judges to define a
ranking of preferences), welfarism (i.e. welfare derived from a good or state can only be judged on the
basis of utility) and that utility is derived exclusively from outcomes (consequentialism) (Hurley,
2000).
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healthcare evaluation4 (Claxton et al., 2007), but also as a general approach to the
evaluation of policy programs for welfare improvement (Sen, 1980).
Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) comes as an alternative to CBA for its use in
healthcare decision-making. While CBA pursues recommendations about choices to
improve social welfare, CEA is motivated by a less ambitious objective, the
maximization of health subject to budget constraint (Brouwer and Koopmanschap,
2000), where health is one part of the social welfare function. CEA responds to the
need of a legitimate health authority that is not able to make an explicit formulation
of a social welfare function but only make recommendations about alternative
allocations of an exogenous health budget focused on the main objective of the
healthcare system, i.e. health (Claxton et al., 2011b). CEA has been criticized
because it does not follow a well formulated and accepted theory as does
neoclassical welfare economics (Tsuchiya and Williams, 2001). In response, CEA
has been framed in an alternative view called extra-welfarism. This theory
transcends the welfarist view in that relevant outcomes to measure welfare can be
other than utilities. The classical extra-welfarist view in healthcare is that the only
relevant argument is health (Culyer, 1989). Thus, the economic analysis should be
understood as a tool to produce evidence that helps decision-makers to allocate
resources of a fixed health budget. In addition, outcomes can be valued by the
affected individuals but also by a legitimate authority, for example, through a
normative set of representative values of the population, where the population
provides legitimacy (Brouwer et al., 2008). Another more pragmatic view suggests
that any person considered with ethical authority, for example as a result of a
democratic legitimate process, can define the objective of any system (e.g. healthcare
system). The subsequent analysis should produce evidence to help this legitimate
authority, called the “decision-maker”, making decisions about allocation of a fixed
budget in response to that (those) objectives. This defines the decision-maker
approach (Sugden and Williams, 1978). Cost-effectiveness analysis has become a
standard method for economic evaluation of healthcare technologies (Drummond,
4 Most of the arguments in healthcare economic evaluation focus on the difficulties of valuing health
outcomes in monetary terms, for example, the robustness of hypothetical exercises in contingent
valuation methods or the fact that willingness to pay is affected by ability to pay (Gold et al., 1996,
Drummond et al., 2005), but also on the criticism of the fundaments of the welfarist approach, i.e.
individuals focused on individual interests and utilities, as a legitimate and independent part of the
social welfare function (Brouwer et al., 2008).
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2012). Many countries have adopted this approach to provide recommendations for
pricing and reimbursement of health technologies (ISPOR, 2012). More recently,
some jurisdictions have used economic analysis derived from standard CEA to make
decisions about the additional research needed to resolve current uncertainty
(Claxton and Sculpher, 2006). In general, any methodological development in this
field responds to the need of producing better information for decision-makers. The
next section presents the main elements of CEA emphasizing the areas where
economic analysis offer additional value to the HTA process.
1.4. Cost-effectiveness analysis: A cornerstone in the understanding
of value to the healthcare system
The comparative analysis in CEA is based on costs measured in monetary terms and
benefits measured in a unit of health. Although health can be described and
measured by some clinical specific parameters (e.g. weight, blood pressure), CEA
has adopted a broader conceptualization of health in order to provide information for
a comparative analysis among different activities developed within the health
system, which is consistent with an extra-welfarist view. In this context, a health
metric should incorporate one element of quantity (e.g. length of life) and quality
related to health (Torrance, 2006). In addition, it has been argued that health related
quality of life (HRQoL) is in part due to the objective consequences of the disease
(impairments, disabilities and handicaps) and in part to the social participation of
individuals. The fact that social participation depends on the preferences of
individuals has become an important reason to construct a health metric that
incorporates preferences (Brazier et al., 2007). One of the metrics that meet these
conditions is the Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY)5, which has become one of the
most used units of health in CEA.
Costs and benefits (QALYs) are usually estimated from individual patient data or
aggregated data or both using decision models (Sculpher et al., 2000). The modelling
5 QALYs are constructed on the basis of specific weights that reflect the relative value of a health
state compared to the best imaginable health state (full health). These values respond to the
preferences of individuals for alternative health states. Health states are descriptive states based on
health dimensions that can include impairment, disabilities and social participation. When health
states are described considering all those dimensions, for example based on the instruments EQ-5D or
SF-6D, QALYs can be considered an appropriate metric of health and can be consistently used in
CEA.
19
process includes some normative considerations, for example, perspective and
discounting, but also some technical issues such as the construction of a feasible
model or the methods to synthesize evidence and estimation of parameters (Briggs
and Sculpher, 1998). This stage of the process ends with the estimation of expected
(mean) costs and benefits for each alternative in the evaluation. Important
developments in this area have been achieved in the last twenty years, and it is still
an area where additional developments represent value for healthcare decision-
making (Briggs et al., 2006).
The cost-effectiveness of a particular healthcare intervention is assessed comparing
the incremental cost per unit of additional health (cost per QALY) and the
opportunity cost of the healthcare budget (1/λ), i.e. the health forgone elsewhere in 
the health system due to the new allocation of resources. This can be represented as a
decision rule where one treatment can be considered cost-effective compared to
another insofar as the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) is lower than the
cost-effectiveness threshold (λ)6.
where C1 and C0 are the costs and B1 and B0 are the benefits of the new (1) and old
(0) treatments respectively. An alternative decision rule can be presented as a linear
transformation of the previous expression (Stinnett and Mullahy, 1998). Thus, net
monetary benefits can be expressed as a function of the cost-effectiveness threshold
such that:
The same transformation can be done to express net benefits in health terms:
6 This decision rule assumes that all costs fall in the healthcare budget, therefore, the cost-
effectiveness threshold represents the opportunity cost of the alternative use of resources of the
healthcare system and it does not include private consumption of healthcare.
(1.1)(ܥଵ− ܥ଴)(ܤଵ− ܤ଴) < ߣ
(1.2)ߣ(ܤଵ− ܤ଴) − (ܥଵ− ܥ଴) > 0
(1.3)(ܤଵ− ܤ଴) − (ܥଵ− ܥ଴)ߣ > 0
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As mentioned earlier in this section, costs and benefits correspond to expected
values. The idea of adopting a decision rule based on expected values might be seen
as opposed to the classical decision rules in statistical inference, as adopted by
clinical epidemiology and evidence based medicine. However, it has been argued
that for decision-making under uncertainty, and especially for decisions affecting
social interests, a decision rule based on the expected utility theory is consistent with
the objective of a social planner (Arrow and Lind, 1970). In the context of CEA for
healthcare, in particular, Claxton (1999b) has argued that “the rules of classical
statistical inference and its Bayesian counterpart are arbitrary and inconsistent with
the objectives of any coherent healthcare system and impose unnecessary costs”
(page 347). In other words, decisions regarding the cost-effectiveness of new
healthcare technologies should be based on the mean net (health) benefits7.
According to Claxton, the fact that the adoption of a new technology is based on the
mean net benefit (and not its confidence interval) should not lead us to consider that
uncertainty is not relevant for the decision-making process (Claxton and Posnett,
1996, Claxton, 1999b). Indeed, uncertainty is relevant for a second and simultaneous
question, whether to conduct further research to solve the current uncertainty
represents a good use of limited resources. Moreover, decision-makers should
consider whether the expected benefits of immediate adoption of new technologies
(which is a disincentive of further research) is greater than the value that new
research might have provided for future patients (Griffin et al., 2008). This might
lead to postpone early adoption until the uncertainty is resolved. Likewise, even
when technologies are expected to be cost-effective, the presence of significant
unrecoverable costs8 might lead decision-makers to approve those interventions
conditional to further research, for example, “approval with research” or “only in
research” (Walker et al., 2012, Claxton et al., 2011a).
7 Expected Net (Health) Benefit corresponds to the integral of the density function of the net health
benefits. Consequently, it can be interpreted as a weighted average of the all possible consequences of
alternative decisions based on net health benefits and their probabilities of occurrence.
8 Irrecoverable costs refer to those costs which cannot be recovered at any time after the
implementation of the guidance. They include capital expenditure of equipment or healthcare
facilities, implementation of the guidance such as dissemination or training the staff in the utilization
of the new technology.
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The study of uncertainty in CEA has concentrated many efforts in the last ten years.
Uncertainty can be categorized into three types, namely, methodological, structural
and parameter or stochastic uncertainty (Briggs, 2001). Methodological uncertainty
refers to the alternative methods adopted by different analysts to conduct an
economic evaluation in healthcare. This source of uncertainty has been largely
addressed through the harmonization of methods and generation of methodological
guidelines (ISPOR, 2012). A second source is structural uncertainty, which
corresponds to the set of scientific judgments and simplifications that analysts must
make alongside the process whereby the cost-effectiveness results are estimated and
interpreted 9 (Bojke et al., 2009b). Finally, parameter uncertainty refers to the
impossibility of collecting an infinite sample, which implies that any parameter
estimation cannot be totally precise and, as a consequence, uncertain. A final, and
often less acknowledged type of uncertainty, is unrevealed heterogeneity (O'Brien
and Sculpher, 2000). Cost-effectiveness estimates are usually presented as average
estimates without regard to the differences between individuals in terms of their
costs and consequences. This lack of information responds to the intrinsic variability
that cannot be solved with additional samples.
As a consequence of the previous explanations, uncertainty in CEA can be
interpreted as an opportunity for additional value rather than a barrier for decision-
making. Important developments have been made in the last few years in this field.
For example, methods to estimate the value of information (VoI) have been applied
in healthcare to assess the value of further research conducted to resolve parameter
uncertainty10. Analysts can estimate the Expected Value of Perfect Information
(EVPI) from the distribution of net (health) benefits. This metric expresses the value
of collecting an infinite sample in order to obtain the true mean parameter (Ginnelly
et al., 2005). It also represents an upper boundary and, therefore, a necessary
condition for decisions about further research. In other words, the costs of any
research proposal should not exceed the EVPI. However, because one of the goals of
9 The sources of structural uncertainty have been categorized in four types: (a) selection of relevant
comparators, (b) selection of relevant events, (c) alternative statistical methods and (d) clinical
uncertainty that affect the structure of the decision model. For a detailed review of these elements and
alternative remedial actions see (Jackson et al., 2011) and (Bojke et al., 2009b).
10 This analysis requires the characterization of parameter uncertainty through a probabilistic
sensitivity analysis in order to estimate the probability density function of net (health) benefits. For
details see (O'Hagan et al., 2005) and (Fenwick et al., 2001).
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the health system is efficiency, health resources should be spent in an optimal
manner, something that it is also relevant for the part of the budget allocated to
research. Consequently, decision-makers should be interested in two elements. First,
which parameters explain most of the uncertainty so that specific research can be
prioritized and conducted to resolve the uncertainty around those specific
parameters, and second, the optimal sample size considering the additional value that
each sample unit adds to the decrease of decision uncertainty.
The Expected Value of Perfect Information for Parameters (EVPPI) can be estimated
for single parameters that have been considered in the decision model, for example,
HRQoL values or treatment effect (Griffin et al., 2010). As a result, they can be
ranked and compared in terms of the expected health if research is conducted. A
second stage of the research design process is the definition of a sufficient condition
to undertake further research, which is achieved when the optimal sample size for the
new study is defined, something that can be found at the point where the marginal
benefit equals the marginal cost of sampling. In order to do this, analysts can
estimate the Expected Value of Sampling Information (EVSIn) for a sample of size n,
i.e. the marginal benefits of an additional unit of observation measured by the
reduction in expected opportunity loss (Claxton and Posnett, 1996, Ades et al.,
2004). Then, the difference between EVSIn (when n takes alternative values of
sample size) and the cost of research proposal of size n, corresponds to the Expected
Net Benefit of Sampling (ENBSn). All these metrics are function of n. The optimal
sample size is found at the point of n where ENBSn is the maximum.
Although the value of conducting CEA for decision-making is mainly related to
decisions about reimbursement of new technologies, here its value is also presented
in informing future research. However, there are two other important aspects of
value that deserve attention. The first is the value of information about issues related
to implementation. Because the decision concerning reimbursement does not
guarantee perfect implementation, there is value in exploring whether investing in
implementation strategies it is worthwhile from the health system point of view
(Fenwick et al., 2008, Hoomans et al., 2009). A second issue, and more important for
this thesis, is the value of understanding the variability between individuals. Several
authors have raised the importance of considering heterogeneity in decision-making
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based on cost-effectiveness (Coyle et al., 2003, Sculpher, 2008a, Basu, 2009).
Although there is a vast body of literature in the field of comparative effectiveness
research, mostly motivated by subgroup analysis (Stallones, 1987, Yusuf et al., 1991,
Oxman and Guyatt, 1992, Feinstein, 1998, Parker and Naylor, 2000, Assmann et al.,
2000, Sleight, 2000, Brookes et al., 2001, Cui et al., 2002b, Pocock et al., 2002,
Rothwell, 2005, Lagakos, 2006, Wang et al., 2007, Sevdalis and Jacklin, 2008,
Gabler et al., 2009, Sun et al., 2010), only few contributions have been carried out in
the field of cost-effectiveness analysis (Nease and Owens, 1994, Sculpher, 1998,
Coyle et al., 2003, Basu and Meltzer, 2007, Basu, 2011, van Gestel et al., 2012). It is
not the aim of this chapter to present these contributions in detail but only to
highlight that methodological developments in this field are recent, offering an
opportunity to explore additional issues related to heterogeneity in cost-
effectiveness, which is the main motivation of this thesis. The reader of this doctoral
thesis will find in Chapter 2 a more exhaustive review of the methodological aspects
of heterogeneity in CEA, their strengths and limitations as well as the gaps that need
further research.
1.5. Objectives and structure of this thesis
The general objective of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of the value
of heterogeneity in cost-effectiveness analysis for healthcare decision-making. This
objective is addressed through four specific objectives that provide the structure of
this doctoral work. They include the examination of the current knowledge of the
standard approaches to explore and understand the value of understanding
heterogeneity for healthcare decision-making, the construction of a framework for
cost-effectiveness subgroup analysis and its application, and the examination of the
elements that determine the implementation of individualized decisions in a
collectively funded healthcare system. A final chapter provides a summary of the
contribution made by this thesis, their strengths and limitations as well as their
relevance for a systematic consideration of heterogeneity in different types of
healthcare systems. This thesis adopts an extra-welfarist conceptualization of the
economic analysis for healthcare, which is consistent throughout the subsequent
chapters.
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1.5.1. Objective 1. Current knowledge of the value of heterogeneity for
healthcare decision-making
The first objective is to review, describe and discuss the standard approaches to
assessing heterogeneity for healthcare and clinical decision-making as well as the
methods developed to realize its value. As a result, it is expected to identify areas
requiring further development that can be addressed in this thesis.
This objective is addressed in Chapter 2, which presents the motivation for studying
heterogeneity for decision-making in healthcare. The main concepts of variability
and heterogeneity are defined, as well as the types of heterogeneity that can be
assessed in healthcare decision problems. This aims to clarify some confusion
generated by the wide use of these terms in the general literature of healthcare.
Methods to express the value of exploring and characterizing heterogeneity are
reviewed subsequently, introducing individual preferences and choices as central
characteristics of the analysis. These concepts connect the study of heterogeneity
with the agenda of individualization in healthcare, something that was identified at
this point of the work. This chapter was based on an extensive review of the
literature, allowing the author to identify the gaps in the current knowledge. A
subsequent judgement about the feasibility of addressing these gaps was the starting
point of the original pieces of work of this thesis. The remaining chapters are a
consequence of this process.
1.5.2. Objective 2. Constructing a framework for cost-effectiveness subgroup
analysis
The second objective of this thesis is to examine the fundamental elements that give
support to cost-effectiveness subgroup analysis in order to construct an analytical
framework for a systematic approach.
One of the main approaches to assess heterogeneity in healthcare evaluations is the
examination of subsets of the studied population. In Chapter 3 the arguments are
examined based on which cost-effectiveness subgroup analysis for healthcare
decision-making can be considered the most appropriate approach. This analysis
provides the elements to construct an analytical framework to explore, characterize,
present and interpret results of these analyses. Thus, the methods presented in this
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chapter expect to contribute to the decisions that central or local authorities have to
make in terms of adoption and reimbursement of new technologies.
One of the most relevant elements of this chapter is the formal conceptualization of
the value of heterogeneity as the sum of two parts, the value of making different
decisions for different subgroups based on current information (called the static
value of heterogeneity) and the value of resolving uncertainty collecting further
information conditional to some level of heterogeneity (dynamic value of
heterogeneity).
1.5.3. Objective 3. Application of a novel analytical approach to cost-
effectiveness subgroup analysis
The third objective is to apply the analytical approach developed in Chapter 3 in
order to explore the strengths and weaknesses of the technique, as well as
contextualizing it with previous contributions in this field.
This objective is addressed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. The implementation of the
conceptual basis developed in Chapter 3 demands the development of specific
technical issues such as the prediction of individualized cost-effectiveness analysis
and the characterization of the uncertainty under such estimations. Further, new
concepts coined and formalized in this thesis (Chapter 3) are empirically illustrated
and discussed contrasting with previous contributions.
1.5.4. Objective 4. Examination of the conflict between individual decisions
and social values
The fourth objective of this thesis is to examine the elements that lead to the
definition of a particular approach to the implementation of individualized care in a
collectively funded healthcare system.
It follows from the arguments developed in Chapter 3 that decisions at individual
level are consistent with a goal of efficiency, insofar as costs and benefits are taken
into account. However, the only feasible way of implementing this in a collectively
funded healthcare system is to allow patients and doctors to make choices without
restriction. Social planners can take different perspectives on the problem of
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individualization of care, bringing to bear social values that can ultimately serve as
justification of different approaches to the decision-making process. Chapter 5
presents an analysis of these elements, distinguishing which of them corresponds to a
pure normative judgement from those which need some consideration of value in
terms of the consequences for the healthcare system (positive statement). This
analysis provides the basis of a framework whereby the value of choice can be
examined through a quantitative exercise based on a real case study.
More specifically this chapter examines, from a social planner point of view (i.e.
central or local health authority), the effects of leaving doctors and patients making
choices versus a centralized selection of treatments, under alternative normative
judgements about health state values. Thus, the chapter contributes to the
understanding of the conflict between society and the individual, the social value of





Understanding heterogeneity for healthcare decision-
making about health interventions
2.1. Introduction
The constant development of new health technologies (e.g. drugs or medical devices)
responds to several factors: greater life expectancy of the population, leading to new
healthcare needs; changes in environmental conditions creating new epidemiological
profiles; and scientific development11. This scenario has a huge impact on health
systems, which are forced to increase their expenditure on healthcare to respond to
the increasing demand for the new technologies. This situation is a problem even in
the most liberal health system, where ultimately the individual citizen has to sacrifice
his/her own consumption to allocate his/her individual budget to healthcare. Most
countries, however, have a financial protection system through private or public
insurance to protect patients from the financial burden of poor health, or at least part
of it. Regardless of the health system structure, the problem of dealing with
increasing expenditure on healthcare is unavoidable and forces planners to adopt a
clear approach to allocating limited resources. Thus, the main objective of most
European healthcare systems and certainly the National Health Service (NHS) in the
UK, is to maximise some comprehensive measure of health outcome subject to the
budget constraints of the healthcare system. This view is consistent with the extra-
welfarist framework as explained in Chapter 1.
The allocation of resources requires, at the very least, information about which
interventions work and the value of such technologies measured in terms of the
health displaced elsewhere in the healthcare system. As introduced in Chapter 1,
11 The scientific development refers to the ability of understanding the process of health and disease
as well as the capacity to produce health technologies able to improve health of the population.
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HTA has emerged as a multidisciplinary field of systematic analysis of evidence in
order to provide decision-makers with necessary inputs for their decisions (Eddy,
2009). Most jurisdictions consider evidence about effectiveness and safety an
essential component of the decision. In other countries, such as the UK, cost-
effectiveness is also given formal consideration because it assesses the value of the
additional gains for the health system. Both, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness, are
usually considered as average estimates of the target population. This approach has
been largely justified by the fact that is impossible to observe the effect of alternative
treatments in the same individual at the same time (Goodman, 1947), which is also
referred to as the “fundamental problem of causal inference” (Holland, 1986).
Instead, average treatment effects are unbiased estimates when two (or more) groups
being compared are, on average, totally similar, so that the differences in the
outcomes are only explained by the treatment. Typically, this is achieved through
randomization of individuals to alternative courses of action such as diagnostic tools,
treatments or both.
Although the arguments given for using average estimates in healthcare research
have been widely accepted, they are essentially pragmatic and should not be
considered a gold standard from a theoretical point of view. Rather, they are the best
approach available hitherto, and should motivate further methodological
development on the estimation of individual treatment effects. This has been
recognized as an important concern for both comparative effectiveness research
(CER) and CEA (Basu, 2009). While decisions based on the average might adopt
one particular intervention for the whole population, decisions that consider
heterogeneity in the population (for example at subgroup level) can deny the
intervention in some patients where it is not (cost-)effective. As a result, resources
can be re-allocated to other more (cost-)effective alternatives, leading to an
improvement in the overall population health. At the limit, when decisions are made
at individual level, the gains are the maximum possible, as long as the decision rule
applied at that level is founded on the same principles of rationality that provide
grounds for decisions at a more aggregated level.
The interest in heterogeneity for decision-making has been described in different
ways. From a biomedical perspective, reflecting heterogeneity in decisions has been
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promoted as achieving personalized medicine (PM), which aims to provide “the right
treatment to the right patient at the right dose at the right time” (Hamburg and
Collins, 2010). The idea of reaching PM requires the identification of measurable
parameters (e.g. molecular biomarkers) that allow doctors to prescribe treatments
according to specific individual characteristics. This idea has led to an increasing
development of diagnostic tools based on molecular biology methods, including
pharmaco-genetics (Evans and Relling, 2004, Conti et al., 2010). In nursing, on the
other hand, this has been promoted as the implementation of a person-centred care
model or individualized care model, where decisions take into account as much
individual information as possible, including PM but also patient choices (Suhonen
et al., 2002, Charalambous et al., 2010).
The idea that patient choices should play a central role in decision-making has been
at the centre of political debate for a long time, in particular in countries with liberal
health systems such as the USA. However, this is also part of the current policy
agenda in countries such as the UK, where the right to choose healthcare at the
individual level has been given formal consideration. In principle, this included the
right to choose among healthcare providers (Department of Health, 2009). More
recently, the British health authority has announced the introduction of choice for
diagnostic testing and treatments (Department of Health, 2010).
The aim of this chapter is to review the key elements of the discussion about how
heterogeneity should be examined, exploited and analysed for the purposes of
decision-making about healthcare interventions. In terms of the methods for
economic analysis, this review focuses on the role of heterogeneity as a source of
value to achieve greater health, which is consistent with an extra-welfarist
perspective. The chapter is structured in four sections. The first section seeks to
review the standard approaches to assess heterogeneity. Second, there is an
exploration of the methods developed to represent the value of considering
heterogeneity in healthcare decision-making. Third, the role of patient choices and
patient preferences is examined as a source of heterogeneity. The final section
identifies some research needs and priorities.
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The literature review was conducted in November 2010. Relevant methodological
published papers were searched in Pubmed, Embase, Econlit, NHS Economic
Evaluation Database. The following terms from the Pubmed MeSH database were
considered for this search: “heterogeneity”, “cost effectiveness”, “cost benefit”,
“comparative effectiveness research”, “individualized medicine” and “decision-
making” (adapted to MeSH terms of each database). In addition, the following string
terms were also considered “potential outcomes”, “subgroup analysis” and
“methods”. There was no pre-defined limit of year or language. A total of 442 papers
were potentially relevant according to several combinations of those terms. From
these, only 42 papers were considered relevant for this review, because they
corresponded to original methodological contributions. A further hand search
through the reference list of those papers was conducted, which included official
governmental documents (n=7). This literature was considered for a narrative
review. An update of this literature search was conducted in April 2012. Seven
further methodological papers were found and included in the chapter.
2.2. Standard approaches to assess heterogeneity in evaluation of
healthcare technologies
The term variability has been used to express the differences in outcomes between
individuals, which can be explained by observed and unobserved characteristics.
Heterogeneity has been defined as the proportion of the variability that can be
explained by a set of observed (known) characteristics at the time of analysis (Briggs
et al. 2006).In this chapter, total variability is understood as equivalent to total
heterogeneity, which includes observed and unobserved heterogeneity. In the
unobserved heterogeneity, there is a proportion of variability that can be revealed
through further research, which corresponds to those knowable characteristics that,
once revealed, will explain the remaining observable heterogeneity. In this group we
find the known unknown and the unknown knowable unknown characteristics. The
first corresponds to the set of known covariates for which further research will
provide specific individual information. The second refers to the unknown covariates
able to further explain any residual observable heterogeneity and that can be
identified only through additional exploratory research. Finally, the proportion of the
variability that cannot be explained (the unknowable characteristics) corresponds to
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random error12. The unobserved part of the variability (unobserved heterogeneity)
has also been called stochastic uncertainty or first-order uncertainty (Briggs et al.
2012). Complete information refers to the knowledge of the set of covariates that are
able to explain differences of outcomes between all individuals in the population
(total variability or total heterogeneity)13. From a decision-maker point of view, the
main challenge is to take into account as much information about individual level
characteristics as possible. The aim for health researchers is therefore to achieve a
proper characterization of the total heterogeneity, i.e. not only to convert the
knowable characteristics into observed measurable variables but also making some
prediction of the expected individual outcomes considering unobservable
heterogeneity.
The literature in different areas provides alternative nomenclatures to refer to the
study of heterogeneity. For example, in the context of the evaluation problem in
econometrics, unobserved heterogeneity has been termed non-essential heterogeneity
when the selection of treatment does not depend on these unobserved characteristics.
Instead, when treatment selection depends on the unobserved expected gains, this is
called essential heterogeneity (Heckman et al., 2006). Epidemiology and biostatistics
emphasize the importance of distinguishing between moderators, mediators or non-
specific predictors of treatment outcomes (Kraemer et al., 2002). Variables
considered moderators inform for whom and under which conditions the treatment
works. Mediators, in contrast, inform about potential mechanisms that explain the
causal effect. Non-specific predictors are variables that show an effect on the
outcome without interacting with the treatment (Baron and Kenny, 1986, Kraemer et
al., 2001). This distinction is relevant in understanding the underlying causal model
of the health problem. More generally, terms such as observable or measurable
heterogeneity are broadly used across the sciences. Figure 2.1 synthesises these
12 These terminology, which in their former presentation included the “known-known”,” known-
unknown” and “unknown-unknown”, was coined by Donald Rumsfeld in (2002) and lately supported
by journalists, economists and philosophers. An additional category, the unknown-known, has been
suggested by Zizek (2006) to refer the things that we know but we refuse to acknowledge.
13 Complete information should be distinguished from perfect information. Complete information is
reached when all the covariates needed to explain differences between individuals are revealed.
Perfect information instead refers to the knowledge of the true mean effect of such covariate (and its
correlation with others) on the health outcome. Likewise, perfect information also refers to the
knowledge of the true value of a particular covariate in one individual (e.g. presence of a genetic
characteristic with 100% accuracy).
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terms, making a parallel correspondence between them. For example, observable
heterogeneity includes, on one side, mediators, moderators and non-specific
predictors. On the other hand, it includes known and knowable heterogeneity.
Unobserved heterogeneity, also called first order uncertainty or stochastic
uncertainty, includes part of the observable heterogeneity (the part that has not been
revealed yet) and the unobservable (or unknowable) heterogeneity. Essential and
non-essential heterogeneity, as explained above, corresponds to the proportion of
heterogeneity that has not been observed.
Table 2.1.Terminology in the study of heterogeneity. Relationship between different terms and the field
where it is used.
Exploration of heterogeneity has classically been driven by subgroup analysis.
Usually, the dimensions explored correspond to baseline risk and treatment effect
heterogeneity. Baseline risk refers to the set of characteristics that determine a
particular a priori probability of presenting the health outcome. It is important to
emphasize that this probability might or might not influence the treatment effect.
However, even in the case where the treatment effect is the same across individuals,
the absolute value of the health outcome varies across patients with different baseline
risk profiles. Treatment effect heterogeneity, on the other hand, corresponds to the
variation of the treatment effect among different patients. In statistical terms, it
corresponds to the interaction between the treatment and the covariate that defines
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the membership of an individual in one particular category14. Two elements can be
identified affecting this type of effect: responsiveness and vulnerability (Kravitz et
al., 2004). Responsiveness refers to a set of unobserved genetic, physiological or
psychological factors that can ultimately explain differences in this effect between
patients15. On the other hand, vulnerability corresponds to the patient’s tolerance and
subsequent adherence to a particular treatment. It is important to stress that both
baseline risk and treatment effect heterogeneity are defined on the basis of one or
more observable characteristics at baseline, assessed on the basis of health
outcome(s)16. Other sources of heterogeneity include costs and preferences.
Heterogeneity in costs can be observed as differences either in unit costs or use of
resources. For example, in-hospital diabetic patients with a myocardial infarction
require periodic control of glycemia and eventual use of insulin, leading to a
systematic additional use of resources in this subgroup. On the other hand, in
healthcare systems with a decentralized process of expenditure, where different
healthcare trusts or clinics make different price arrangements with their providers,
unit costs might also vary. Heterogeneity in preferences will be discussed in detail
later.
Variation between contexts has also been a matter for attention in the evaluation of
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. Geographical differences have been explored
mostly in the context of countries, though they could also be important in terms of
different jurisdictions within a country with specific characteristics that affect, for
example, the incidence or prevalence of a particular condition. These differences can
be explained by several elements of the health system, clinicians, patients or wider
socio-economic factors (Sculpher et al., 2004) . For example, costs are very likely to
vary across jurisdictions as well as the specific opportunity cost for that healthcare
system (reflected as different cost-effectiveness thresholds). It has also been reported
14 Treatment effect heterogeneity can be categorized as quantitative interaction (differences between
subgroups are in the same direction but they vary in terms of their magnitude), effect concentration
(treatment effect is only seen in one subgroup) and qualitative interaction (treatment effect varies not
only in magnitude but also in direction between subgroups) (Gail and Simon, 1985, Brookes et al.,
2004)
15 For example, in most cases the treatment effect of drugs is related to the plasmatic levels and the
metabolism rate of the drug by the liver. Some genetic characteristics determine that this metabolism
rate is faster in some subset of patients with the subsequent lower plasmatic levels and smaller effect
(Meyer, 1994).
16 This statement is founded on the conceptual grounds of the Rubin’s model for causal inference
(Holland, 1986)
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that teaching and specialized hospitals incur higher expenditure than general
hospitals, differences that can be observed within the same jurisdiction (Iezzoni et
al., 1990, Mechanic et al., 1998). Further, more trained health professionals might be
associated with better results and fewer costs, as a result of more efficient care (e.g.
quicker diagnostics, lower complication rates in surgical procedures). This variation
has been demonstrated by empirical work using specific statistical techniques which
have been proposed to improve estimation of effectiveness and cost-effectiveness in
particular locations (e.g. multilevel modelling and shrinkage estimation) (Manca et
al., 2005).
Despite the growing interest in considering heterogeneity in decision-making in
healthcare, researchers face some constraints that hinder its examination. One of
these is the adherence to classical standards of statistical inference that mainly affect
the study of heterogeneity in baseline risk and treatment effect. Because most
clinical trials are designed to find significant average treatment effects and their
sample size is calculated consistently with that goal, any attempt to make inference
on subsets of the sample faces the problem of loss of power (increase of error type 2)
due to a decrease in sample size (Grouin et al., 2005)17. Further, when additional
testing is performed on the same data, there is a higher probability of finding
differences between groups explained by chance (false positives or increase of error
type 1) (Brookes et al., 2004, Lord et al., 2004, Rothwell, 2005, Ioannidis, 2005)18,19.
A third problem relates to the requirement of an interaction test to prove treatment
effect heterogeneity in clinical studies (Wang et al., 2007, Oxman and Guyatt, 1992).
If treatment effect is proved to be significant, authors usually report both baseline
and treatment effect heterogeneity. If treatment effect is not significant, information
about (significant) baseline risk heterogeneity might be omitted. Although from a
clinical point of view, treatment effect heterogeneity might be considered the only
17 This concern is a statistical fact; however, there is also evidence in the opposite direction. It has
been demonstrated that using pre-specified (baseline) covariates in a regression framework increases
the statistical power (Hernandez et al., 2006, Hernandez et al., 2004, Hauck et al., 1998, Steyerberg,
2009). This increase can be explained by the magnitude of the prognostic effect of the covariate on
the outcome(Lingsma et al., 2010).
18 This has led experts to recommend adjustments for multiple comparisons, a procedure that
ultimately increases the p-value cut-off point to reject the null hypothesis(Aickin and Gensler, 1996,
Bender and Lange, 2001, Bland and Altman, 1995)
19 The need of conducting multiple testing adjustments has also received critics. For a broader
discussion of these arguments see (Rothman, 1990).
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relevant attribute to report heterogeneity, variations in baseline risk are an important
source of heterogeneity from a decision-maker’s point of view. In addition, although
these tests respond to a genuine interest in achieving good estimates of treatment
effect differences between subgroups, they have been demonstrated to have low
power and a high rate of false negatives (Brookes et al., 2004). Finally, loss of
balance between arms of a trial has also been raised as a concern in comparing
subgroups20.
All these concerns are relevant for clinical studies and they do not necessarily apply
in a similar way to cost-effectiveness analysis. Decision rules in CEA are grounded
on the principles of expected utility theory, which not only considers the probability
of a wrong decision (equivalent to a p-value or a confidence interval) but also its
consequences (Claxton, 1999b). However, even in the case of decisions based on
cost-effectiveness, there are some constraints on the study of heterogeneity. For
example, characteristics used to explain differences between individuals should not
transgress ethical or equity relevant principles for particular societies. Thus,
guidelines of the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the
UK, for instance, states that subgroup analysis based purely on differences in
treatment costs is not relevant (NICE, 2008). Furthermore, transaction costs involved
in the operationalization of decisions at an individual level or in different subgroups
are not usually considered and might hinder the implementation of these types of
decisions21. Although heterogeneity in CEA has been indicated as one of the
elements that require more discussion and methodological development (Sculpher,
2008b), there are no clear guidelines to systematically address, analyze and
understand these different dimensions of heterogeneity.
20 Stratified randomization has been suggested as a tool to keep balance on pre-specified subgroups
(Torgerson and Torgerson, 2008).
21 The relevance of transaction costs is further developed in the next chapter
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2.3. Value of Heterogeneity
As previously mentioned in the introduction, heterogeneity has value for the
healthcare system simply because greater population health can be achieved by
conditioning treatment decisions on those factors responsible for such between-
patient heterogeneity. Subgroup analysis has been the most common approach to
explore heterogeneity in HTA (Brookes et al., 2001). Coyle et al. (2003) have
represented the value of considering subgroups in terms of Incremental Net Benefits
(INBs) that can be gained from a stratified analysis for the simplest case where two
strategies are compared. The authors explain that if policy makers restrict the
adoption of technologies to those subgroups with positive INBs, then the gains
derived from making different decisions for different subgroups is the difference
between the total INBs (including positive and negative INBs) and the sum of the
positive INBs. In other words, it is the absolute value of the sum of the INBs in those
subgroups where the INB is negative. The approach suggested by Coyle et al. (2003)
is restricted to express gains based on current information for a case where two
strategies are compared22.
Nease and Owens (1994) introduced the idea of estimating individualized expected
health benefits to realise the value of a guideline that considers individual
preferences. Using a Markov decision model for mild hypertension, they showed that
decisions guided on the basis of individualized utility assessment should be
considered cost-effective compared to average utility estimates. Later, other studies
have applied similar methods (Sculpher, 1998, Dowie, 1998). Basu and Meltzer
(2007) move forward from this point proposing an estimation of the value of
eliciting information at patient-level to make individualized decisions using the Net
Benefits (NBs) framework (Stinnett and Mullahy, 1998). They introduced the
Expected Value of Individualized Care (EVIC), a metric that reflects the population
NBs forgone because of the ignorance of heterogeneity in preferences23 when
decisions are made based on the average estimates. EVIC is calculated as the
difference between the average of the maximum NBs in each patient (individual Net
22 This is an important starting point of the conceptual framework for cost-effectiveness subgroup
analysis developed in Chapter 3 and will be analyzed in detail.
23 Heterogeneity in preferences refers to the variability among health state values and will be
explained in detail in the next section.
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Benefits or iNBs) and the maximum of the average NBs of the alternative treatments
across patients. The authors point out that although EVIC was initially estimated for
patient preferences, it might be estimated for any other (set of) parameter(s) of
interest in the decision model. Indeed, a total EVIC captures all parameters of
interest and should be interpreted as the expected gains that could be attained if
individual information about every patient is considered when estimating the
outcome of interest.
Basu and Meltzer (2007) distinguish two formalizations of EVIC depending on
which decision rule is applied. When the objective is to maximize individual
expected net benefits, EVIC is called “with cost-internalization”. On the other hand,
if the objective is to maximize expected health benefits but without accounting for
costs, EVIC is denominated “without cost-internalization”. In the example provided
by the authors, it is demonstrated how the value of individualized information can be
affected by the decision rule applied. While the EVIC with cost-internalization is
greater than US$70 million, this value falls to US$0.9 million without cost-
internalization, suggesting that the effort of eliciting individualized information is
much more valuable if doctors (and patients) internalize costs when make their
decisions.
Basu and Meltzer (2007) also presented the parameter-specific EVIC (EVICθi),
analogous to the expected value of perfect information for parameters (EVPPI). An
advantage of this metric is that by ranking parameters according to EVICθi, the most
valuable information for individualized decisions can be identified. In a more recent
study, van Gestel et al. (2012) tested the feasibility and role of EVIC for decision-
making in a cost-effectiveness study of glaucoma using discrete event simulation.
They illustrated the interpretation of total EVIC as well as parameter-specific EVIC
(with cost-internalization) on supporting partial decisions for subgroups (van Gestel
et al., 2012).
These recent methodological approaches described above allow researchers to
provide an adequate representation of the potential health that can be gained if
heterogeneity is taken into account in healthcare decision-making. For example,
Basu and Meltzer (2007) estimated the value of eliciting preferences directly from
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patients (using time trade-off). In this particular case, the true value of the patient-
health status is available and no remaining uncertainty needs to be resolved, at least
for preferences. Likewise, in the example provided by van Gestel et al. (2012), total
EVIC represent the value of patient specific decisions according to individual
characteristics, assuming perfect information. An important issue that needs to be
addressed is the role of decision uncertainty when heterogeneity is taken into
account. It has been demonstrated that decision-makers not only face the question
about adoption and rejection of interventions but also whether resolving the
remaining uncertainty should be considered a good use of resources (Griffin et al.,
2011). Therefore, these two dimensions should be analysed in a more integrated
framework.
2.4. Preferences and choice as a source of heterogeneity
Preferences and choices are concepts with important implications for the study of
heterogeneity across individuals and will be examined in this section. Although in
principle they seem similar concepts, they encompass and express different
meanings in the context of healthcare decision-making. In this section, the main
concepts are defined in order to examine their implications further.
2.4.1. Preferences as a source of heterogeneity
Preferences arise from the conceptual grounds of economic analysis in healthcare. In
particular, for CEA, where the primary objective is to maximise health subject to
budget constraint, utility theory has been employed to measure the value of health
outcomes (for example in the QALY model) generated by alternative programs
(Torrance, 2006). Further, the tools used to measure the value of health outcomes
(e.g. standard gamble) are entirely based on expected utility theory under a set of
some restrictive assumptions (Pliskin et al., 1980)24. These methods estimate a
relative value for descriptive health states, which are a representation of a particular
level of Health Related Quality of Life (HRQoL)25. Under this framework,
preferences refer to the rational element of judgment that guides individuals to rank
24 These assumptions include utility independence, constant proportional trade-offs and risk neutrality
(Pliskin et al., 1980).
25 Health states are defined as a description resulting from combining dimensions of HRQoL.
Therefore, by construction each health state has attached a unique absolute level of quality.
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health states in a particular order to reveal the relative value of such states. These
elicited values, used as weights of the observed quantity of life (e.g. years of
survival), express the ultimate maximand of the CEA objective function, which can
be denominated the ultimate health effect.
Preferences are usually elicited from a sample of the population. The sample can be
representative of the general community (public preferences) or particular groups of
patients (patient or private preferences)26. Regardless of the source, these values are
usually aggregated and presented as averages in a normative “tariff” to be
subsequently used in economic evaluations (Kind, 2005). In practice, most of the
time these values are taken as perfect information without even considering the
uncertainty around them (Gray et al., 2012). Likewise, although the original surveys
have shown the variability around those mean values (Zarate et al., 2011, Dolan et
al., 1996, Zarate et al., 2008), heterogeneity is usually not considered in CEA.
Given the close link between health states and health state values, an important
distinction must be made between heterogeneity in HRQoL and heterogeneity in
preferences. HRQoL corresponds to the outcome upon which heterogeneity of
different sources are expressed. They include baseline risk, treatment effects, costs or
preferences27. Therefore, heterogeneity is observed in the distribution of HRQoL but
is explained by, for example, preferences. Thus, the real interest is to examine
heterogeneity of different sources, such as heterogeneity in preferences, on the
relevant health outcome, for example, HRQoL or QALY.
Few studies have addressed the idea of considering heterogeneity in preferences.
Nease and Owens (1994) provided one of the earliest examples of how preferences
from patients, i.e. private preferences (revealed by time trade-off), can be
incorporated in formal CEA in order to take into account their heterogeneity. They
showed that decisions based on individualized utility assessment can be considered
cost-effective. Later, Sculpher (1998) compared different preference-based
approaches to treatment allocation (expected individual health, expected individual
26 Public and private preferences are elements of intense debate and will be addressed more in detail
in chapter 5.
27 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, other variables no directly related to the health problem might
also explain heterogeneity.
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cost-effectiveness and treatment selection28) to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of
making decisions considering specific patient-preferences. It was concluded that a
decision rule based on individual net QALYs provided greater population health. In
addition, it revealed that decisions based on expected individual QALYs and net
QALYs are not well correlated with treatment selection. However, in theory, they
should be correlated if patients are rational and have the same information from
which QALYs have been estimated. This suggests that there is some information
contained in the process of making choices that is not being considered in the whole
process of evaluation or, alternatively, patients are not making decisions according to
the expected utility theory and QALY maximization.
In the context of public preferences, Sculpher and Gafni (2001) suggested that there
are subgroups of people in the population whose preferences are sufficiently
different from others and that the incorporation of these differences in cost-
effectiveness studies is consistent with the main objective of CEA. However, the
implementation of a systematic evaluation of subgroup public preferences seems less
feasible than patient preferences and even less likely to be good predictors of
treatment selection.
2.4.2. Choice as a source of heterogeneity
An optimal (treatment) choice is a decision that allows the individual (e.g. the
decision-maker or the patient) to maximise his/her welfare, utility or health
depending on the elements in his/her objective function. In the context of healthcare
we distinguish ex-ante choices or treatment preferences as the decisions made by
patients before being subjected to critical scrutiny whereby other relevant
information and point of views are taken into account. On the other hand, treatment
selection or revealed choices is the individual decision resulting from the interaction
of the patient with health professionals, relatives and other sources of information
28 Treatment selection refers to individual choice for treatment (defined in the next section).
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that are relevant for the decision. This can be operationalized in the context of a
shared decision-making model of care29 (Charles et al., 1997).
One of the central elements of the current policy agenda is the idea that patients'
preferences and choices should be taken into consideration in the decision-making
process. The autonomy of individuals is argued as an ethical imperative that justifies
any effort in this direction. NICE in the UK recognizes this argument as part of its
social value statement but it also highlights the importance of making adequate
judgments to ensure good use of the limited resources (NICE, 2005). Consideration
of patient preferences in HTA is consistent with both concerns. However, less clear
is the extent to which treatment choices can be consistent with the health
maximization objective. In other words, do patient choices provide some unobserved
information about the expected potential gains due to a particular treatment?
In the clinical trials literature it has been reported that when patients are allocated to
their preferred treatments, their outcomes are affected positively without effect on
attrition rates (Preference Collaborative Review Group, 2008). This might indicate
that the treatment works better in patients who prefer it, irrespective of the causes
that explain loss in the follow-up30. If ex-ante choices can be used to predict
outcomes, then they could be used to help select treatment as a form of subgroup
analysis. However, findings indicating that ex-ante choice are not good predictors
have also been reported (Moffett et al., 1999). While the role of ex-ante choices as
predictors is not clear, this might not be the case for ex-post choices. Given the
process needed to reveal those choices, they are likely to be more informative of the
health outcomes than ex-ante choices.
Because individuals do not necessarily behave according to the rules of rational
choice theory to make their decisions, revealed choices are not necessarily the same
as those predicted by a decision rule such as the maximization of expected QALYs
according to expected utility theory. This suggests that patients bring additional
29 Shared decision-making is a process whereby patients and health professionals share information
about alternative diagnostic and treatment options as well as outcomes preferences with the aim of
making the best choice among the alternative courses of action.
30 This argument has led to the suggestion that open and adaptive trials should be more often
considered to characterize this effect on treatment effect, especially in the context of the estimation of
individual treatment effects (see below) (Basu, 2011).
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elements of value to their decisions. There is evidence in the econometrics field
(Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007) with some applications to healthcare indicating that
treatment selection has value as predictor of health outcomes (Basu et al., 2007). In
fact, choice for treatment might correlate very strongly with many other covariates
that explain variability in health outcomes. Thus, by using adequate statistical
techniques, the individual treatment effects could be estimated and characterized,
producing a better understanding of the joint distribution of potential health
outcomes31 (Basu, 2011).
The current debate in the UK has raised the desire to implement a healthcare system
where people are given greater opportunity to choose the healthcare they receive
without restrictions (Department of Health, 2010) in the context of a shared decision-
making model (Gulland, 2011). In contrast, the actual approach determines that some
patients sharing one particular condition or disease (will) face limited access to some
very expensive technologies because of the resource constraints of the health budget.
This political discourse responds – at least in part - to some empirical evidence that
shows that more than 95% of British citizens think that there should be opportunity
to choose between alternative treatments (British Social Attitudes Survey, 2009).
Therefore, choice is valued in the current agenda for its own sake, which can be
ethically justified on the principle of autonomy. However, choices are not only
relevant because of a patient’s autonomy, which is one element, but also because
they (revealed choices) might provide information about individual treatment effects.
As already mentioned, the selection of treatment might be informed partially by
information publicly available but also by some information that cannot be observed
by the social planner. If this unobserved information reveals some expected
(individual) gains, treatment selection can be used to estimate individualized
treatment effects. Consequently, a research agenda for understanding heterogeneity
should also include new approaches to reveal individual choices and their role in
explaining variability in health outcomes. This should address alternative study
designs, as well as more sophisticated analytical techniques.
31 The joint distribution of potential outcomes refers to the Rubin’s causality model. The potential
outcomes are defined as the observed consequences (Y) of alternative treatments (t=0,1) in one
particular individual (i) , i.e. the outcome observed de facto and the counterfactual (unobservable).
Thus, the joint distribution is defined by G(Yoi,Y1i) (Holland, 1986).
43
Therefore, the problem of considering individual choices of treatment in healthcare
decision-making can be addressed using two approaches. First, taking the
perspective of a centralized decision-maker, heterogeneity in preferences (health
states values) can be reflected more systematically in HTA. Whether public or
patient preferences should be used is a question that ought to be revisited in this
context. Second, if patient choices are allowed, they should correspond to revealed
choices because of their potential ability to generate greater health outcomes. In
addition, further research should try to shed light on the extent to which these ex-
post choices explain heterogeneity and whether they are consistent with efficiency
goals of the healthcare system.
2.5. Discussion
The relevance of heterogeneity in decision-making has grown in the last few years.
Despite the significant progress in many areas of health research, most of the
evidence used for decision-making only provides average estimates, and the
underlying variability is not acknowledged under a strong assumption of
homogeneity (e.g. treatment effect homogeneity). However, the need for revealing
more about heterogeneity is increasing not only because of theoretical arguments but
also because of political motivation towards individualized decision-making. In this
chapter, the main concepts and different approaches for the analysis of heterogeneity
have been reviewed. They have been examined in the context of different sources of
heterogeneity, as well as the relevance of realizing its value. In this section, the key
elements presented in this chapter are summarized in order to discuss the gaps that
should be considered in a research agenda for health research.
Healthcare systems face the problem of making decision about new health
interventions, which are usually more expensive, within a limited budget. HTA tools,
including CEA, provide a set of coherent methods to support decisions in this
context. Further, growing concern about considering heterogeneity in decision-
making is consistent with efficiency goals of a collectively funded health system and
several methods have been developed to realize its value. Different sources of
heterogeneity, such as baseline risk heterogeneity, treatment effect heterogeneity,
contextual factors, health preferences and patient choices have been defined and
explained throughout this chapter. In addition, the usual constraints faced by
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researchers when they attempt to explore heterogeneity have been examined.In terms
of the definition of heterogeneity, this chapter has contributed to the improvement of
the understanding of its meaning. A comprehensive description of alternative terms
to refer to heterogeneity has been developed. From this, there are two elements that
worth to be highlighted. First, total heterogeneity can be considered the same as total
variability. This is because the differences in outcomes can ultimately be explained
by some individual characteristic. Thus, what has been called stochastic uncertainty
corresponds to unobservable heterogeneity. Second, from the point of view of the
healthcare decision-making process, the lack of knowledge about heterogeneity can
be considered as another type of uncertainty. This dearth of information forces
analysts to assume that the differences in outcomes observed between individuals are
due to random variability, which has been termed first order uncertainty.
The alternative approaches to characterize the value of making decisions conditional
to (some) heterogeneity include subgroups (stratification) and individualized
decisions. Methods to express this value in terms of the opportunity cost of a health
system have been developed in recent years. They focus on only one dimension of
value, which is the expected health gains based on different decisions among
individuals. However, most of the information is uncertain (as is revealed from
samples of the target population), and this should be taken into account in the
assessment of the value of heterogeneity. Thus, a following step should bring these
two dimensions of the problem together in a more integrative framework. These
elements represent the main motivation for chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis.
Another important element examined in this chapter is the potential role of
preferences and treatment choices in health. As mentioned, the consideration of
heterogeneity in preferences is consistent with the objectives of a public health
planner. More recently, knowledge has progressed in the understanding of the
potential role of revealed choices in the estimation of a joint distribution of potential
outcomes. However, it still remains unclear in which cases we can rely on those
choices as good predictors of health outcomes and in which cases they have been the
consequences of other factors (out of the health construct).
Regardless of the potential role of revealed choices in explaining health outcomes,
the act of making choices is presented in the public agenda as an essential value that
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should be considered as another objective of a health system, especially in more
libertarian health systems. Nevertheless, the idea of unrestricted choices could be
introduced, consistent with the aim of a collectively funded health system (such as
the National Health Service in the UK) under two considerations. First, by
identifying subsets where the new alternative is cost-effective, patients who are
members of such subgroups can make free choices between all alternatives (Brazier
et al., 2005). Although the selection of less effective treatments could lead to health
losses, this could, in part, be offset by transferring those resources to other efficient
activities of the healthcare system. In addition, it remains unclear whether the true
expected health outcome for that specific patient is actually lower than the
expectation we assume on the basis of the current HTA process. A better
understanding of patient preferences and the joint distribution of potential outcomes
might reveal that in some cases patient choices maximize health. Second,
unrestricted choices can also be consistent with the aim of a collectively funded NHS
if the expected health forgone derived from their implementation is lower than the
transaction costs due to restriction of choices. This latter idea is further developed in
chapter 5.
It has been described in this chapter, that heterogeneity for decision-making entails
several dimensions, each of them affected by constraints on their realization, further
exploration and implementation. Different health systems face this problem in
different ways. For example, transaction costs for implementation and equity
constraints to reveal heterogeneity might be addressed very differently by private
health insurance companies and public national health systems. For example, while
private insurance adapts the co-payment or coverage schemes for a particular new
technology in order to minimize moral hazard, the NHS assesses whether a policy
based on subgroups can achieve more population health when compared to its
opportunity cost. Likewise, while equity constraints might be important from the
NHS point of view, they might be less relevant for a less regulated healthcare
system.
In conclusion, heterogeneity in healthcare decision-making is occupying an
important place in the health research agenda, not only because it is an intrinsic
value for individualization of care but also because it is consistent with the
objectives of maximising health under limited budgets. Important contributions have
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been developed in the last few years; however, there are still several gaps that need
more research. Future investigation should examine the need to produce a more
systematic approach to exploring heterogeneity (e.g. through subgroup analysis), the
incorporation of parameter uncertainty in a more integrative framework with
heterogeneity and the exploration of the role of patient choices in the consideration
of heterogeneity of health outcomes.
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3. CHAPTER 3
THE VALUE OF HETEROGENEITY
A Framework for cost-effectiveness subgroup analysis
3.1. Background
As introduced in Chapter 1, a prominent objective of healthcare systems
internationally is to deliver maximum health improvement to the population under its
care given limited available and exogenously allocated resources. By comparing
average net health benefits (net of costs) –typically expressed in terms of QALYs
gained– associated with alternative uses of the healthcare budget, CEA generates the
information needed to support resource allocation decision problems consistently
with this objective (Brouwer and Koopmanschap, 2000).
It is increasingly recognised, however, that treatment decisions based on average
measures of cost-effectiveness risk incorrect decisions for specific subsets of the
population (Stevens and Normand, 2004), because they fail to reflect the fact that a
treatment which may be cost-effective for one type or patient may not be so for
another. This type of heterogeneity can be ascribed to both individual and
contextual-level factors (Sculpher, 2008a) which, when taken into account in
analysis and decisions, is consistent with an efficient allocation of resources and thus
the realisation of greater population health benefits. Despite its importance in
supporting decisions regarding the funding and provision of new medical
technologies, there is relatively little in the literature on the methodology of
characterising and understanding heterogeneity in cost-effectiveness analysis32. Key
papers have explored the potential value of understanding and acting upon
heterogeneity (Sculpher, 1998, Coyle et al., 2003, Basu and Meltzer, 2007, Sculpher,
2010) as well as its sources and the practicalities of analysis (Sculpher, 2008a).
32 This literature has been introduced in Chapter 2.
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However, none of them provides a guide for systematic subgroup analysis, including
identification, selection and presentation of cost-effectiveness results, and none of
the issues regarding decision uncertainty have been addressed either.
Given the current policy debate and government agenda relating to the
personalisation of health and social care services in the UK (Department of Health,
2010) and elsewhere (US Public Law Sec 6301, 2010, Hamburg and Collins, 2010,
National Health and Hospitals Reform Commision, 2009) the need for a clear and
coherent framework to support and guide decisions made by local and central health
authorities in different groups of patients within the population is no longer an
academic exercise but is rapidly becoming a key policy question.
The first section of the chapter summarises the debate on heterogeneity and subgroup
analysis and the issues relevant to economic evaluation in supporting healthcare
decision-making. Next, it shows how the existing CEA methods toolbox can be
extended to address the identification and selection of subgroups. The framework is
further expanded to consider how heterogeneity should be reflected and accounted
for when assessing the potential costs associated with decision uncertainty,
introducing the concepts of static and dynamic value of heterogeneity. Next, the role
of transaction costs associated to the implementation of guidelines based on
subgroups is examined. A simple stylized example is used to illustrate the concepts
introduced in the chapter. The final section summarises the main contributions of the
manuscript and provides a discussion of some of the issues to be considered in future
research.
3.2. Heterogeneity and decision-making in healthcare
While the concept of subgroup analysis has existed for quite some time (Stallones,
1987, Oxman and Guyatt, 1992), its adoption has been met with caution in certain
areas of healthcare decision-making, possibly due to concerns related to issues such
as low statistical power and the risk of multiplicity in the analysis33 (Cui et al.,
2002a, Cook et al., 2004, Grouin et al., 2005). Many authors have indicated their
preference for using an average measure of treatment effect (Oxman and Guyatt,
33 This view has been fuelled by a classical frequentist interpretation of the statistical decision rules,
which has been dominated for many years by a strict inferential paradigm (see Chapter 2 for details).
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1992, Sun et al., 2009, Sun et al., 2010) and that findings from subgroup analyses
should be considered exploratory in nature (Sun et al., 2009, Wang et al., 2007).
More recently, economists and some statisticians have argued against the use of
strict inferential rules regarding the effects of interventions in healthcare decision-
making (Goodman, 1999b, Goodman, 1999a, McClosey and Ziliak, 1996, Claxton,
1999b). Specifically, the importance has been recognised of considering evidence
on subgroups of patients when making probabilistic statements about the (cost-)
effectiveness of a given treatment strategy (Sculpher, 2008a, Coyle et al., 2003).
This more encompassing attitude to sub-group analysis has been reflected in the
position of agencies with responsibility for decisions about the funding of new
medical technologies. For example, the possibility of considering subgroup analyses
in its deliberations are now reflected in the methods guidance for technology
appraisal issued by NICE for England and Wales (NICE, 2008). No specific
guidance, however, is offered on how to explore and reflect heterogeneity when
conducting subgroup cost-effectiveness analyses to inform the Institute’s
recommendations.
To date, most of the contributions to the literature have focused on specific practical
issues. For instance, several authors have shown how baseline risk and treatment
effect heterogeneity can be incorporated into decision models (Kuntz and Goldie,
2002, Groot Koerkamp et al., 2010). Others have discussed methods to estimate the
cost-effectiveness of allocating patients to different treatments based on their
preferences (Nease and Owens, 1994, Sculpher, 1998). Others have used covariates
to assess cost-effectiveness of interventions for specific subgroups in the context of
trial-based data and to characterise uncertainty as cost-effectiveness acceptability
curves per subgroup (Nixon and Thompson, 2005). However, only a few
contributors have explored the value of introducing these concerns in terms of
population health.
As introduced in Chapter 2, the work by Coyle et al. (2003) represents one of the
first attempts to produce a framework within which the value of subgroup CEA
could be assessed. They show how consideration of treatment effect heterogeneity in
a stratified CEA may lead to different recommendations being made for different
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patients’ subgroups, yielding higher societal payoffs compared to un-stratified cases.
Basu and Meltzer (2007) have extended this framework to consider the notion of
individualised care and develop the concept of EVIC, which represents the potential
net health benefits attainable when research to explain the variability at individual
level has been undertaken (Basu and Meltzer, 2010). Nevertheless, none of these
approaches have taken into account decision uncertainty as part of an integrative
framework.
The initial point of this work recognises that the analysis of heterogeneity has two
dimensions of value, one related to the study of between-patient variability and the
other to the analysis of parameter uncertainty. First, there is value in considering
current information about the heterogeneity of estimated costs and benefits within a
patient population. At the maximum, when all relevant individual level information
is revealed and used to make decisions, the value of considering such information in
decision-making is represented by EVIC34. Second, in the context of estimating
population ‘average’ costs and benefits, the analysis is limited to studying the value
of collecting additional sample data in order to reveal the true mean value of a
parameter. This is driven by applying the value of information methods to estimate
EVPI and EVPPI. Although these metrics have been used for average estimates, the
value they express is entirely relevant for the interpretation of those analyses that
have included (to some extent) information about heterogeneity. Thus, average and
individual levels define two extremes of a continuum that contains partial degrees of
revealed heterogeneity but also partial degrees of unresolved uncertainty. Further,
this dual conceptualization of heterogeneity for decision-making is consistent with
the aim of the health system, since the use of finite resources to maximise health
outcomes includes investment in additional research (Griffin et al., 2011). This
chapter proposes a methodological framework that studies the value of
heterogeneity, emphasizing the relevance of these two dimensions and their
relationship. In addition, it argues that there are practical constraints to achieving
individual-level decision-making which inevitably require the policy maker to make
decisions at some point in the continuum between the average and individualized
34 In practice, the value estimated by EVIC is conditional to the set of observed characteristics that
have been used in the decision model to represent heterogeneity.
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levels. As a consequence, the framework can be consistently operationalized using
subgroup analysis.
The chapter presents the value of characterising heterogeneity and using it in
decision-making as a two dimensional concept determined by (i) the benefits
achieved in stratified versus average decisions and (ii) the potential benefits of
resolving the parameter uncertainty at the disaggregation point where the transaction
costs are not higher than the benefits. The approach seeks to locate the optimal level
of disaggregation somewhere between the two extremes of population average and
individual level. Ideally, this will be as far as possible from the average but is
unlikely to be at the point of individual decisions because there are transaction costs
that make this unfeasible. The framework proposed here is constructed to estimate
these two parts. First, it extends the work of Coyle et al. (2003) to estimate the value
of further interrogating the available evidence (e.g. secondary data analysis) to
explore issues of heterogeneity. Since this activity does not involve extra data
collection it is called the static value of heterogeneity. Second, Value of Information
analysis is used to address the value of funding additional data collection. This is
called the dynamic value of heterogeneity, since it involves further data collection
conditional to specific levels of disaggregation.
3.3. Subgroup cost-effectiveness analysis under current information
This section examines subgroup CEA under current information on two dimensions:
first, the comparison between different numbers of subgroups facilitated by the
disaggregation of the population; and, second, the comparison between different
specifications (i.e. the covariates used to define one particular subgroup) for a given
number of subgroups (an analysis undertaken to compare alternative ways of
grouping the population). It begins extending the framework previously developed
by Coyle et al. (2003) to accommodate more than two treatment strategies.
3.3.1. Net Benefits for Subgroup Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
Classical decision rules in CEA (Briggs et al., 2006) state that, under current
information, the optimal strategy among j mutually exclusive alternatives, given a set
of θ uncertain parameters, can be expressed as follows:
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݉ ܽݔ௝ܧఏܰܤ( ,݆ߠ) (3.1)
That is, the optimal strategy is that with the maximum expected net benefit (NB). If






where I represents the disease incidence for each period t, T indicates the period over
which the technology is assumed to be relevant to clinical practice, and r is an
appropriate discount rate, the population expected NB can be estimated as
݉ ܽݔ௝ܧఏܰܤ( ,݆ߠ)෍ ܫ௧(1 + ݎ)௧்
௧ୀଵ
(3.3)
Coyle et al. (2003) showed that, by considering the differences in treatment effect
heterogeneity (treatment effect moderators) within this framework, different
recommendations can be made for different subgroups. This results in a greater
expected NB compared to decisions based on the average across the patient
population as a whole.
Using alternative notation, Total Incremental Net Benefit (TINB) (with ܰܫ ܤ ൌ
ܧఏܰܤ( ǡ݆ߠ) െ ܧఏܰܤ(݆∗ǡߠ), where ്݆ ݆∗) across S subgroups can be written as
ܶܰܫ ܤ = ෍ ܰܫ ܤ௦ݓ௦ௌ
௦ୀଵ
(3.4)
where ݓ௦ ∈ (0,1) is a weight indicating the proportion of the total population
represented by subgroup s and ∑ ݓ௦ = 1ௌ௦ୀଵ . The TINB is, therefore, the weighted
average of the INB across subgroups. Since some of the subgroup-specific INB may
be negative, Coyle et al. (2003) state that the TINB, when the intervention is
restricted to those subgroups where the new treatment is cost-effective, is
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ܶܰܫ ܤௌ = ෍ ܰܫ ܤ௦ݓ௦ௌ
௦ୀଵ
, ∀௦ ݓℎ ݁݁ݎ ܰܫ ܤ௦ > 0 (3.5)
and the INB gained from considering patients’ heterogeneity in the decisions - what
Coyle et al. (2003) termed ‘stratification’ - can be written as the negative sum of the
population weighted INB in those subgroups where INB is negative. This expresses
the static value of heterogeneity.
∆ௌܶܰܫ ܤ = ܶܰܫ ܤௌ − ܶܰܫ ܤ = −෍ ܰܫ ܤ௦ݓ௦ௌ
௦ୀଵ
, ∀௦ ݓℎ ݁݁ݎ ܰܫ ܤ௦ < 0 (3.6)
This estimation is generalized in this chapter, using absolute NB values35 and
illustrated with an example presented in Table 3.1. Let us define four subgroups (A,
B, C and D) each representing 25% of the population. The objective is to assess the
cost-effectiveness of three alternative strategies (j=1,2,3). Using a cost-effectiveness
threshold of £20,000 per QALY, the maximum NB, expressed in terms of health, for
the entire population is 20.75 QALYs per patient net of costs or net-QALYs. This
corresponds to treatment 3. Allowing for the possibility of making different
decisions for different sub-groups of patients, yields a TINB of 22.08 net-QALYs,
which results in 1.33 net-QALYs gained from stratification (expressed as ΔSTINB)
compared to the un-stratified case. Notice that ΔSTINB is equivalent to the expected
opportunity loss of a policy whereby all patients receive the new treatment on the
basis of average estimates.
35 The estimation of the total net benefits (TNBS) based on absolute NB values can be expressed more
generally as
ܶܰܤௌ = ෍ ݓ௦ௌ
௦ୀଵ
(݉ ܽݔ௝ܰ ܤ௦) (3.7)
with the ΔSTNB being
∆ௌܶܰܤ = ෍ ݓ௦ௌ
௦ୀଵ
൫݉ ܽݔ௝ܰ ܤ௦൯− ݉ ܽݔ௝ܰ ܤ (3.8)
which can be easily generalized to the case with j multiple strategies and S subgroups.
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Table 3.1. Total Net Health Benefits estimation for three treatments and four subgroups.
Note: The estimation assumes a cost-effectiveness threshold of £20,000 per QALY. C: Costs; B:
Benefits; QALYs: Quality Adjusted Life Years; NHB: Net Health Benefits; TNHB: Total Net Health
Benefits on average; TNHBS: Total Net Health Benefits considering subgroups
3.3.2. Defining Subgroups
Cost-effectiveness analysis includes more sources of heterogeneity than standard
clinical studies (Sculpher, 2008a, Kravitz et al., 2004). The analysis of clinical trials
is generally focused on inferences about treatment effects for the patient population
defined by the study's inclusion criteria. Any interest in heterogeneity is generally
confined to treatment effect moderators, and this is generally cautiously applied (Sun
et al., 2010). In addition, there is often a clinical interest in heterogeneity in the
underlying risk of adverse clinical events associated with a disease (Sculpher, 2010).
This can lead to sub-group differences in the absolute benefit conferred by a
treatment offering a fixed proportionate risk reduction across all types of patient.
There may also be situations where baseline risk is correlated to relative treatment
effect (Rothwell, 2005). These sources of heterogeneity relating to the intervention
and the disease are also important in CEA. In addition, resource use (and hence
costs) may systematically vary between individuals based on their characteristics and
the geographical location of their treatment (Drummond et al., 2005). Finally,
heterogeneity in preferences (Kravitz et al., 2004, Basu and Meltzer, 2007, Brazier et
al., 2005) is increasingly being recognised as another key source of heterogeneity in
cost-effectiveness.
B1 B2 B3 C1 C2 C3 NHB1 NHB2 NHB3
Average 21 18 22 20,000 10,000 25,000 20 17.5 20.75
A (25%) 23 16 21 20,000 7,000 24,000 22 15.65 19.8
B (25%) 19 21 22 20,000 8,000 30,000 18 20.6 20.5
C (25%) 18 17 24 20,000 10,000 25,000 17 16.5 22.75
D (25%) 24 18 21 20,000 15,000 21,000 23 17.25 19.95
TNHBs = [ (22 x 0.25) + (20.6 x 0.25) + (22.75 x 0.25) + (23 x 0.25)]
TNHBs = 22.08
TNHB = 20.75
ΔSTNHB = NHBS – NHB = 22.0875 – 20.75 = 1.3375
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There are, however, some potential constraints on sub-group analysis in CEA. One
is the need to consider the costs of implementing sub-group-specific guidance made
by the health system. These could include the costs of clinicians acquiring all
relevant data on individual patients in order for their treatment decisions to adhere to
the guidance. Costs can also be imposed on the health system if it wishes to monitor
whether clinicians are implementing their guidance appropriately. There are also
potential ethical and equity constraints in reflecting sub-group CEA in decisions.
For example, NICE considers unethical to reflect age as a source of heterogeneity in
its decisions unless it impacts directly on the efficacy of an intervention. These
elements should be made explicit when subgroups are being defined.
After the identification of the subgroups that will be explored, decision-makers need
to address the choice between subgroup specifications (f); that is, the covariate that
defines the membership of individuals in one particular subset (Kent and Lindenauer,
2010). They should be at least biologically plausible and operationalizable in
practice (Sculpher, 2008a). For example, patients at risk of cardiovascular events can
be grouped on the basis of whether or not they have diabetes (f=1), hypertension
(f=2) or a combination these variables36. The question is how to select between
alternative specifications. To help with this task, a criterion based on efficiency
(measured in terms of expected NB) is proposed here.
Let us assume we wish to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of two different treatments
for Acute Coronary Disease (ACD) and that there are F possible subgroup
specifications that could be defined. Each subgroup (s) may be obtained using f
alternative partitions37. Clearly, further combinations of these partitions may
generate more mutually exclusive subgroups, though there is a trade-off between the
number of subgroups and the practicality of implementing these (e.g. data
availability, our knowledge of the clinical problem).
36 A more complicated situation is faced with a complex risk prediction model based on several
baseline characteristics of the patient and the question is how to disaggregate a continuous risk
variable into categories of risk that clearly and unequivocally reflect different subgroups. For
instance the analyst may choose to report the results of the CEA by subgroups defined in terms of
quartiles of the predicted risk distribution.
37 For example, the sample can be divided in two (S=2) based on whether the individual has diabetes
(f=1), i.e. diabetic patients (s=1) and non-diabetic patients (s=2) or subdivided on the presence of
high blood pressure (f=2), i.e. hypertension (s=1) and non-hypertension (s=2).
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The goal is to identify relevant subgroups and associated specifications which
produce the highest expected NB, resolving the following maximisation problem
݉ ܽݔ௝,௙ܧఏܶܰܤௌ,௙( ,݆ߠ) ܵ= 1,2, … , ;݊ ݂= 1,2, … ,ܨ (3.9)
A simple example is shown in Table 3.2. Four different subgroups are defined using
different specifications in a population of patients with non-ST elevation acute
coronary syndrome (NST-ACS). When only two subgroups are considered (S=2),
the population can be subdivided using three alternative specifications, namely,
based on the presence of diabetes (f=1), high versus low baseline TIMI risk-score
(Antman et al., 2000), a well-known baseline risk score (f=2), or based on the
presence of a highly sensitive and specific biomarker (Troponin) (f=3). The same
concepts can be used to define alternative specifications for three and four
subgroups. For each subgroup, total expected NBs can be estimated, under current
information. Equation (3.9) suggests that the specification with the greatest total
expected NBs should be preferred, given current information. These points would
lead to an efficiency frontier similar to that depicted in Figure 3.1, which represents
the range of possible expected NBs which could be achieved using alternative
subgroup specifications for each given number of subgroups.
Table 3.2. Definition of subgroups. Grouping the population according to different specifications for
different levels of disaggregation.
S=1 S=2 S=3 S=4














































5.6 5.6 6.2 7.1 6.6 7.7 7.4 7.9
Note; The matrix shows seven different specifications for subgroup analysis, three specifications to
define two subgroups and two specifications to define three and four subgroups
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The dotted line represents the set of the most efficient specifications for each
partition. In addition, Figure 3.1 introduces two further important elements. First,
there are instances where consideration of subgroups does not add any further
societal benefit (in terms of expected NB) compared to what is achieved by
providing treatment to the whole patient population. This might happen because the
same treatment decision is appropriate for all subgroups (A). Second, in other cases
further exploration of subgroups offers an additional societal benefit, even given
current information. This could be exclusively explained by the effect of a different
specification for the same number of subgroups (B) or because additional numbers of
subgroups have been taken into account (C).
Figure 3.1. Efficiency Frontier for Subgroup Analysis.
Note: The dotted line joins the potential best specifications for each number of subgroups (S). The segment (A)
shows that there is no value of heterogeneity between the points. Segment (B) illustrates the value of a
specification used to define subgroups and (C) the value of considering additional subgroups.
This example also illustrates the problem of a limited analysis of heterogeneity. For
instance, a treatment strategy might be cost-effective for patients with high troponin
and not cost-effective for those with low troponin. Likewise, the treatment can
provide value for money in diabetic patients but not in non-diabetic patients. What





resolve the problem, increasing the number of subgroups can become problematic as
this is associated with transaction costs that will be discussed further in this chapter.
The elements presented in this section can be summarized in the following steps: (a)
definition of subgroups must have biological, ethical and practical support; (b) to
make explicit consideration about the sources of heterogeneity that will be explored,
while baseline risk or treatment effect heterogeneity should always be included, the
inclusion or omission of the analysis of costs and preferences should be properly
justified38; (c) graphical presentation of the efficiency frontier for subgroup analysis.
This approach is consistent with the objective of CEA and highlights the value of
exploring heterogeneity using existing data to identify potential best specifications.
3.4. Decision uncertainty in cost-effectiveness subgroup analysis
As decision-makers’ interest moves away from population average recommendations
towards more individualised decisions, it becomes important to be able to compare
the uncertainty associated with each subgroup-specific decision against the potential
benefits of resolving this uncertainty conditional on the new acquired insight into
heterogeneity (Sculpher, 2008, Sculpher, 2010).
As explained in Chapter 2, uncertainty related to CEA can be classified in three
categories, namely, methodological, structural and parameter uncertainty (Briggs,
2000). The latter is the focus of the present section. Parameter uncertainty is relevant
since a wrong decision can be made because of the lack of precise (perfect) mean
estimates. As a consequence, analysts should address the question of whether
undertaking further research to resolve parameter uncertainty is worthwhile, which
can be examined using Value of Information (VoI) analysis (Claxton and Posnett,
1996, Claxton, 1999a, Claxton, 1999b, Ginnelly et al., 2005). The adoption of this
framework requires an estimation of the value of making decisions with an infinite
sample (perfect information). In this circumstance, the decision-maker would be able
38 Heterogeneity purely based on costs might be questioned, since new (more effective) technologies
can be considered not cost-effective in patients with greater expected costs, other things being equal.
NICE for, example, has recommended not to conduct subgroup analysis based purely on costs. The
analysis of preferences is mainly limited by data, especially, when societal preferences are used.
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to select the intervention that maximises NBs at the true value of the vector of
parameters θ, that is
݉ ܽݔ௝ܰ ܤ( ,݆ߠ) (3.10)
Since the true value of θ is unknown, we can only estimate an expected value of this
quantity by averaging the maximum NBs over the joint distribution of θ,
ܧఏ݉ ܽݔ௝ܰ ܤ( ,݆ߠ) (3.11)
The expected value of perfect information (EVPI) is the difference between the NBs
derived from a decision made with perfect information (equation 3.11) and the NBs
derived from decisions under current information (equation 3.1). This represents the
expected gain (in NBs), for a single patient, from collecting further information and
resolving the existing uncertainty.
ܧܸܲܫ= ܧఏ݉ ܽݔ௝ܰܤ( ,݆ߠ) − ݉ ܽݔ௝ܧఏܰܤ( ,݆ߠ) (3.12)
Notice that the population EVPI can be derived by multiplying equation (3.12) and
equation (3.2).
Claxton (1999b) shows that EVPI represents an upper boundary for a new research
proposal aimed at resolving the current levels of uncertainty. As long as obtaining
new information is less costly than the population EVPI there may be a positive
potential payoff (Griffin et al., 2011). Thus, a necessary condition is achieved when
this payoff is positive, otherwise investing in further research does not represent a
good use of available resources.
3.4.1. Value of additional research and subgroup analysis
As we have seen in the previous sections when mutually exclusive subgroups are
considered, different decisions can be made for different subgroups. Thus, under
current information the decision-maker will need to choose for each subgroup s the
strategy with the maximum NB. Equation (3.1) can therefore be re-expressed as
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݉ ܽݔ௝ܧఏܰܤ௦( ,݆ߠ) (3.13)
with the expected value of the decision for subgroup s under perfect information
being
ܧఏ݉ ܽݔ௝ܰ ܤ௦( ,݆ߠ) (3.14)
and the EVPI for the subgroup s is given by
ܧܸܲܫ௦ = ܧఏ݉ ܽݔ௝ܰ ܤ௦( ,݆ߠ) − ݉ ܽݔ௝ܧఏܰܤ௦( ,݆ߠ) (3.15)
The EVPIs represents an upper boundary for further research on the target population
considering that different decisions can be made for different subgroups. This
expression considers the overall uncertainty of the population, which includes the
uncertainty given by exchangeable and non-exchangeable parameters39. Generalising
equation (3.15), the total expected value of perfect information when considering S
subgroups is the weighted average of each subgroup-specific EVPI weighted by the




The population EVPI can be estimated by multiplying equation (3.16) by the future
population of patients expected to benefit from the new information, which for s
subgroups is given by





where Ts is the period over which the information that could be collected in the
future about the actual decision problem is useful in the subgroup s (Philips et al.,
39Exchangeability means the extent to which the information used to estimate ߠ௦ୀଵ can be used (or is
exchangeable) to estimate ߠ௦ୀଶ (where s indicates subgroup 1 or 2). This point will be addressed with
detail in the discussion section.
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2008) and Is,t is the incidence over the period t. It follows that the population EVPI
with S subgroups is
݌݋݌ܧܸܲܫௌ = ܧܸܲܫௌ ௌܲ (3.18)
which represents the maximum amount of resources that the health system should be
willing to pay for further research given a particular cost-effectiveness threshold.
This framework establishes a direct link between current decision uncertainty and
the value of future research. Rather than considering uncertainty as a constraint for
decision-making, VoI highlights its value as a potential source of health gain (Phelps
and Mushlin, 1988, Claxton and Posnett, 1996, Claxton, 1999a). This chapter
extends this concept to encompass the value of resolving heterogeneity and coin the
term Value of Heterogeneity (VoH), to indicate that the additional health gains given
by understanding heterogeneity involve two different sources. The first of these is
the result of additional exploration of existing datasets in order to identify,
characterise and quantify heterogeneity, which is a static assessment of the VoH.
The second source involves the collection of new evidence to estimate parameters
conditional to subgroups. This is the dynamic assessment of the VoH.
Several hypothetical scenarios are now presented to illustrate how uncertainty and
heterogeneity converge in the decision problem. It starts in Figure 3.2 with the
graphical illustration of the VoI concept. The vertical axis measures the expected
NHB (assuming a particular value for the cost-effectiveness threshold) and the
horizontal axis represents the possible alternative subgroup definitions
(disaggregation) of the population, where ‘one subgroup’ expresses the population
average NHB.
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Figure 3.2. The value of information with and without subgroups.
Note: (a) The empty diamond represents the maximum expected NHBs (current information) and the
filled diamond the expected maximum NHBs (perfect information). (b) The base reference case in (a)
is also illustrated for two subgroups. A corresponds to the EVPI for the whole population and B the
EVPI, when two subgroups have been considered (s=2). No value of heterogeneity is shown in this
graph because the NHBs are the same for one or two subgroups either with current or perfect
information.
Figure 3.2a illustrates the concept of the expected value of perfect information.
Here, the empty diamond marker represents the expected NHB under current
information, while the solid diamond marker indicates the maximum expected NHB
achievable under perfect information. The difference between these two corresponds
to the population-average EVPI.
In Figure 3.2b, the patient population is now split into two subgroups. It illustrates
the situation where there is economic value in carrying out further research to
resolve decision uncertainty. However, this value is not associated with investigating
and reflecting heterogeneity in the population for the purposes of subgroup CEA. In
fact, the maximum expected NHB obtained under current information for the whole
population (represented by the empty diamond marker) is the same as what would be
achievable by considering two subgroups (indicated by the empty square marker).
The scenario reflects the fact that the same treatment decision is made for both
b) Value of Information and no Value of
Heterogeneity
a) Value of Information
A A B
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subgroups, and there is no further value associated with investigating heterogeneity,
which is indicated by the fact that the EVPI for the entire population (the vertical
distance A) is the same as the EVPI with two subgroups (the vertical distance B).
3.4.2. Static and Dynamic Value of Heterogeneity
A more likely scenario occurs when there is value in identifying and reflecting
between-patient heterogeneity using existing datasets, over and above the value
associated with undertaking further research. This case is presented in Figure 3.3a.
Here, the total expected NHB with current information (represented by the empty
markers) is greater when subgroups are considered. The difference between the
total NHB for the entire population and the total NHB when considering subgroups
(represented by the vertical distance C) is what is termed the static value of
heterogeneity, which derives from analyses of existing data with a view to
identifying relevant subgroups and increasing population total NHBs by facilitating
different decision for different subgroups, but without any further primary research
through additional data collection.
In addition, notice that the scenario depicted in Figure 3.3a indicates that even if we
were able to collect additional data through new research and resolve any decision
uncertainty for the subgroups, the expected NHB to be gained would be similar to
what could be derived from the population-average case. This is indicated by the fact
that the vertical distance B is equal to the vertical distance A. In this scenario, a
policy maker might be interested in making different decisions for different
subgroups, according to the evidence available, and further research is still
worthwhile to resolve uncertainties not associated with heterogeneity. Figure 3.3b
shows another situation. Here, the same decision would be made for both subgroups
under current information. This would yield the same total expected NHB as for the
whole population. However, the estimate under perfect information obtained when
considering subgroups (represented by the filled squared) is greater than the NHB
under perfect information derived from considering the population as a whole
(represented by filled diamond). The difference between these two points (indicated
by the vertical distance D) is the dynamic value of heterogeneity, since to benefit
from this the policy maker has to fund new additional research. This additional value
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is not only explained by greater uncertainty around the estimation of conditional
parameters, but also from the fact that different decisions can be made for different
subgroups.
Figure 3.3. Static and dynamic value of heterogeneity.
Note: (a) A represents the EVPI for the average population, B is the EVPI for the population
considering two subgroups, C is the increment in the expected maximum NHB and D is the increment
in the maximum expected NHB. In this illustration C represents the static value of heterogeneity and
no additional dynamic value in undertaking further research conditional to subgroups is observed
since A=B and C=D. The Dynamic Value of Heterogeneity is represented by D. (b) In this case there
is only dynamic value of heterogeneity B>A, D>0 and C=0 (zero static value).
Figure 3.4 illustrates a situation in which there are both static and dynamic values of
heterogeneity (C>0 and D>0). A particular feature of this example is that the EVPI
when considering subgroups (distance B) is less than the average EVPI (distance A).
This is expected to occur when the specification used to define subgroups is
informative about heterogeneity. In this situation, the effect is not only observed
under perfect information but also under current information (positive static value).
Hence, the difference between current and perfect information is lower than the
average.
a) Static Value of Heterogeneity









Figure 3.4. Dynamic value of heterogeneity and decrease in EVPI.
Note: A represents the average EVPI, B is the two-subgroups EVPI, C is the increment in the
expected maximum NHB and D is the increment in the maximum expected NHB. In this case, A>B
and C<D.
Figure 3.5 shows a further scenario in which an alternative subgroup specification
has been introduced (indicated by the empty triangle). Similar to the scenario
presented in Figure 3.3b, both specifications have the same expected NHBs under
current information (i.e. no static value of heterogeneity). However, if further
research were to be carried out, different treatment decisions could be made for
different subgroups (regardless of the specification used), yielding much greater
NHBs than those derived from a decision applied to the population as a whole. This
is indicated by the fact that the vertical distance B is greater than A. Furthermore, it
may be conceivable for this dynamic value of heterogeneity to differ for different
































Figure 3.5. Dynamic value of heterogeneity and its impact on subgroup specification.
Finally, the impact of considering heterogeneity on the selection of subgroup
specifications is presented in Figure 3.6 where we return to the scenario in which
different specifications for two subgroups are available. The expected NHBs (with
current information) estimated for one specification (empty triangle) is assumed to
be greater than those obtained from the other (empty square), which itself is assumed
to be equal to the NHBs derived for the population as a whole (empty diamond).
Under current information, a static value of heterogeneity is observed for one
specification but not for the other, which would guide the decision-maker’s
recommendation based on the specification with the greater expected NHBs.
However, it is entirely conceivable that further research could reveal the
specification with the lower static value of heterogeneity to be the one which could
produce the greater expected NHBs under perfect information (B>C=A in Figure
3.6a). This can be expressed as non-proportional dynamic value of heterogeneity,
meaning that there is a dynamic value of heterogeneity for either specifications, but
the potential NHBs obtained under perfect information for the specification with less
static value is greater than the one with higher static value.
One could also conceive a scenario (Figure 3.6b) where there is a proportional
dynamic value of heterogeneity where the expected benefits estimated under perfect






Figure 3.6. Proportional and non-proportional value of heterogeneity.
Note: (a) A represents the EVPI estimated from the whole sample, B is the EVPI considering two
subgroups defined according to specification 1 and C is the EVPI considering two subgroups and
specification 2. In this case B>C and C=A. (b) A proportional dynamic value is presented where B>A,
C>A and C=B.
3.5. Presentation of subgroup analysis and choice of the optimal
number of subgroups: the role of the cost function
By considering the static and dynamic dimensions at the same time, the trend of the
expected NHBs as a function of the number of subgroups can be shown graphically
for both current and perfect information. Since several alternative specifications are
available for each number of subgroups, ranging from no subgroups (indicated by
the vertical bar on the left in Figure 3.7) to individualized decisions (indicated by the
vertical bar on the right in Figure 3.7) the analyst is required to plot -at least- the
most efficient specifications (i.e. those with the highest NHB for each number of
subgroups). In addition, those specifications that have lower NHB under current
information but are expected to produce higher NHB with perfect information might
also be included in the graph.
a) Non-proportional dynamic value
of heterogeneity







Figure 3.7. Representation of the gaining in expected NHB with current and perfect information when
heterogeneity is considered.
Note: The transaction cost function shows two kink points illustrating a segment where the additional
costs are higher than the additional gains. This represents the case where the optimal number of
subgroups is the lower between those two points.
In principle, if there is no residual unexplained heterogeneity (i.e. there is complete
knowledge of the individual characteristics that determine variability), the decision-
maker has the best possible information to allocate resources efficiently. At the other
extreme, the maximum value of exploring heterogeneity is observed when no
subgroups have been taken into account (which can be represented by EVIC). In
terms of uncertainty, it is not the case that the maximum decision uncertainty is at
the average level. Indeed, more granular analysis could increase or decrease it,
depending on the informative capacity of the specification used and the reduction of
the sample size due to disaggregation40. However, it is expected that if heterogeneity
is progressively explained with informative covariates, then the remaining
uncertainty should decrease with higher levels of disaggregation. In addition,
although decision uncertainty will decrease as more heterogeneity is revealed, it is
40 Total uncertainty depends on the standard error of the parameters. One particular specification can
be informative in the sense that decreases the standard deviation of the key parameters leading to a
lower standard error. However, these estimations are made on the basis of lower sample size which
increases the standard error. Because the total uncertainty is the weighted average across subgroups,
the subgroup with higher sample size will add more than the smaller subgroup. Hence, the final



















never going to be completely resolved. This is because the true value of the
individual treatment effect can never be measured, since the counterfactual can never
be observed. A graphical representation of these concepts is presented in Figure 3.7.
Under this framework, the optimal number of subgroups tends towards n; however,
because there are significant constraints to fully characterise heterogeneity the
optimal number of subgroups will never be equal to n. One such constraint is the
lack of information to characterize heterogeneity, for example, the data available
usually do not have all the covariates in which we are interested (known unknown).
A second element is the dearth of evidence to understand this heterogeneity, which
leads to the fact that new research should be undertaken in order to find new factors
able to explain some part of the variability (unknown knowable unknown). A third
factor is related to the implementation of recommendations based on subgroups.
Depending on the healthcare system, different strategies can be employed to
monitor, enforce and ensure the fulfilment of healthcare recommendations. In
general, this is expected to be more expensive as more heterogeneity is considered.
Therefore, incorporating heterogeneity in health decision-making entails several
costs not only limited to the required research but also other transactions that must be
considered.
The formalization of a cost function which includes the components of research and
other transaction costs is needed to answer the question about how many subgroups
should be considered in a particular recommendation. A general form can be
expressed in terms of three key elements:
ΔCt= f (ΔX, ΔY, ΔZ)
where ΔCt defines the incremental transaction costs between two levels of
disaggregation, ΔX represents the additional effort of implementing a further level of
disaggregation, which may include additional health professionals’ time, the cost of
additional diagnostic tests required to categorize the patient and the cost of
dissemination and implementation strategies. Next, ΔY corresponds to the effort
required to enforce and monitor the compliance with guidelines. If the effort is paid
in financial terms ΔY becomes the opportunity cost of an alternative allocation of
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those resources. On the other hand, if the authority does not make any effort, ΔY
becomes the health forgone due to partial implementation. Finally, ΔZ is the
additional cost of future collection of information to resolve uncertainty of
conditional parameters at the extra level of disaggregation. This source of cost is
relevant when decisions are implemented conditional to further research funded by
the health system. Assuming that all transaction costs fall on the health budget, the
function can be expressed in NHB using the cost-effectiveness threshold (Figure
3.7).
The analysis of transaction costs and the efficiency frontier provides a rational
element to make decisions about the optimal number of subgroups. It is argued that
the optimal number of subgroups that should be implemented is the maximum level
of disaggregation where the expected additional benefits are greater than the
additional costs. This might be expressed in terms of the ratio between the
incremental benefits and incremental costs of two adjacent levels of disaggregation
(e.g. 1 and 2). If the ratio is lower than one, then the next relevant comparison is the
levels 1 and 3. As a consequence of this analysis, the analyst can present the
efficiency frontier net of transactions costs.
3.6. Brief illustrative example
A numeric example to illustrate the static and dynamic values of heterogeneity is
provided in Table 3.3 for a simple hypothetical decision problem comparing two
mutually exclusive treatments (T1 versus T2). For simplicity, we consider here two
subgroups, each representing 50% of the population and only the first five initial
iterations of a probabilistic sensitivity analysis are reported in the first column of
Table 3.3. The maximum NHB at each iteration is reported (in the columns headed
Max) and the expected NHB is calculated for each alternative (at the bottom of
each). Table 3.3 shows a set of possible NHB values, for the population-average
case and for each subgroup. Under current information, if decisions were taken at
population-average, T2 would be the optimal choice since it generates a total of 12.8
net-QALYs. On the other hand, specific estimates for both subgroups suggest that
T1 should be adopted for subgroup 1 (12.8 net-QALYs) and T2 for subgroup 2 (13
net-QALYs). Further, the total weighted average NHB [(12.8 x 0.5)+(13 x 0.5)=12.9
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net-QALYs] is greater than the population average, indicating a positive static value
(12.9-12.8=0.1 QALYs). Under perfect information, the expected maximum NHB
for the population on average are 13.6 net-QALYs whereas for subgroups the
expected maximum NHB would be 15.1 net-QALYs, indicating a positive dynamic
value (15.1-13.6=1.5 net-QALYs). In terms of potential gains due to future research,
the example shows that the EVPI increases with subgroups (2.2 versus 0.8 net-
QALYs). In this case, a decision-maker should recommend T1 for subgroup 1 and
T2 for subgroup 2, based on static value. In terms of future research, the positive
static value associated with an increase of the EVPI suggests that conducting future
research considering heterogeneity is worthwhile.
A second example is presented in Table 3.4. It shows the expected NHBs for a
specification that defines three subgroups, i.e. it adds a subgroup to the previous
example. Subgroups 1 and 3 each represent 25% of the population and subgroup 2
represents 50%. After 5 hypothetical iterations, T1 would be recommended for
subgroup 1 and 3 and T2 for subgroup 2 on the basis of expected NHB given current
information.








1 15 15 15 12 18 18 18 12 18
2 10 15 15 8 14 14 12 16 16
3 12 11 12 16 10 16 8 12 12
4 14 11 14 19 9 19 9 13 13
5 11 12 12 9 12 12 13 12 13
Average 12.4 12.8 13.6 12.8 12.6 15.8 12 13 14.4
E(NHB) with current information = 12.8
E(NHB) with perfect information = 13.6
EVPI = (13.6 – 12.8) = 0.8
E(NHB)s with current information = (12.8 x 0.5) + (13x 0.5) = 12.9
E(NHB)s with perfect information = (15.8 x 0.5) + (14.4 x 0.5) = 15.1
EVPIs= (15.1 - 12.9) = 2.2
Static Value (with current information):
E(NHB)s – E(NHB) = 12.9-12.8 = 0.1
Dynamic Value (with perfect information):
E(NHB)s – E(NHB) = 15.1 – 13.6 = 1.5
Interestingly, no additional static value of heterogeneity is observed compared with
the previous case with two subgroups, since in both cases the expected NHB with
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current information is 12.9 net-QALYs. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the
expected NHB under perfect information is higher than the case with 2 subgroups.
Likewise, EVPI for 3 subgroups is greater than the EVPI observed for the 2
subgroups (2.4 versus 2.2 net-QALYs). In this case, a decision-maker might have no
preference for either specifications under current information, as they both give the
same NHB. However, further research has more value if additional information is
planned to be collected in order to resolve uncertainty around conditional parameters
for 3 instead of 2 subgroups.










15 13 15 12 18 18 17 9 17 14 16 16
2
9 15 15 9 15 15 9 15 15 9 15 15
3
12 12 12 16 10 16 8 13 13 16 12 16
4
14 12 14 19 9 19 10 15 15 17 9 17
5
12 12 12 8 11 11 15 12 15 10 13 13
Average 12.4 12.8 13.6 12.8 12.6 15.8 11.8 12.8 15 13.2 13 15.4
E(NHB) with current information = 12.8
E(NHB) with perfect information = 13.6
EVPI = (13.6 – 12.8) = 0.8
E(NHB)s with current information = (12.8 x 0.25) + (12.8 x 0.5) + (13.2 x 0.25) =
12.9
E(NHB)s with perfect information = [ (15.8 x 0.25) + (15 x 0.50) + (15.4 x 0.25) ] =
15.3
EVPIs= (15.3 - 12.9) = 2.4
Static Value (with current information):
A. Three versus one subgroup
E(NHB)s – E(NHB) = 12.9-12.8 = 0.1
B. Three versus two subgroups
E(NHB)s – E(NHB) = 12.9-12.9 = 0
Dynamic Value (with perfect
information):
A. Three versus one subgroup
E(NHB)s – E(NHB) = 15.3 – 13.6 = 1.7
B. Three versus two subgroups
E(NHB)s – E(NHB) = 15.3 – 15.1 = 0.2
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3.7. Discussion
Cost-effectiveness evidence is increasingly being used to inform decision-making
about adoption of new health technologies, in response health systems’ need to
allocate resources efficiently. In most cases the efficiency of this process can be
improved by identifying subsets of the population where the new intervention is
cost-effective from those where it is not. This chapter argues that the decision rule
for adoption or rejection of new interventions in different subgroups should be based
on expected NHBs. Furthermore, by using NHBs, the potential best specification for
resource allocation can be easily identified for different levels of disaggregation.
The relevance of defining and selecting subgroups is emphasized and it is proposed
that the selection process under current information should follow an efficiency
criterion for the best specification. The efficiency frontier for subgroups is presented
as a tool to identify those that are most relevant. However, this does not mean that
other specifications should be eliminated from the analysis. Indeed, they might
produce more benefits if further research is undertaken to resolve the current
uncertainty.
One pragmatic reason for developing this framework is the fact that most cost-
effectiveness studies carry out subgroup analysis to explore heterogeneity. This work
offers a systematic approach to undertaking such analysis. A second reason relates to
the limitation of implementing decisions at individual level in a collectively funded
NHS. Two elements are highlighted here. First, generating guidelines with high
levels of disaggregation is difficult due to our lack of understanding of the total
variability in cost-effectiveness between patients. Moreover, even if those guidelines
were produced, there would be associated costs that would hinder their
implementation (these costs have been presented in this chapter as a transaction cost
function). Second, patients (or doctors on their behalf) might not choose the most
cost-effective treatment (Eddy, 1991). Even in the situation where we have perfect
and complete information at individual level (and an optimal efficient decision can
be made at individual level), a proportion of the population could still face not
having access to new, more expensive (and effective) treatments due to budget
constraints. This is not an argument in favour of subgroups analysis, since subgroup-
based decision-making face the same problem of denying treatment to some patients.
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However, the restrictions imposed by social constraints are better accepted when
they affect groups of the population than when they affect individuals who are not
able to identify themselves as member of a particular subset (Lee and Ishii-Kuntz,
1987).
As mentioned in Chapter 2, recent contributions in the field of health econometrics
have demonstrated that the joint distribution of potential outcomes can be estimated
using information about patient choices for treatment (Basu et al., 2007, Basu, 2011).
It has been suggested that when patients make decisions for treatment, they consider
not only the information publicly available and provided by the health professionals
but also other individual characteristics that cannot be observed by a social decision-
maker. Access to this information could help characterize the heterogeneity in
treatment effects, which could be used to generate more accurate cost-effectiveness
estimates. The challenge for a social decision-maker is to identify the proportion of
patients for whom a new strategy is (cost-)effective based on observable and
measurable characteristics, not only for the purposes of comparative effectiveness
research but also to take into account the opportunity cost of alternative resource
allocations41. Thus, subgroup analysis has a key role even when individual treatment
effects and, as a result, individual NB can be estimated.
The value of considering heterogeneity when making decisions in healthcare is not a
new concept. The relevant literature has been presented in Chapter 2. This chapter
extends previous work in this field, making explicit two dimensions of value, called
here static and dynamic. While the importance of the static value is intuitive and
easy to realize, this could be less obvious for the dynamic value. The dynamic value
corresponds to the additional (population) health that is expected to be achieved
when an infinite sample is collected to resolve current uncertainty for a particular
level of disaggregation compared to the average case. This value can be disentangled
in two sources: (i) the value of an infinite sample to estimate conditional
parameters42, and (ii) the value of estimating conditional parameters with an infinite
sample. The first one relates to the fact that, under uncertainty, expected maximum
41 This is especially relevant for entities such as NICE in the UK.
42 This refers to parameters estimated conditional to the subgroup category determined by a particular
specification
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NHB are higher than maximum expected NHB (i.e. EVPI greater than zero). This is
true at any level of disaggregation and it does not constitute, in itself, a gain due to
heterogeneity. The second is the value due to heterogeneity under perfect
information. Because the value of estimating conditional parameters is also observed
under current information, it is to be anticipated that the difference between the
expected maximum NHB and the maximum expected NHB (i.e. EVPI) is smaller
than the average (or the previous level of disaggregation). If a particular
specification does not have enough informative capacity or because the amount of
data (sample size) to examine its effect is too limited, EVPI can increase instead of
decrease.
The concepts behind the static and dynamic VoH are closely related to the current
metrics proposed in this field, such as EVPI and EVIC. First, dynamic value relates
to the value of resolving uncertainty in order to update a guideline in the future that
considers different decisions for different subgroups. Total EVIC represents only the
static value of heterogeneity and can be understood as though each individual were
representative of a subgroup of homogeneous patients. This idea is consistent with
two previous reports that have calculated EVIC from cost-effectiveness models
(Basu and Meltzer, 2007, van Gestel et al., 2012). However, some confusion remains
in the literature in terms of the degree of correlation between EVIC and EVPI. While
van Gestel et al. (2012) have stated that EVIC and EVPI are not correlated, Basu and
Meltzer (2010) have indicated that EVIC can also be expressed as an extension of
EVPI. Basu and Meltzer (2010) point out that because EVPI corresponds to the value
of having an infinite sample, this quantity can also be expressed as “the difference
between the expected per patient outcome realized based on decisions made with
such perfect information minus the expected outcome realized based on current
information” (page 4). Since EVPI is defined on the basis of the expected per patient
outcome, then it is appropriate to define EVIC as an extension of EVPI. However,
when EVPI is estimated, most studies express this as the value of an infinite sample
to obtain the true mean parameter, which is calculated by averaging the maximum
NHB across many possible (average) realizations simulated by a PSA. In other
words, by estimating the EVPI this way, one does not derive any estimate of the
value of individualized information (e.g. individual treatment effect). Therefore, it is
reasonable to argue that, in practice, and using current methodological tools, EVIC
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does not capture EVPI. While EVPI depends on the variability of the expected NHB
within individuals (which depends on the sample size), EVIC depends on the
variability between individuals (which relies on the true variability among patients).
An extended and formal explanation of this issue is presented in Appendix 1.
In addition, EVIC for specific parameter(s) (EVICθi) has been proposed as an
informative metric to represent the value of eliciting information about one (or a
few) parameter(s) (Basu and Meltzer, 2007). This quantity has also been interpreted
as the value of implementing a subgroup-based policy (van Gestel et al., 2012). In
fact, EVICθi is similar to the static value of heterogeneity. The advantage of the
EVICθi approach is that it can provide an estimate of the static value for a set of
several parameters, which can be less computationally demanding than the approach
presented in this chapter. However, it does not provide specific information as to
which decisions should be made in specific subgroups defined on the basis of the
combinations of such parameters. Furthermore, it has been proposed that EVICθi can
be used to rank parameters to help health professionals to prioritize information that
should be elicited from individuals (Basu and Meltzer, 2007). This is similar to the
efficiency frontier for subgroup analysis presented here, where alternative
specifications are compared in terms of their static value. However, while EVICθi
contrasts different levels of disaggregation without making them explicit, the
efficiency frontier provides more detailed information for policy making.
Another source of possible confusion can arise from the interpretation of EVICθi and
EVPPI. Both share characteristics that are useful for comparisons between different
parameters. However, whilst EVICθi provides information on the value of using
individual information about θi, EVPPI gives information about the value of
resolving the uncertainty of the effect of θi on the net health outcome. In other
words, while EVICθi or the static value, are useful for making decisions across
subgroups under current information; EVPPI provides information about which
parameters should be investigated in the future. Another possible source of confusion
is the uncertainty of the specifications that define subgroups (e.g. moderators of
treatment). For example, we might know for sure that our patient has a genetic
polymorphism (complete information) but we might be uncertain about the effect of
the polymorphism on the (net) health outcome. In a more realistic world, we are
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uncertain about the effect of the polymorphism on the outcome but also whether the
patient has the polymorphism (since genetic tests are not 100% sensitive and
specific). It is therefore important to emphasize that EVICθi assumes that the
information at individual level is 100% accurate. In other words, it represents the
value of using information 100% specific and 100% sensitive at individual level (van
Gestel et al., 2012). In principle, the uncertainty around the value that a covariate
takes can be represented as another EVPPI for the diagnostic of the condition.
EVPPI calculation is computationally demanding for the population analysis and
may be even more difficult in the case of subgroups. This work assumes that EVPPI
methods can be applied as an extension to subgroup analysis, which might not be the
case due to correlation between subgroups. Applied work is needed to tease out the
strengths and limitations of the EVPPI approach to subgroup analysis.
An important concept mentioned in this chapter is that subgroup specific parameters
can be exchangeable or non-exchangeable. One parameter (θi) is exchangeable if the
information used to estimate θi|s conditional for one subgroup can be used to estimate
θi|(1-s) for another subgroup. The EVPIs estimated as the weighted average of the
EVPI for each subgroup captures the uncertainty given by both exchangeable and
non-exchangeable parameters. Therefore, EVPIs is the informative metric with
which to address the question of whether further research should be conducted in
order to update a guideline for the whole population, considering that different
decisions can be made in different subgroups with future information. However, we
might be interested in conducting information only in the subgroup. In this case, we
should choose the one that offers the highest population EVPI. The aim in the future
would be to synthesize the new information and update the guideline for the whole
population. If this is the purpose, the EVPI estimate, as presented in this chapter,
underestimates the real EVPI for that subgroup, because it does not take into account
the value of (previous) information provided by another subgroup. The extent to
which parameters relating to one subgroup add value of information to decisions
relating to another subgroup is given by the degree of exchangeability of the
parameters relating to this second subgroup. This issue offers an opportunity for
future research.
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It is important to highlight that the approach to decision-making that underlies and
motivates this work assumes a health authority to be able to: (i) undertake a
systematic review and analysis of the current scientific evidence; and (ii) prescribe
the most cost-effective treatment for patients. While this is a reasonable
characterization of the current scenario in the UK NHS, it is not the case in other
countries. Even in the UK, there has been deliberation of a move to the decision-
making approach from a centralized to a devolved process. This might include
modifications of the current process in order to satisfy patient preferences and
choices for treatment (Department of Health, 2010). It was mentioned that choices
for treatment could be informative about the joint distribution of potential outcomes.
Therefore, a decision-making process that formally considers these choices might be
consistent with the societal aims. The role of choices for treatment in a devolved
healthcare system is a matter that requires further research.
Overall, while analysing data to obtain average cost-effectiveness estimates does not
recognize the underlying heterogeneity, a systematic analysis of subgroups in CEA
offers relevant information to central or local authorities for making better decisions
in allocating resources. The value of heterogeneity has been presented highlighting
two dimensions of the decision-making problem. While the static value informs
whether different decisions must be made in different subgroups, the dynamic value
reveals whether heterogeneity should be considered in future research. Application
of this framework to real data is needed to reveal the feasibility of its implementation
in practice, which is the motivation for the next chapter of this thesis.
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4. CHAPTER 4:




The previous chapter developed a methodological framework for cost-effectiveness
subgroup analysis. The main points of this approach can be summarized in three key
messages. First, several specifications supported by biological rationale should be
compared in terms of their potential gains. This comparison offers an opportunity to
address the selection of subgroups considering an efficiency criterion. Second, the
optimal number of subgroups is defined at the maximum point of stratification, such
that the additional benefits are greater than the additional (transaction) costs. Third,
the value of heterogeneity has two dimensions, the additional expected net benefits
according to the available information (static value) and the potential expected net
benefits that can be achieved if the remaining uncertainty is resolved for a particular
level of disaggregation (dynamic value).
The aim of this chapter is to apply the methods described in Chapter 3 in a real cost-
effectiveness study in order to test its feasibility, identify its practical strengths and
weaknesses as well as presenting the potential impact in the decision-making
process. The case study was carried out with data collected alongside a multicentre
clinical trial performed in the UK to explore alternative treatments in patients with
coronary heart disease (CHD).
The chapter starts by presenting the clinical and cost-effectiveness study used as a
motivational example followed by the description of the methods. Next, results are
presented emphasizing the key points of the new approach. The chapter ends with a
discussion of the main findings, their potential applications, practical strengths and
weaknesses of the methods applied here and final conclusions.
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4.2. Motivational example: RITA-3
4.2.1. Clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness
Non-ST-elevation acute coronary syndrome (NSTE-ACS) is one type of CHD that is
associated with high incidence of complications and mortality (Anderson et al.,
2007). The third Randomised Intervention Trial of unstable Angina (RITA-3) is one
of the trials performed to compare the efficacy of an intensive versus a conservative
strategy in patients with NSTE-ACS (Fox et al., 2002). After a five-year follow-up,
the study demonstrated that an intensive strategy was able to reduce the risk of the
primary outcome, which was defined as a combined endpoint of death and
myocardial infarction (MI) (primary outcome: OR 0.78; 95% CI 0.61 to 0.99) (Fox
et al., 2005).
Henriksson et al. (2008) reported in a subsequent study, a cost-effectiveness analysis
carried out alongside the RITA-3 trial. The study was primarily based on the
individual patient data of the trial, which were used to populate a decision analytic
model. The structure of the model is presented in Figure 4.1. In addition to standard
cost-effectiveness analyses, this study aimed to explore heterogeneity across
patients. Thus, the analysis was conducted to produce cost-effectiveness estimates
for five subgroups defined on the basis of a predicted baseline risk score. The
baseline risk score was estimated from a logistic regression used to predict the
probability of presenting the primary outcome using a set of individual
characteristics. This approach is consistent with the previous clinical report (Fox et
al., 2005). In order to operationalize this in practice, each subgroup was
characterized as an average patient profile such that the predicted probability is equal
to the average predicted probability of that subgroup.
The study showed that the invasive treatment was not cost-effective at a threshold of
£20,000/QALY gained (ICER=21,943). The subgroup analysis showed that the
invasive treatment was cost-effective only in two subgroups, both with the highest
risk (£11,898/QALY gained and £10,476/QALY gained respectively). Patient
profiles and cost-effectiveness results are presented in Table 4.1. Details about the
clinical and cost-effectiveness study are presented in Appendix 2.
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Figure 4.1. Structure of the RITA-3 decision model.
Note: Reproduced with permission (Henriksson et al., 2008)
Table 4.1. Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) of the RITA-3 cost-effectiveness study for
subgroups.




Age 45 52 52 61 66
Diabetes No No No No Yes
Previous MI No No Yes Yes Yes
Smoker No Yes No Yes No
Heart rate 72 82 82 87 97
ST depression No No Yes Yes Yes
Angina (grade 3 or 4) Yes No Yes No No
Sex Female Male Male Male Male
Left bundle branch
block
No No No No No
ICER (£/QALY) 53,760 22,949 21,325 11,957 12,750
Note: Each subgroup is characterized as an average patient defined by a set of individual
characteristics. The probability of each average profile is tantamount to the average predicted
probability of the corresponding subgroup. (table reproduced with permission from (Henriksson et al.,
2008)).
4.2.2. Limitations of RITA-3 subgroup analysis
Heterogeneity in baseline risk and treatment effect were analysed and reported in the
original study (Henriksson et al., 2008). However, the approach adopted might not
necessarily be the most adequate for the purposes of – for example - clinical practice.
One of the limitations in the RITA-3 cost-effectiveness analysis is that subgroups
were defined based on a baseline risk score estimated from the data. Although this

















approach is internally valid, it fails in terms of external validity. For example,
doctors are limited in defining a high risk patient on the basis of the risk score used
in this study. Instead, they are more likely to estimate the baseline risk based on a
well established risk score system, for example, the GRACE risk score as
recommended by NICE guidelines (NICE Guideline 94, 2010).
In addition, the analytical approach used a representative profile for each subgroup.
For example, for subgroup 1 (lowest average risk) the profile was a female patient,
45 years old with severe angina. On the other hand, the highest risk subgroup was
defined by a 66 years old male patient with diabetes, previous MI, no severe angina
but presenting ST depression at baseline. As explained above, these profiles were
defined according to the baseline risk score, such that the predicted risk score of each
specific profile equalled the mean risk score of that subgroup. In some cases, patients
in the real world can be very similar to the profiles presented in the report and can be
categorised in one particular subgroup; however, in many other cases patients cannot
be categorised. Thus, according to the elements presented in Chapter 3, this analysis
failed to be explicit in its consideration of how this subgroup definition can be
operationalized in practice.
Furthermore, the baseline risk score was estimated for the primary outcome, i.e. the
composite endpoint of cardiovascular death or myocardial infarction during the
index hospitalization. It is clear that, for decisions based on cost-effectiveness, the
relevant outcome is the ratio between incremental costs and benefits (or NHB)
estimated for a longer time horizon. Thus, an analysis based on discrete (baseline)
covariates (or their combinations) could offer a better understanding of the baseline




A subgroup cost-effectiveness analysis was undertaken based on the individual
patient data collected in the RITA-3 trial, including baseline risk characteristics,
treatment effect, HRQoL and costs. Details of these data have been reported
previously (Henriksson et al., 2008, Epstein et al., 2008, Kim et al., 2005). In this
section, five main points that must be considered in cost-effectiveness subgroup
analysis are described, namely: definition of subgroups; sources of heterogeneity;
selection of subgroup specifications; cost-effectiveness analysis; and value of further
research.
All results are presented as population values. The size of the population of patients
with NSTE-ACS was estimated considering an annual incidence of 59,756 patients,
a time horizon of 10 years and a discount rate of 3.5% per year. The incidence
corresponds to the UK estimate available from the British national statistics (Office
for National Statistics). The relevant population for this case study was estimated in
556,723 patients according to the formula (3.17) in Chapter 3. For simplicity, the
annual incidence was assumed to be the same across different subgroups.
Following the arguments developed in Chapter 3, definitions of subgroups
considered three main elements: first, specifications must offer feasibility for future
implementation in practice; second, specifications must have biological plausibility;
and third, no ethical or equity concerns should hinder a potential implementation of
decisions based on those specifications. A fourth logical constraint is the lack of
information in the data either to include other specifications or to examine further
combinations of specifications. All covariates that have been reported as significant
predictors of the primary outcomes were considered for the analysis. This is because
the heterogeneity that can be captured and represented through the decision model is
only due to this set of covariates. However, there is no guarantee that all the
covariates will be equally significant in their ability to explain variability of the cost-
effectiveness outcome, as they did for the clinical primary outcome. A regression
analysis was conducted to explore the effect of each covariate on the probability that
the new strategy was cost-effective for a particular patient. The analysis was
performed in STATA 12.
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4.3.1. Sources of Heterogeneity
As mentioned, the original cost-effectiveness model developed by Henriksson et al.
(2008) was specified on the basis of eight equations, four to estimate the transition
probabilities of the decision model and four to estimate costs and utilities. For the
purpose of this application study, it was decided to keep the original decision model
to undertake the subgroup analysis as described in Chapter 3, rather than exploring
the effect of alternative structural assumptions in the model.
This analysis incorporates baseline risk heterogeneity through the prediction of
individual parameters, including probabilities, costs and utilities. These individual
estimates are conditional to the set of covariates considered in the regression
equations. Thus, for example, only age and severity of angina were significant
covariates for predicting the composite event (Equation 1). On the other hand, all
covariates were significant predictors of the failure to the treatment in the follow-up
estimation (Equation 2). Equations are presented in Appendix 2.
The impact of treatment effect heterogeneity was also explored in this study. The
effects of the interaction terms between treatment and the covariates of interest were
analysed in all equations. Heterogeneity in preferences was not considered because
of the lack of information about community preferences in the general literature43.
Neither was heterogeneity in costs exclusively considered. All covariates used to
predict the expected individual costs were also risk predictors at baseline. Therefore,
heterogeneity in costs in this case is a result of baseline risk heterogeneity.
4.3.2. Selection of Subgroups
Total expected population NHB were estimated for each specification. Details of the
implementation are described below. Results were plotted to represent the efficiency
frontier for subgroup analysis, according to the framework presented in Chapter 3.
For illustrative purposes, a simplified guideline is presented for each level of
disaggregation. These guidelines are constructed on the basis of the specification that
provides the highest NHB and showed as a clinical algorithm.
43 The difficulty of exploring heterogeneity for community preferences has been discussed in Chapter
2.
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4.3.3. Implementation of the trial based Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
The model estimated the individual NHB of an invasive and conservative
intervention conditional to the characteristics of each patient recruited in the trial. In
other words, instead of choosing a representative profile for each subgroup as in the
original report (Henriksson et al., 2008), the profile of each patient was used to
estimate expected costs and benefits of both strategies, providing an estimate of the
counterfactual. The mean costs, QALYs and ICERs are calculated as the average
across individual estimates. For subgroup analysis, the mean values are obtained as
the average across patients that are members of one particular category (e.g.
diabetics). This technique also provides an opportunity to estimate the Expected
Value of Individualized Care (EVIC). According to the definition of Basu and
Meltzer (2007) and the subsequent application by van Gestel et al. (2012), total
EVIC can be calculated as the difference between the average of the maximum
individual NHB and the maximum of the average NHB (see Appendix 1 for details).
In addition, parameter-specific EVIC can also be estimated from this data using the
method explained by van Gestel et al. (2012) (see Appendix 3).
4.3.4. Value of further research
As mentioned in Chapter 3, one of the main contributions of this analytical
framework is to consider uncertainty as one of the dimensions of the value of
heterogeneity. The characterization of parameter uncertainty requires consideration
of the standard errors of the point estimates obtained from the regression models into
the decision model (equations 1-4, costs and utility). This was undertaken using the
Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix estimated from such equations.
Next, a PSA was conducted in order to propagate the parameter uncertainty through
the decision model. One thousand iterations were run for each patient, so that an
individual profile of uncertainty was obtained. As a consequence, the PSA produced
1,810,000 iterations (four matrices of 1,000 by 1,810): two for expected costs and
two for expected QALYs of the invasive and conservative strategy respectively.
These matrices provided the whole data needed for the subgroup analysis planned in
this chapter. The model was implemented in Excel 2007.
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The uncertainty relating to the overall population was estimated by averaging each of
the 1,000 iterations across the 1,810 individuals, producing a unique vector of 1,000
iterations. Because the purpose was only to estimate uncertainty at this stage (no
heterogeneity), the seed that generates the set of random parameters was set so that
each iteration of the PSA was estimated in every individual with a unique set of
random parameters. The vectors of 1,000 possible realizations each (two for costs
and two for benefits) provide the results to estimate the maximum average NHB and
the average of the maximum NHB, and as a consequence, the total expected value of
perfect information (EVPI).
For subgroups, the expected NHB and expected maximum NHB, were estimated
using the same approach but separately for each specific subgroup. For example, in
order to analyse diabetes, each matrix44 was divided into two, one including patients
with diabetes (244 individuals) and another with patients without diabetes (1,566
subjects), i.e. one matrix of 1,000 by 244 and other of 1,000 by 1,566. Later, NHBs
for both treatments were calculated for diabetic and non-diabetic patients combining
the information of costs and QALYs. Finally, the maximum average NHB and the
average across the maximum NHB were estimated for both sub-populations.
Subgroup analysis for the rest of the specifications followed the same principles
described for diabetes. These estimates provided the basis to calculate the static and
dynamic value of heterogeneity. For simplicity, all the results shown in this
application study were calculated for a threshold (λ) value of £20,000/QALY.  
The transaction costs between specifications on the cost-effectiveness frontier will be
discussed considering the type of guidelines resulting from the subgroup cost-
effectiveness analysis.
44 This refers to each of four matrices: (i) matrix for costs of the invasive strategy, (ii) matrix for costs




4.4.1. Definition of subgroups
All covariates that were significant in predicting the primary clinical outcome were
considered. Average marginal effects were estimated from a logit model to explore
the effect of each covariate on the probability that the new strategy is cost-effective
for a particular individual at a cost-effectiveness threshold of £20,000 per QALY.
The dependent variable is binary taking the value of 1 if the individual expected
NHB of the invasive strategy is the maximum and zero if the individual expected
NHB of the conservative strategy is the maximum. The analysis was conducted
using the command margeff in STATA 12 (Bartus, 2005). Table 4.2 shows the
average marginal effects from the multivariable analysis.
Table 4.2. Average marginal effects of nine covariates on the probability that the invasive strategy is the
most cost-effectivee at a threshold of $20,000 per QALY. Results based on a multivariable logit model.
dF/dx Std Error z (P > z)
Diabetes 0.448 0.021 20.67 (p<0.001)
Previous MI 0.270 0.016 16.29 (p<0.001)
Smoker 0.359 0.015 23.89 (p<0.001)
ST depression 0.177 0.014 12.34 (p<0.001)
Left Bundle Branch Block 0.622 0.025 24.47 (p<0.001)
Severe Angina -0.082 0.013 -6.31 (p<0.001)
Sex 0.192 0.012 14.90 (p<0.001)
Age 0.009 0.0006 15.15 (p<0.001)
Pulse 0.04 0.002 19.29 (p<0.001)
The logit model showed that all covariates are significantly associated with a greater
probability of the invasive strategy being cost-effective, with diabetes the variable
with the highest magnitude of effect. The only exception is severe angina, which is
significant but negatively associated45. Further, in the univariate analysis angina was
the only covariate that was not significant. This might suggest a limited capacity of
angina to explain the heterogeneity of decisions. Regardless, these results support the
45 This finding seems inconsistent with the clinical report that showed that severe angina is associated
with higher risk of presenting the primary outcome, which could be interpreted as more capacity to
benefit within these patients. This can be explained by the fact that patients in this category incur
higher costs under the invasive strategy (see Table A2.3 in Appendix 2) and, as a consequence, is less
cost-effective.
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use of all these covariates in the subsequent analysis because they might provide
evidence for different decisions between subgroups.
Three of these covariates were excluded from the analysis for reasons other than
their ability to explain heterogeneity. Sex and age have been excluded, because
decisions that differentiate reimbursement based on any of those specifications are
subject to ethical criticism. In the case of pulse, which corresponds to a numerical
variable, there is no consensus about how to categorise it and it would be very
difficult to implement alternative decisions based on an arbitrary definition. This is
also applicable to age. However, their suitability as baseline risk predictors would
indicate that they should be used as part of the estimation of a well documented
baseline risk score system, for example, TIMI or GRACE (Antman et al., 2000,
Muthappan et al., 2012). Thus, subgroups based on alternative cut-offs in the score
can be explored. Unfortunately, the data available for this study did not provide
enough information to calculate any well established baseline risk-score. For this
reason, an additional subgroup analysis based on the baseline risk score used by the
original cost-effectiveness study (Henriksson et al., 2008) was used to illustrate this
point. Next, a brief justification for the selected specifications is provided.
4.4.1.1. Diabetes
Diabetes has been recognized as a major baseline risk factor affecting CHD. In
particular for patients with NSTE-ACS, diabetes might explain differences in cost-
effectiveness outcomes because of higher rates of mortality or myocardial infarction
(Luscher et al., 2003). The biological plausibility is founded on the fact that patients
with diabetes have, on average, higher levels of inflammation, which is etiologically
related with more unstable atheromatous plaques (Creager et al., 2003). Thus,
diabetics have increased rates of acute CHD, a higher number of complications and
greater mortality rates as well as higher likelihood of restenosis and future coronary
events (Lincoff, 2003, Stone et al., 1989). Therefore, the co-morbidity “diabetes” is
acknowledged to be a relevant condition in cardiovascular pathophysiology and it
seems entirely appropriate to explore whether the cost-effectiveness of an invasive
strategy varies between patients with and without this condition. No ethical concerns
seem relevant and the specification can be easily operationalized in practice.
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4.4.1.2. ST depression
ST depression is an electrocardiographic marker of myocardial ischemia that
indicates partial obstruction of the coronary network. In addition, ST depression is
associated with increased future cardiac events and mortality (Nyman et al., 1993,
Hyde et al., 1999, Krone et al., 1993, Savonitto et al., 1999). Moreover, it has been
reported that patients with ST depression have more capacity to benefit from an early
revascularization than those without this marker (Diderholm et al., 2002). There are
no limitations of implementation since electrocardiography is considered a basic
element of the coronary examination at the first evaluation in emergency. No ethical
concerns should be raised, because it is a condition that might provide information
about which patients can perceive more benefit from the invasive strategy.
4.4.1.3. Previous MI
The antecedent of a previous MI guarantees the fact that the patient has coronary
heart disease and is associated with a higher rate of complications and mortality due,
for example, to ventricular arrhythmias or left ventricular dysfunction (Bigger et al.,
1984, Schulze et al., 1975). It is highly likely that by providing early
revascularization patients will benefit more in clinical terms but also extra costs
might be avoided because the procedure may also be needed after the early stage of
the episode. This rationale leads to us to consider that, on average, an invasive
strategy can be cost-effective only in patients with previous MI. This specification
can be easily operationalized in practice and no ethical concern should limit its
potential implementation.
4.4.1.4. Left Bundle Branch Block
Left bundle branch block (LBBB) is an electrocardiographic anomaly that can occult
classical electrocardiographic manifestations of acute myocardial infarction (AMI).
In addition, the diagnostic of the new LBBB in the course of an acute coronary
syndrome is highly suggestive of myocardial infarction (Sgarbossa, 1996). An
invasive strategy is considered effective and cost-effective in patients with AMI.
Therefore, if an important proportion of patients with LBBB corresponds to patients
with AMI, then is highly likely that NST-ACS patients with LBBB will have
benefits greater than the average. Similar to ST depression, another specification
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based on electrocardiography, this specification is easy to implement in practice and
no ethical concerns should be raised.
4.4.1.5. Smoking
Tobacco is a well acknowledged independent risk factor of CHD (Lloyd-Jones et al.,
2006). Its effect on the coronary bed includes vasomotor dysfunction, inflammation
and modification of the lipid profile (Ambrose and Barua, 2004). In the context of
NST-ACS, clinical guidelines recommend smoking be considered in the risk
stratification (Anderson et al., 2007). More recently it has been reported that the
treatment effect of an early invasive strategy in patients with NST-ACS is greater in
smokers than in non-smokers (Aune et al., 2010). Therefore, clinical and biological
evidence suggest that patients who smoke might have more capacity to benefit from
an invasive strategy. From an ethical point of view, a valid concern could be to
generate alternative recommendations in favour of smokers. Because this is an
unresolved issue, from the analyst’s point of view, it is considered appropriate to
examine subgroups based on this specification.
4.4.1.6. Severe Angina
Angina is a consequence of the lack of blood flow to some areas of the heart and its
severity is associated with the degree of coronary injury. In the clinical RITA-3
report angina proved to be a good predictor of the primary outcome (Fox et al.,
2005). Therefore, if patients with severe angina have more capacity to benefit, an
early intervention might also prevent future complications, avoiding extra costs.
Thus, there is clinical and biological support to explore this covariate. Neither ethical
concerns nor operationalization problems are identified for this specification. Angina
was considered severe if patients presented with angina grade 3 or 446.
4.4.2. Cost-effectiveness results
4.4.2.1. Average
The invasive strategy was considered not cost-effective at λ=20,000/QALY 
(ICER=21,960). The expected NHBs achieved by the most cost-effective strategy
(conservative strategy) are 4,397,388 net-QALYs. If further research is undertaken
46 Angina degree 3 or 4 refers to the presence of typical cardiogenic thoracic pain associated to
clinical signs of pulmonary oedema or cardiogenic shock respectively (Anderson et al., 2007).
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to resolve the current uncertainty, the expected NHBs are 4,408,143 net-QALYs.
The EVPI, i.e. the potential gains of resolving the uncertainty are 10,755 net-
QALYs.
4.4.2.2. Expected Value of Individualized Care (EVIC)
The total population EVIC was estimated at 14,349 net-QALYs. This corresponds to
the difference between the expected maximum individual NHBs (4,411,737 net-
QALYs) and the maximum expected NHBs (4,397,388 net-QALYs). This can be
interpreted as the expected gains that can be achieved if decisions were based on
individualized cost-effectiveness estimates. This between-patient heterogeneity, from
which EVIC is estimated, is conditional on the information that has been considered
in the decision model, which includes a set of observable covariates that were good
predictors of relevant parameters of the model. The individualized analysis also
provided evidence that the new strategy should be implemented in 591 patients of
the sample (32.65%). The subgroup analysis in the next section aims to identify
these patients through observable characteristics.
4.4.2.3. Subgroup analysis: The two subgroup case
The expected NHBs under current and perfect information were estimated for six
binary specifications. Results are presented in Table 4.3. Severe angina was the only
covariate that did not differentiate decisions between subgroups. As a consequence,
the maximum expected NHBs are the same as the average (4,397,388 net-QALYs).
Diabetes showed the highest expected NHBs under current and perfect information
among all covariates, 4,403,199 and 4,412,177 net-QALYs respectively. This
provides the greatest static value for all binary covariates, 5,811 net-QALYs
(4,403,199 minus 4,397,388). A guideline based on this finding is shown in Figure
4.2. Furthermore, the potential health gains that can be obtained by resolving
uncertainty (EVPI) conditional for diabetic and non-diabetic patients is lower than
average (8,978 versus 10,755 net-QALYs). However, the absolute value of health
under perfect information is higher than average. This provides evidence that the
value of resolving uncertainty conditional to heterogeneity (dynamic value) has two
sources: first, the value of an infinite sample in estimating conditional parameters,
which is revealed by a positive EVPI; and second, the value of estimating
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conditional parameters with an infinite sample, which is revealed by the fact that the
EVPI is lower than the average.
Table 4.3. Cost-effectiveness subgroup analysis of RITA-3 trial: The two subgroup case.
Specification (proportion of










Average 4,397,388 4,408,143 10,755 21,943
Diabetes (0.13) 4,403,199 4,412,177 8,978 15,808 23,528
Previous Myocardial Infarction
(0.27)
4,400,926 4,411,501 10,574 18,558 23,877
ST depression (0.36) 4,398,950 4,411,199 12,248 19,452 23,765
Left Bundle Branch Block (0.035) 4,399,530 4,410,850 11,320 14,628 22,402
Smoker (0.32) 4,399,896 4,411,278 11,382 19,016 23,721
Severe Angina (0.35) 4,397,388 4,410,526 13,138 22,704 21,495
Note: NHB and EVPI are presented in QALYs (net of costs) for a threshold value of £20,000/QALY
gained. The ICER is presented in sterling pounds per QALY gained.
For patients without previous MI, expected NHBs were 4,400,926 net-QALYs,
providing a positive static VoH of 3,538 net-QALYs. However, the increase in
NHBs provided by this specification is lower than was observed in the case of
diabetes. In terms of the potential health gains if perfect information were revealed,
the expected maximum NHBs are 4,411,501net-QALYs leading to an EVPI of
10,574 net-QALYs. Specifications such as depression of the segment ST, LBBB and
being a smoker also provided a positive static value (1,562; 2,142 and 2,508 net-
QALYs respectively). However, these values are lower than can be obtained by
making decisions based on the two previous specifications.
Figure 4.2. Guideline for the management of patients with Non ST elevation Acute Coronary Syndrome:






4.4.2.4. Subgroup analysis: the four subgroup case
Pairs of binary covariates were analysed as single specifications of four subgroups.
The results are presented in Table 4.4.They show that under current information the
combination of diabetes and LBBB achieves the maximum expected NHBs
(4,404,566 net-QALYs). This corresponds to a positive static value of 7,178 net-
QALYs compared to the average case and 1,367 net-QALYs compared to the
specification diabetes for two subgroups. The results also showed that diabetes was
part of the five specifications with the highest expected NHBs. This suggests an
important informative role of diabetes for understanding heterogeneity in
comparison with other covariates47. Previous MI, LBBB and smoking seem to be the
next most informative covariates. They provided the next highest expected NHB
either in combination with diabetes or between them. As expected from the analysis
for the two subgroups, severe angina was not informative in combination with any of
the previous covariates. However, it provided evidence for different decisions in
combination with depression of ST segment leading to a modest gain in expected
NHBs. Thus, although at this level of disaggregation, severe angina does not offer
major gains, it keeps its potential when further disaggregation is examined.
In terms of dynamic value, results are consistent with the analysis for the two
subgroups where diabetes provided the highest value. In this case, the specifications
with the highest NHBs under perfect information were in combination with diabetes.
Likewise, EVPI in all these specifications was lower than average. A clinical
guideline constructed at this level of disaggregation is presented in Figure 4.3. In
addition to this analysis, decision-makers might be interested in selecting subgroups
where further research is worth conducting. For example, let us consider the situation
where there are four subgroups defined by the combination of diabetes and LBBB. In
this case, the subgroup of patients that are non-diabetic and do not have LBBB
produces the maximum health gains when uncertainty is resolved (EVPI 6,767 net-
QALYs). A list of EVPI per subgroup is provided in Appendix 3.
47 The informative capacity of one covariate or specification refers to its ability for disaggregating the
population such that more individuals are classified correctly, i.e. as they would have been according
to their individual expected incremental cost-effectiveness ratio.
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A & B A & No B No A & B No A & No B
Average 4,397,388 4,408,143 10,755 21,943
(A) Diabetes and
(B) LBBB
4,404,566 4,412,841 8,275 11,526 16,111 15,553 24,013
(A) Diabetes and
(B) Previous MI
4,403,714 4,413,271 9,556 14,899 16,484 19,720 25,554
(A) Diabetes and
(B) Smoking
4,403,455 4,413,444 9,988 14,223 16,429 19,881 25,990
(A) Diabetes and
(B) Severe Angina
4,403,199 4,412,590 9,391 17,212 14,813 24,344 23,071
(A) Diabetes and
(B) ST depression
4,403,199 4,412,897 9,698 15,013 16,434 20,661 25,586
(A) Previous MI and
(B) LBBB
4,402,052 4,412,169 10,117 13,969 18,897 15,111 24,373
(A) LBBB and
(B) Smoking
4,401,288 4,412,090 10,802 12,308 15,380 19,283 24,366
(A) ST depression and
(B) Smoking
4,400,939 4,412,249 11,310 16,642 21,107 20,697 25,672
(A) Previous MI and
(B) ST depression
4,400,929 4,412,673 11,746 19,439 16,877 20,533 26,812
(A) Previous MI and
(B) Smoking
4,400,926 4,412,664 11,738 15,994 19,833 20,435 26,211
(A) Previous MI and
(B) Severe Angina
4,400,926 4,411,979 11,052 19,824 17,480 25,075 23,314
(A) ST depression and
(B) LBBB
4,400,214 4,411,976 11,762 13,249 19,748 15,297 24,392
(A) Smoking and
(B) Severe Angina
4,399,896 4,411,627 11,731 19,376 18,804 24,732 23,127
(A) LBBB and
(B) Severe Angina
4,399,530 4,411,306 11,776 16,421 13,137 23,195 21,946
(A) ST depression and
(B) Severe Angina
4,399,396 4,411,566 12,170 20,408 18,860 24,481 23,360
Note: Abbreviations used in this table are: MI (myocardial infarction), ST depression (depression of
the ST segment), LBBB (left bundle branch block), ICER (Incremental cost-effectiveness threshold),
NHB (Net Health Benefits) and EVPI (Expected Value of Perfect Information)
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Figure 4.3. Guideline for the management of patients with Non ST elevation Acute Coronary Syndrome:
The four subgroup case
4.4.2.5. Additional subgroup analysis
The analysis conducted so far provides a partial understanding of how to characterize
heterogeneity of the population using certain informative covariates. Further analysis
can be guided by this knowledge, particularly exploring combinations of covariates
that have shown informative capacity. Ultimately, the analysis can be extended to the
study of the combinations of the whole set of observable covariates in one single
specification, in order to produce a single guideline.
Table 4.5 presents the results for six additional specifications. Four of them were
defined on the basis of the alternative combination between diabetes, previous MI,
smoking, LBBB and ST depression to produce eight subgroups. From these, the
specification that combined diabetes, previous MI and smoking reached the
maximum expected NHBs (4,405,519 net QALYs). The analysis for the other three
specifications showed that previous MI, smoking or ST depression do not add more
information to the combination defined by diabetes and LBBB (zero static value). A
guideline based on this specification is showed in Figure 4.4. Details of these results















Previous MI & Smoking (8 subgroups) 4,405,519 4,414,587 9,068
(2) Diabetes &
Previous MI & LBBB (8 subgroups) 4,404,566 4,413,892 9,326
(3) Diabetes &
Smoking & LBBB (8 subgroups) 4,404,566 4,414,198 9,632
(4) Diabetes & LBBB & ST depression
(8 subgroups) 4,404,566 4,413,820 9,254
(5) Diabetes & Previous MI &
Smoking & LBBB (16 subgroups) 4,406,788 4,415,294 8,505
(6) All covariates (49 subgroups) 4,408,359 4,416,806 8,447
Note 1: NHB and EVPI expressed as QALYs net of costs for the population.
Note 2: For the eight subgroups case the specification that combines diabetes, previous MI and
smoking provides the highest NHB. Specifications (2), (3) and (4) have the same expected NHB as
the single combination between diabetes and LBBB (see Table 4.4) (zero static value).
Note 3: Specification (6) is defined as multiple combinations between six covariates, which produce
64 theoretical subgroups. However, the trial did not provide data for the whole subgroups. Therefore,
these results are constrained to 49 subgroups.
Figure 4.4. Guideline for the management of patients with Non ST elevation Acute Coronary Syndrome:















Figure 4.5. Guideline for the management of patients with Non ST elevation Acute Coronary Syndrome:
The sixteen subgroup case
Table 4.5 also shows the estimations of two additional specifications. One of them is
based on the combination of diabetes, previous MI, LBBB and smoking leading to
sixteen subgroups. This specification provided higher expected NHBs (4,406,788
net-QALYs) than combinations examined in previous analyses. The corresponding
guideline is presented in Figure 4.5. The final specification presented in Table 4.5
corresponds to the combination of all (six) observable covariates. Although this
specification produces 64 potential subgroups, the trial only provided data for 49
subsets of patients (details in Appendix 3). This analysis showed the highest
expected NHBs, which correspond to a static value of 10,971 net-QALYs. In other
words, it takes account of 76.5% of the total EVIC (10,971/14,349). The efficiency
frontier for subgroup analysis presented in Figure 4.6 shows the maximum expected
NHB for each level of disaggregation. As suggested in Chapter 3, the curve shows
diminishing marginal returns of net health. In other words, higher net health gains
are achieved at lower levels of disaggregation. The guideline that can be constructed
from the evidence under current information with the specification for 49 subgroups
is presented in Figure 4.7.
It seems feasible that all guidelines presented for this subgroup analysis could be






















and well accepted clinical characteristics. Therefore, it is argued that the increase in
NHBs is higher than the transaction costs in each case.
Figure 4.6. Efficiency Frontier for Subgroup Analysis. Specifications that maximise the expected Net
Health Benefits for each level of disaggregation.
Note: Each point is labelled with the name of the specifications and the number of subgroups. The
abbreviations are: dm (diabetes mellitus), dm&LBBB (diabetes mellitus and left bundle branch
block), dm&pmi&smoker (diabetes mellitus, previous myocardial infarction and smoker), all
covariates (diabetes mellitus, previous myocardial infarction, smoker, left bundle branch block, ST
depression and angina). The x axis is presented in a logarithmic scale to facilitate visualization.
In terms of dynamic value, all specifications showed positive values with respect to
the baseline and the previous level of disaggregation. The highest estimates under
perfect information were always given by the same specification on the efficiency
frontier, except for one case. The specification defined by diabetes and smoking (4
subgroups) is not on the frontier but it provides more expected NHBs under perfect
information than the specification on the frontier defined by diabetes and LBBB.
This was referred to in Chapter 3 as a non-proportional dynamic value and suggests
that further research conditional to the former specification has more value than the
latter. The estimates under current and perfect information as well as the EVPI are






































































No ST depress Conservative Strategy
100
These results show that the specification that combined all covariates provided the
highest expected NHBs under current and perfect information observed in this analysis.
The distance between empty and filled points in the graph corresponds to the EVPI,
which is depicted in filled circles. These results also show a trend in which the EVPI
decreases as more subgroups are considered in the analysis.
Figure 4.8. Expected Net Health Benefits under current and perfect information for different level of
disaggregation.
Note: Expected Net Health Benefits (NHB) expressed in QALYs. Empty diamonds represent the
expected NHB achieved with the specification that maximises net health in one particular level of
disaggregation. The dotted line across those points illustrates the efficiency frontier for subgroup analysis
(as shown in Figure 4.6). Filled diamonds represent the expected NHB that might be achieved if an
infinite sample is collected for the corresponding specification on the efficiency frontier. The empty and
filled square correspond to the expected NHB under current and perfect information for the specification
defined by diabetes and smoking (dm&smoking).
As explained in section 4.4.1 a baseline risk score might be a more informative
specification than those examined hitherto in this chapter. Table 4.6 shows the results of
the subgroup analysis based on the specification used in the original RITA-3 cost-
effectiveness study. The invasive strategy is considered cost-effective only in those
patients whose risk score was above the percentile 75. The expected NHBs under
current information are 4,407,074 net-QALYs, which is equivalent to 9,686 net-

































































by Henriksson et al. (2008) (Table 4.1) can be explained by the different methodology.
In this study the estimates correspond to the average across individuals, whereas
Henriksson et al. (2008) reported the estimate of an average individual (see section
4.2.1). The results under perfect information illustrate the positive dynamic value,
which is even greater than the specification of sixteen subgroups but lower than the
specification for all covariates.
















4,407,074 4,416,926 9,852 34,055 24.925 20,129 17,974 15,813
Finally, as expected and explained in Chapter 3, EVIC for parameters were equivalent
to the estimations of the static value of heterogeneity. For example, the estimation of the
specific EVIC for diabetes was 5,803 net-QALYs, which is approximately the same as
the static value reported in this chapter (5,811 net-QALYs). It is argued that small
differences between estimates of static value and parameter specific EVIC are explained
by approximations alongside the calculation process. Appendix 4 provides an
explanation of the parameter specific EVIC and a demonstration of its equivalence with
the static value concept.
4.4.3. Analysis of other sources of heterogeneity
In addition to the results presented above, the relevance of considering treatment effect
heterogeneity was also studied in this chapter. Several alternative models were studied
and compared with original equations. Table 4.7 shows the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) for the equations where interactions between covariates and treatment
can be included in the model. This excludes Equation 4 and the equation for utilities at
randomisation because they did not include the treatment term. The values presented for
the model with interaction corresponds to the smallest AIC observed among several
models studied with different interaction terms. In all cases the equations without
interaction terms were considered more appropriate than alternative specifications
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including interactions between covariates and treatment. Given these characteristics of
goodness of fit and parsimony the analysis was restricted to the original equations.
Table 4.7. Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) of equation models with and without interaction with
treatment effect.
Model without interaction Model with interaction
Equation 1 460 463
Equation 2 (3) 1739 1742
Costs during the index hospitalization 36,242 36,252
Cost first year after the index
hospitalization
35,837 35,838
Change in utility at follow-up 546 547
4.5. Discussion
Chapter 3 argued in favour of the role of subgroup analysis in exploring heterogeneity
in the context of cost-effectiveness studies. This chapter shows an application of the
methods presented in that previous chapter using the economic evaluation of the RITA-
3 trial as a motivational example. In this study a subgroup analysis based primarily on
six binary specifications (diabetes, previous MI, smoking, ST depression, LBBB and
severe angina) was performed. They were examined as single binary specifications and
also in combination. This led to a specification of 64 possible subgroups when all
covariates were simultaneously combined. The results showed that as long as the
analysis progressed in disaggregation, higher expected NHBs (under current
information) could be achieved when informative specifications were considered.
Further, the expected health gains between two points (static value) were higher at low
numbers of subgroups and decreased as the analysis increased in disaggregation. This
can be expressed as diminishing marginal returns of net health. In terms of dynamic
value, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that the value of collecting further
research increases when it is conditional to heterogeneity. In addition, results are
compatible with the hypothesis that when the analysis has been performed using
informative specifications the general trend is towards a decrease in the EVPI as more
subgroups are considered.
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It is important to emphasize that these results depend on the decisions across different
subgroups, which will vary depending on the threshold used. For simplicity, in this
study all interpretations have been made based on a threshold of £20,000 per QALY. In
the event that decision-makers require results for different threshold values, this
analysis can be extended to examine the static and dynamic value of each relevant
specification for a set of threshold values.
Another important element of this framework is the role of transaction costs in the
selection between levels of disaggregation. In this chapter, transaction costs have not
been estimated, which can be considered a limitation of this study. However, it is
argued that the guidelines presented here do not impose additional complexity on other
schemes of risk stratification presented in the literature for these patients, and as a
consequence, it is unlikely to determine difficulties in their implementation. Thus, even
the guideline that combines 49 subgroups can be reasonably implemented in practice
because the transaction costs are likely to be very low. In contrast, the restriction of
transaction costs could be observed for the specification based on the baseline risk
score. It can be argued that the implementation of such guidelines requires the
validation of that specific baseline risk score by the clinical community. For this reason
it is very likely that the transaction costs are higher than the additional benefits.
As pointed out previously in Chapter 3, the dynamic value has two sources; first, the
value of an infinite sample to estimate conditional parameters and second, the value of
estimating conditional parameters48 with an infinite sample. While the first relates to the
classical concept of Value of Information, the second refers to the value of an
estimation of parameters for specific subgroups under perfect information. As explained
before, if the specification is informative, the effect of heterogeneity is to be expected,
not only on the estimation of perfect information but also under current information. As
a consequence, the EVPI should decrease. This chapter provides empirical evidence of
this argument. It shows that as the level of disaggregation increases the expected NHBs
under perfect information increase and, in general, the EVPI decrease. This is true for
the most informative specifications, i.e. those that lie on the efficiency frontier.
48 Footnote 42 in Chapter 3.
104
The chapter also includes an estimation of EVIC. Total EVIC (1,981 net QALYs)
represents the potential gains if individual information about the set of covariates
considered in the model is used to make individualized decisions. This can also be
interpreted as the maximum achievable static value according to the information
considered in this study. This chapter shows that the specification that combines all
covariates accounts for more than 75% of this value, which can be considered a
significant improvement of the efficiency achieved by the clinical guideline.
As explained in Chapter 3, EVIC is independent of EVPI since it depends only on the
level of heterogeneity presented in the random sample, whereas EVPI depends on the
sample size. Results of this study are consistent with this statement since it provides
different expected values for EVIC (1,981) and EVPI (1,484). On the other hand,
parameter-specific EVIC has been suggested as a good instrument to inform policies
based on subgroups (van Gestel et al., 2012). The framework developed in this thesis is
entirely consistent with such a statement because parameter-specific EVIC is equivalent
to the static value of heterogeneity. However, this approach has an advantage in that it
offers a more detailed understanding of the decisions that should be made in specific
subgroups. This is considered paramount for the construction of clinical guidelines.
The framework presented in this thesis proposes to select subgroups based on an
efficiency criterion, the maximisation of the maximum expected NHBs. A similar
answer can be achieved by analysing the rate of misclassification in each subgroup. For
example, let us assume that a guideline based on two subgroups is implemented. It is
known from the analysis at individual level that the invasive strategy is expected to be
cost-effective in 591 patients (32.65%) and not-cost-effective in 1,219 patients
(67.35%). From these, a guideline based on previous MI misclassifies 550 patients
(30.39%). In contrast, a guideline based on diabetes misclassifies 457 patients
(25.25%). The conclusion is that a guideline based on diabetes is more accurate than a
guideline based on previous MI. This is exactly the same result obtained applying the
decision rule proposed by this thesis. The additional benefit of performing this analysis
is that it provides information about the distribution of misclassifications under each
specification. For example, in patients who should receive the invasive strategy,
diabetes misclassifies 402 and previous MI misclassifies only 320. On the other hand,
for patients who should not receive the invasive strategy, diabetes misclassifies 55,
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whereas previous MI misclassifies 230. Thus, if the decision-maker is concerned about
misclassifications in patients who should receive the invasive strategy, previous MI is a
better specification than diabetes. This is an advantage of this type of analysis that
cannot be performed, for example, with the estimation of EVIC for specific parameters.
One of the relevant contributions of this chapter is to provide a demonstration of an
analytical technique able to generate estimates that are consistent with the theory. In the
stage of implementation of the method, several approaches were considered; however,
only one provided adequate estimates. One alternative was to estimate specific
parameters of the original equations for specific subgroups. For example, in order to
estimate cost-effectiveness in diabetic patients, equations might have been estimated
using only the diabetic patients in the trial. A second alternative was to modify original
equations, only including treatment effect and the covariate of interest. Third, the
original model could be used to obtain results based on representative profiles of the
subgroups of interest, as used in the original cost-effectiveness study (Henriksson et al.,
2008). These three approaches presented some drawbacks: first, if original equations
were modified in their initial structure, an additional source of structural uncertainty
would have been introduced49. Second, parameters estimated based on smaller sample
sizes are less consistent and efficient than estimates from bigger samples, leading to
biased cost-effectiveness results and less adequate representation of uncertainty. Third,
the definition of a representative profile is not an easy task and is still an approximation
of the reality that can be misleading. Finally, the estimation of the overall NHBs
assumes a linear relationship between NHBs for specific subgroups and the average
NHB. This assumption cannot be held under any of these alternative approaches. Hence,
an approach based on the estimation of cost-effectiveness at individual level was finally
preferred. This technique has been used in the past (Nease and Owens, 1994, Sculpher,
1998) and also in the cost-effectiveness study of RITA-3, but only to describe the
heterogeneity across individuals. As mentioned, the method uses individual patient
profiles, which are propagated through the decision model producing individual cost-
effectiveness results. It is assumed that the information about the covariates is perfect.
Thus, the overall NHBs (i.e. the average of the individual NHBs) are linearly correlated
with estimates in specific subgroups. In addition, the characterization of uncertainty is
49 Structural uncertainty has been defined and explained in Chapter 1.
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also achieved properly under this approach. The use of the same set of random
parameters for each of the 1,000 iterations produces a correct representation of the
parameter uncertainty without including additional sources of variability such as
individual patient variability.
This study has also explored the possibility of considering other sources of
heterogeneity, such as treatment effect heterogeneity. In this chapter, variations of
treatment effect were explored adding interaction terms between baseline risk covariates
and treatment into the regression models. The fact that different model specifications
might produce completely different results might be due to the effect of the
interaction(s) terms or because of the new structure of the model, that might not
necessarily provide consistent or efficient estimates. It is important to clarify that the
methods applied in this study addressed the characterization of parameter uncertainty
only. In contrast, structural assumptions such as alternative specifications of the model,
corresponds to an additional source of uncertainty called structural uncertainty (Jackson
et al., 2011, Bojke et al., 2009a). In this case, structural assumptions have been
supported on the basis of statistical tools, for example, Akaike information criterion
(AIC), parsimony and models with minimum collinearity. This might still be subject to
criticism, since other statistical methods could have been explored, for example
generalized linear models instead of ordinary least squares in the case of costs and
utilities. Nevertheless, because there is not a clear guideline in this respect, the approach
used here was considered valid and appropriate. This area might be further explored in
the future, and the use of methods to deal with structural uncertainty, such as model
averaging, is worth taking into account (Jackson et al., 2009).
In this study, five covariates of interest were used to predict costs (sex, age, severe
angina, previous MI and ST depression). It is important to highlight the fact that
heterogeneity in costs can be presented in two ways: first, when the specification is
defined exclusively based on costs and without regard for any biological support; and
second, when the specification has been demonstrated to be a risk factor for relevant
health outcomes and it also explains differences in costs. The case presented in this
study is the second situation. While considerations of heterogeneity based solely on
costs can raise ethical questions, it can be considered appropriate to take into account
specifications with both costs and clinical support. In fact, if patients with a particular
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risk factor have lower relative risk than patients without the risk and costs are the same,
there is risk of concluding that a new technology is cost-effective only in the subgroup
with the condition, whereas this might not be the case if differences in costs are
properly taken into account. For example, let us compare two technologies with average
incremental costs and benefits being £20,000 and 1 QALY. Next, let us assume
differences based purely on effects in two subgroups: 1.3 QALY in the subgroup with a
risk factor (lower relative risk) and 0.8 QALYs in the subgroup without risk factors.
This leads to the following estimates: £20,000/1.3QALYs=15,384 and
£20,000/0.8=25,000 indicating that the new treatment is cost-effective in the subgroup
with the risk factor only. But, if costs differences are taken into account (assuming that
patients at higher risk are £10,000 more costly) the estimates are
£25,000/1.3QALYS=19,230 and 15,000/0.8QALYs=18,750. If the threshold is assumed
to be £20,000 per QALY, the omission of heterogeneity in costs could deny a cost-
effective strategy to patients with less capacity to benefit because of the assumption that
they incur more costs.
One of the limitations of this study relates to the exchangeability of information
between subgroups. The estimation of the EVPI for one subgroup assumes that no
additional information will be provided by another subgroup when further research is
undertaken. This is a limitation when decision-makers are focused on one particular
subgroup. However, if the target is the original population, the overall EVPIs presented
here is the metric of interest to update the guideline in the future. In contrast, if the
objective is to collect information only in one subgroup, and then to synthesize evidence
in the future, the EVPI, as estimated in this chapter, underestimates the real value of
further research. An alternative estimate for each subgroup should be estimated in order
to account for the exchangeability of information between subgroups. This requires the
development of methods to adjust the EVPIs presented here, which provides an
opportunity for further research. On the other hand, if the objective is to conduct further
research to update a guideline in one specific subgroup only, the EVPI estimated for
that specific subgroup (without adjustment), as presented here, is the correct estimate.
This study has been performed on the basis of individual patient level data. The
advantage of this type of data is that it provides complete information about each
individual in the sample. Consequently, not only static and dynamic VoH can be
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estimated, but also EVIC and specific-parameter EVIC. Recently, van Gestel et al.
(2012) have estimated EVIC through individual patient level simulation in a case study
for cost-effectiveness in glaucoma. The data they produced by simulation can also be
used to apply the methods presented here. This represents a good example of how to
conduct the analysis when trial-based data is not available and researchers only have
aggregated data. However, some additional elements need to be considered. One of the
characteristics of such data is that individual profiles are drawn from prior information
about the distribution of observable covariates in the population. A common limitation
of that type of data is that the structure of the variance/covariance matrix of such
covariates is not always available, which leads to less representative profiles. In
contrast, the data used in this chapter consider these correlations because the units of
observation (patients) can be considered a truly representative sample of the target
population (Fox et al., 2002).
As mentioned in Chapter 3 this approach aimed to study and understand heterogeneity
in terms of its additional value in current decisions, but also in terms of resolving the
remaining parameter uncertainty. However, it does not provide the methods to prioritize
the type of study that ought to be undertaken, or the size of the studies that represent a
good use of the limited resources. In order to deal with this issue, a future research
agenda should include the adaptation of the expected value of perfect information for
parameters and the expected net benefit of sampling information to subgroup analysis.
This has not been undertaken here, not only because of the complexity that an
adaptation of such methods would demand but also because it is considered to be
outside of the scope of the main purpose outlined in the first chapter, which is to study
elements of value of heterogeneity in cost-effectiveness analysis.
4.6. Conclusions
The value of heterogeneity framework is a novel analytical approach whose practical
implementation has been demonstrated in this chapter. An approach based on the cost-
effectiveness estimated at individual level in the context of individual patient data
produced an adequate method for obtaining robust and interpretable estimates. Either
the static or the dynamic value of heterogeneity can be properly presented to decision-
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makers for different subgroup specifications in order to provide additional elements to
central and local health authorities for the decision-making process.
In addition, the argument that resolving uncertainty conditional to heterogeneity
provides more net health benefits has been empirically demonstrated in this chapter, and
the idea that understanding heterogeneity can decrease the additional expected net
health benefits that can be achieved when uncertainty is resolved (i.e. EVPI) has also
been shown here.
Finally, it must be emphasized that a systematic application of this analytical approach
requires not only additional effort in terms of modelling but also making explicit those




INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS AND SOCIAL VALUE:
Alternative decision-making approaches and the value of
heterogeneity in the era of individualized care
5.1. Introduction
Previous chapters have examined some important elements of the value of considering
heterogeneity for decision-making in a collectively funded health system. As introduced
in Chapter 2, the overall value corresponds to the difference between the total expected
NB with complete information50 and the expected NB for the average population, which
has been called EVIC51. The EVIC can be estimated from the available data (under
incomplete information) and interpreted as the maximum static value that can be
achieved when decisions at individual level are implemented based on individual cost-
effectiveness. However, as explained in Chapter 3, decisions at individual level, i.e.
decisions that account for the overall value revealed by EVIC, cannot be implemented
due to high transaction costs. As a consequence, recommendations based on subgroups
can be considered an appropriate policy not only because they account for some
proportion of this static value but also because they offer the opportunity to increase
value through further research to resolve decision uncertainty (dynamic value).
The arguments developed in previous chapters are consistent with a framework of a
centralized process of decision-making. However, both the concepts of decentralizing
decision-making and individualization of care have grown in popularity in the last few
years (Mishra, 2011, Malandrino and Smith, 2011, Hewitt, 2011, Tursz et al., 2011,
Trusheim et al., 2007). For example, in the US individualization has been broadly
50 Complete information (formally presented in Chapter 2) corresponds to a theoretical (unachievable)
state of knowledge where each subject can be distinguished from other based on a set of individual
observable characteristics. It is unachievable because, as explained in Chapter 2, there are characteristics
that are unobservable, unmeasurable or unknowable.
51 Specifically, this concept of EVIC corresponds to the EVIC with cost internalization.
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focused on how to achieve personalized medicine52 (Hamburg and Collins, 2010) with
significant emphasis being placed upon patient choice (US Public Law Sec 6301, 2010).
In the UK, patient choice has been part of the policy agenda over the last decade with
regard to access and utilization of healthcare facilities (McCabe et al., 2008). More
recently, a proposal for reform of the NHS has considered the empowerment of local
authorities and General Practitioners (GPs) so that they can make decisions that were
previously made centrally. Under this new setting, central authority will devolve
decisions at individual-patient level (i.e. doctors, patients or both) in order to give
explicit consideration to preferences and treatment choices expressed by patients
(Department of Health, 2010).
These changes in the policy agenda represent a strong motivation to study issues around
the individualization of care. In this thesis, the term “decisions at individual level” has
been used to indicate individual recommendations based on cost-effectiveness predicted
specifically for one patient53. This prediction is based on a set of all observable and
measurable characteristics, which might include individual preferences as defined in
Chapter 2. A second type of decisions at individual level is what in this chapter is
termed an “individualized decision”. These decisions are made under Individualized
Care (IC), which corresponds to an interdisciplinary model of healthcare that considers
two elements: (i) all patient heterogeneity that can be observed; and (ii) individual
choices (Happ, 2010). In this context individual choices correspond to ex-post choices
revealed for example through Shared Decision-making54 (Charles et al., 1997). This
definition of IC is consistent with the use that this term has had in fields such as nursing
(Gerrish, 2000, Suhonen et al., 2002) and medicine (Baker et al., Peppercorn et al.,
2011). Therefore, an individualized decision can be considered one type of decision at
individual level where patient choice is taken into account.
52 Personalized Medicine has been defined as the discipline that allows health professionals to prescribe
“the right treatment to the right patient at the right dose at the right time”. It has been argued that this goal
can be achieved by revealing observable biological or clinical characteristics (Thompson, 2011).
53 In principle, this prediction should be based on complete information. However, in practice, it is
estimated conditional to the current understanding of the joint distribution of potential outcomes. In other
words, because the current knowledge is limited to a set of observable characteristics, and we still face the
challenge of understanding the remaining non-observed heterogeneity, decisions at individual level are in
practice decisions at subgroup level.
54 Shared decision-making model has become the more accepted decision-making model at doctor-patient
level, Its main characteristic is that the patient and the doctor share information about knowledge,
preferences and values in order to conclude with a mutual agreement in terms of the treatment.
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Following the line of reasoning developed in Chapter 3, this chapter argues that
decisions at individual level can only be implemented as individualized decisions, i.e.
allowing the patients to make choices without restrictions. In other words, the
impossibility of implementing individual level decisions in a centralized system can
only be solved through a decentralized decision process. Although the idea of making
unrestricted decisions for individual patients seems to receive support in the current
health policy scenario, the discussion should also consider the fact that a health system
built on the principles of public universal coverage55 faces budgeting constraints that
make it unlikely that unrestrictive choices can be given to the whole community. This is
the source of potential conflict within the NHS, that aims to maximise population health
and, at the same time, is pursuing freedom of choice for its patients.
This chapter examines individualization of care in two domains. The first is the extent
to which a decision-making approach that incorporates unrestricted choices conflicts
with the objective of a collectively funded NHS. It is argued that permitting unrestricted
choices depends, for the most part, on a positive judgement, the value of which can be
expressed as an expected population health loss due to unrestricted choices. Second, it
acknowledges that a normative judgment is also relevant for individualization of care.
However, it does not define whether restrictions should be implemented or not. This
chapter develops the argument that normative judgments must be made to define the
way in which values of health (or HRQoL) are considered in the analysis. Although this
is an issue that invites a broader discussion in the economic evaluation field, its role in a
policy for individualization of care is essential.
The current chapter is structured in the following manner. First, the conceptual
fundamentals of IC are introduced, emphasizing its economic rationale. Second, the
conflict between society and the individual in public decision-making is presented,
offering an empirical solution. Third, a normative judgment is examined on the basis of
the definition of the maximand of the social planner’s function. Fourth, a conceptual
framework is formulated, structured in six alternative approaches to decision-making.
Fifth, the positive and normative elements of the framework are applied to a real case
55 The World Health Assembly has launched an agenda to promote universal coverage in all Member
States of the World Health Organization. The resolution 58.33 from 2005 states “everyone should be able
to access health services and not be subject to financial hardship in doing so”. In countries such as UK the
universal coverage is pursued to be achieved as a goal of the public sector.
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study. Finally, the discussion section highlights the implications of this framework for
policy making, with emphasis on the gaps that need further research.
5.2. Individual decisions and social value
5.2.1. Economic rationale for pursuing Individualized Care
As discussed in Chapter 2 the main motivation for situating IC at the centre of
healthcare arises from an ethical imperative. The autonomy of the patient is the main
ethical principle that refers to the right to make voluntary, well informed and rational
decisions from all available alternatives (Gerrish, 2000)56. Empirical evidence has
shown that many actors in the health field have validated this idea, for example, health
professionals, healthcare managers, patients and families (Radwin and Alster, 2002).
However, although not always acknowledged, the idea of IC also has an economic
rationale.
Let us consider a hypothetical scenario where there is perfect and complete information,
the health authority does not impose any restriction on access to treatments (it does not
offer any coverage either) and there is no income inequality across individuals (although
individual pockets impose constraints). In this case individuals choose a new treatment
as long as the benefits are greater than the consumption they have to sacrifice57. In
addition, some people might be willing to forgo some of their own consumption to pay
for health interventions that provide additional health in other individuals of the society.
This altruistic behaviour can be managed by a social (public) insurer who, given the full
information available, will give full coverage only to those patients for whom the
benefits are greater than the price and will make the transfers from altruistic individuals
to sick people in order to facilitate access to more expensive treatments. However,
neither complete nor perfect information exist in healthcare. Most of the studies of
comparative effectiveness provide (uncertain) average estimates about treatment. Thus,
if a particular treatment is expected to be cost-effective, i.e. the average expected
benefits are higher than the expected benefits forgone, the system will recommend the
treatment for all patients, including those for whom the treatment is not effective or is
56 This is also the same principle to support the implementation of shared decision-making (Gulland,
2011).
57 The value of the benefits revealed by individuals under this scenario does not vary due to ability to pay
(because it is assumed no income inequality).
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even harmful. The result of this policy can be a large efficiency loss as a result of moral
hazard (Basu, 2011)58. It also imposes a limitation to effect efficient transfers from
healthy people to sick people because the budgets coming from altruistic pockets can be
wrongly allocated to patients not in need of the treatment. Considering specific
information about subgroups can decrease this loss. At the maximum, when all
heterogeneity is revealed, the true marginal benefits curve can be represented and the
efficiency loss becomes zero59.
Individualized decisions are consistent with the aim of decreasing the loss due to moral
hazard, because they seek to reveal the joint distribution of potential outcomes. As
mentioned in Chapter 2, this understanding could be achieved by exploring observable
heterogeneity but also modelling revealed patient choices, because they bring
information about unobserved expected individual gains. Therefore, if treatment
selection under individualized decisions is consistent with the maximization of
individual NHBs, unrestricted choices should be implemented in the NHS60. Chapter 1
introduced the argument that the monopoly of the demand side of healthcare is a
requirement to achieve efficiency. Here, it is important to emphasize that individualized
decisions (unrestricted choices) do not contravene this argument; rather it is a consistent
approach to efficiency insofar as costs and benefits are considered.
However, there is no guarantee that treatment selection is consistent with a unique
decision rule, for example, the maximization of individual expected net health. In fact,
patients might want to maximize their individual expected health or something else. If
the role of a social planner is to maximize population health subject to budget constraint
(maximising individual NHBs) whereas patients maximize another factor, for example
health, we face a conflict that is represented and analysed in the following section.
58 Basu refers to moral hazard in the sense that people will demand according to the information for the
average population, which can be considered an inappropriate behaviour because it fails in making
consideration of individual level information. This use of the term might conflict with the usual
understanding of moral hazard in economics, where the person who make a choice does not take any risk
because the costs are borne by someone else.
59 The marginal benefit curve represents the true demand curve of the patients for the treatment. This
curve reveals the individual treatment effect heterogeneity (Basu, 2011).
60 The reason why the maximisation of net health benefits is an objective that the health system should
pursue has been introduced and argued in the first chapter of this thesis.
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5.2.2. Society versus the individual: centralized or devolved decisions?
5.2.2.1. Definition of the conflict between the society and the individual
Eddy (1991) presents this problem as follows (page 1,450):
“The conflict can arise whenever an individual receives a disproportionate amount of
resources (e.g. services) without replenishing them (e.g. paying for them). Failure to
replenish a resource can occur directly (e.g. the individual is billed for a service but
does not pay the bill) or indirectly (e.g. an insurance premium does not anticipate the
cost of the service). When either occurs, other people can be harmed in two main ways,
depending on whether and how the resources eventually are replenished. If the funds
are not replenished, the harm is to health; other people do not get the benefits of the
lost services. If the funds eventually are replenished, the harm is financial; other people
must pay to replenish the funds. In both cases, the ‘other people’ are what we call
society”.
From a collectively funded NHS point of view, where all costs related to health are
covered by the health system’s budget, the definition of a disproportionate amount of
resources depends on the value of the benefits they provide which is revealed when
they are compared with the opportunity cost of the health budget (i.e. the health forgone
due to displaced activities in the health system). An important concern associated with
the implementation of IC in healthcare is that patients and doctors might choose some
treatments that could be considered disproportionate. This introduces conflict between
societal interests versus individual interests. This conflict occurs when the societal
decision-maker rejects a new treatment, usually one that is more effective and more
expensive. For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that there is no conflict when
the new treatment is considered cost-effective since free choices can be implemented61.
Next, an analytical approach is proposed to address the question of whether a
decentralized process for healthcare decision-making can be considered a good use of
limited resources of a collectively funded NHS. Although this description of the health
61 Indeed, another conflict could arise if a health authority wants to compel patients to receive only one
treatment, the most cost-effective, which would exclude other less effective treatments from the whole set
of alternatives. The fact that patient might choose less effective (and cheaper) treatments can be
inconsistent with the objective of maximizing expected health (since it can only be achieved by choosing
the alternative that provides the maximum expected health). However, it is still an empirical question the
extent to which individuals are considering other important (unobserved) aspects in their decisions. These
elements (if they were observed) might ultimately reveal that the selection is such that maximizes health.
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system is a very good representation of a public national health system (e.g. the NHS in
the UK) it also applies to any system (public or private) whose objective is health
maximisation of a heterogeneous population in terms of health risk profiles.
5.2.2.2. The value of unrestricted choices: base case analysis
Let us consider the problem faced by the social planner when the decision based on
average cost-effectiveness is to reject the new intervention. Figure 5.1 shows a
hypothetical cloud of points (oval on the cost-effectiveness plane) that represents the
joint distribution of potential outcomes (assuming each point represents one individual).
Six areas are defined based on incremental costs, incremental benefits and the cost-
effectiveness threshold. The area A contains individuals whose incremental costs are
positive (the new treatment is more expensive) and the incremental benefits are negative
(new treatment is less effective). The opposite area, F, is that occupied by individuals
whose incremental costs are negative (new treatment is cheaper) and incremental
benefits are positive (new treatment is more effective). Further, area D includes those
individuals whose incremental costs and benefits are positive, but their individual
incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (iICERs) are greater than the cost-effectiveness
threshold (λ) (i.e. their individual NHBs are less than zero). Area C contains patients 
with negative incremental costs and benefits whose iICERs are lower than λ. Area B is 
similar to C but the iICER is greater than λ. Likewise, E is equal to D but the iICER is
lower than λ. 
If the “average ICER” leads to a decision to reject the new strategy, the net gains of
restricted choices for the society can be characterized as the difference between the
gains and the losses. The gains correspond to the density of the distribution that lies
above λ (A+B+D) whereas the area below λ represents the loss (E+F+C). Thus, the net 
societal gain of restricting choices is (A+B+D) - (E+F+C).
As an alternative to central decision-making, the social planner can implement a
decentralized decision-making process where patients and doctors (assuming doctors as
perfect agents of the patients) jointly decide on treatment without restrictions imposed
by the central authority. This decentralized approach assumes that: (i) patients (and
doctors) will use as much individual information as possible so that they can make a
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good prediction of the position of the patient in the cloud62; and (ii) they will choose in
a way that maximizes their expected health benefits, where health is measured with the
same metric used by the social planner (e.g. QALY). Assumption (ii) is how the source
of conflict for the NHS has been initially operationalized in this analysis, since by
choosing the most effective treatment (irrespective of costs), using Eddy’s words, an
individual might receive “a disproportionate amount of resources (e.g. services)
without replenishing them (e.g. paying for them)”. This assumption will be relaxed later
in this chapter. If this is the case, the net gain for the society under a decentralized
process is (A+B+E+F) – (C+D). Table 1 presents the sub-areas of the distribution in
terms of gains or losses.
Figure 5.1. Social versus individual conflict: the case of rejection of a technology
Note: The line λ represents the cost-effectiveness threshold. The central dot represents the average incremental costs 
and benefits of a new strategy compared with the standard. The oval represents the joint distribution of potential
outcomes of individuals in terms of incremental costs and effects.
Patients can be situated in one of the following areas according to their individual incremental costs and effects
A new treatment is more expensive and less effective
B new treatment is cheaper and less effective
62 This includes observable characteristics and revealed choices. If revealed choices are informative of the
joint distribution of potential outcomes, the challenge is for analysts to estimate this joint distribution















C new treatment is cheaper and less effective and the incremental net health benefits are greater than zero
D new treatment is more expensive and more effective and the incremental net health benefits are smaller than zero
E new treatment is more expensive and more effective
F new treatment is cheaper and more effective
Table 5.1. Sub-areas of the joint distribution of potential outcomes as societal gains or losses under alternative
decisions.
Rejection from a centralized decision-making process Decentralized (individualized) decision-making-process
Area Societal gain or loss Area Societal gain or loss
A+B Gain A+B Gain
E+F Loss E+F Gain
D Gain D Loss
C Loss C Loss
A rational solution to this conflict is shown below. If the net gains of allowing
individuals to choose are greater than the net gains derived from rejecting the new
treatment then no restrictions to the new treatment should be imposed.
Net gain due to decentralized process (A+B+E+F) - (C+D) (5.1)
Net gain due to centralised process (A+B+D) - (E+F+C) (5.2)
A decentralized decision-making process is better than a centralized rejection if
[(A+B+E+F) - (C+D)] > (A+B+D) - (E+F+C)
E + F – C – D > D – E – F – C
2E + 2F > 2D
E + F > D
More widely, a decentralized process is a rational option as long as:
E + F ≥ D (5.3)
There are two additional elements of this problem. First, it might be the case where the
implementation of guidance that rejects a new (more effective) treatment leads to some
additional costs (Cr). Cr includes: (i) the time spent in giving special considerations to
conflicting views; (ii) costs of reviewing additional information submitted to the
regulatory agency; (iii) additional effort to disseminate and monitor the fulfilment of a
guideline that does not have the approval of the whole clinical community; and (iv) the
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resources needed to deal with some societal discomfort created by the fact that some
patients will not have access to an effective treatment. Second, as mentioned above, a
decentralized decision-making process aims to take into account as much individual
information as possible, which is the result of the exchange of information between
patients and health professionals and other relevant actors. It seems totally appropriate
to assume this process as the implementation of the shared decision-making model
(SDM) (Charles et al., 1997). It is very likely that this process is not without costs.
These costs include the extra time of health professionals and extra costs to reveal
heterogeneity (CSDM). If both, Cr ≥ 0 and CSDM ≥ 0, then they should be subtracted from 
the net societal gain from centralized rejection and decentralized decisions, respectively.
Thus, decentralized decisions are the best option if:
The expression to the left in equation (5.5) represents the additional value of adopting
decentralized decisions instead of rejecting the new (non cost-effective) treatment. The
expression to the right of the inequality corresponds to the additional cost of
implementing shared decision-making and individualized decisions with respect to the
costs of rejecting the treatment for the whole patient population. If the additional value
of decentralized over centralized decisions is greater than the additional costs of
implementing decentralized over centralized decisions, then decentralized decisions can
be considered a good use of resources.
The problem of asymmetry of information has been implicitly considered in the solution
presented here. If decisions are made under average current information, it is very likely
that some relevant information of the individual patients is not considered. However, if
decisions are devolved to the individual level, in the context of SDM, asymmetry of
information should no longer constitute a problem since all relevant and available
information will be taken into account. Once again, this relies on the assumption that
doctors are perfect agents for their patients.
E + F – CSDM ≥ D – Cr




From this point onwards, area D will be called NNE quadrant (north north east) and
(E+F) will be called NSE area (north south east). A stylized example is shown in Figure
5.2. Each area corresponds to the sum of the incremental individual Net Health Benefits
(iNHB). The value of leaving individuals to choose can be calculated as the difference
between the weighted averages of the iNHB in the NSE and NNE. The weights for NSE
and NNE (ws and wn, respectively) are the proportion of the densities that such areas
represent, with respect to the whole joint distribution. A population estimate can be
obtained multiplying this amount by the relevant population as explained in Chapter 3
(equation 3.18).
As shown in Figure 5.2, the value of implementing unrestricted choices instead of
rejecting the new treatment is 28,000 QALYs. Thus, decentralized decisions can be
made if the additional costs of SDM compared to centralized decisions (CSDM – Cr) are
less than £560,000,000. It could be assumed that the implementation of SDM is very
unlikely to cost more than that amount. Therefore, decentralized decisions should be
implemented even though the costs due to rejection are zero (Cr=0). Because the NNE
and NSE areas depend on the cost-effectiveness threshold, the difference in costs (CSDM
– Cr) can be plotted as a function of λ (this will be explained in detail in Section 5.4 and 
shown in Figure 5.4).
This example shows the value of decentralized decisions as health gains. However, it
might be the case that the value is negative, indicating expected losses. If decision-
makers are willing to implement decentralized decisions assuming the loss, the expected
health forgone represents the social value of unrestricted choices for healthcare (this

















Figure 5.2. The societal versus individual conflict: A stylized example.
Note 1: The graph shows 100 simulated points distributed on the four quadrants of the cost-effectiveness
plane. The diagonal line represents a cost-effectiveness threshold of 20,000 per unit of benefit. The black
diamond illustrates the mean incremental costs and benefits. The dashed and dotted triangles frame the
areas of conflict, previously defined as NNE and NSE respectively.
Note 2: Estimation:
1. Area NSE (dotted triangle) has 39 individuals (39%). The average incremental individual net health
benefit is 1.36 QALYs.
2. Area NNE (dashed triangle) has 27 individuals (27%). The average incremental individual net health
benefit is 0.89 QALYs.
3. The difference between NSE and NNE is (1.36*0.39) – (0.89*0.27) = 0.28 QALYs (net of costs)
4. Assuming a relevant population of 100,000 patients the value of decentralized decisions is 28,000
QALYs.
5. The additional cost of shared decision-making compared to transaction costs due to rejection should be
less than the value of decentralized decisions (28,000 QALYs) converted into monetary terms, i.e.
560,000,000 (28,000x20,000).
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5.2.2.3. The value of unrestricted choices: An extended analysis
As explained in the previous section, this method assumes that patient choices are
consistent with the maximization of health. Further, it assumes that the health outcome
is the same as that which matters for the society, for example, QALYs. However, it
might be the case that patients’ (and doctors’) choices are driven by a different outcome.
Even if they are interested in maximising expected health, QALYs might not represent
the only element in their individual preferences. In other cases, choices are directly
explained by considerations other than maximization of expected health gains. For this
reason, the method presented in the previous section needs to be extended in order to
capture these alternative heuristics.
The assumption that patients and society focus on the same health outcome can be
relaxed by estimating which individuals change their decisions when they seek to
maximise another outcome. Thus, in those subjects who rejected the new strategy
(based on the rule of maximising QALYs), which implied societal gains (areas A and
B), a change in their decision will impose societal losses. As a consequence, they should
be subtracted from the A+B density. Likewise, in those individuals whose adoption of
the new treatment represented a societal gain (E+F), a change in their treatment choice
(based on a different decision rule) will represent a societal loss. Analogously, for areas
C and D, where rejection and adoption, respectively, were understood as societal losses,
a change in the decision implies a societal gain. These changes affect only the net gains
due to a decentralized process, which can be expressed as:
where i represents the density of individuals whose decision is the same under any
heuristic, i.e. the new decision rule or the maximand used by the social planner (e.g.
QALY), and j represents the density of individuals whose decision changed, when they
apply an alternative decision rule. In the case of a centralized process the areas are the
same as in equation (5.2), however, they must be expressed as a sum of individuals i
and j as follows:
[(Ai+Bi+Ei+Fi) - (Aj+Bj+Ej+Fj)] – [(Ci+Di)- (Cj+Dj)] (5.6)
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This analysis needs the identification of the outcome based on which individuals will
make decisions, i.e. the new maximand. Expected costs and benefits must be estimated
for both outcomes simultaneously, in order to identify which individuals keep or change
their decisions. Finally, as in the previous case, a devolved decision-making process is
appropriate if net gains due to decentralized decisions are greater than net gains of those
that are centralized, i.e. the magnitude of equation (5.6) is greater than the magnitude of
equation (5.7).
If the transaction costs derived from the implementation of centralized and
decentralized decisions are also considered in the expression (5.9), the solution is
equivalent to equations (5.4) and (5.5).
Ei + Fi + Cj - CSDM ≥  Aj + Bj + Di – Cr
Ei + Fi + Cj - Aj - Bj - Di ≥  CSDM – Cr
The analytical approach presented in this section supports the argument that the
implementation of centralized versus decentralized decisions must consider a positive
judgment, which is the net health that can be gained or forgone when patients make
their own choices. A stylized example of this extended approach is presented in
Appendix 5 and its implementation in a real case study is illustrated in section 5.4.
[(Ai+Bi+Ei+Fi) - (Aj+Bj+Ej+Fj)] – [(Ci+Di)- (Cj+Dj)] >
(Ai+ Aj +Bi+ Bj +Di + Dj) – (Ei+ Ej +Fi + Fj + Ci + Cj)








5.2.3. Social value orientation: A normative judgment for individualization of
care
The need for a detailed examination of the implications of individualized care and
unrestricted choices is motivated by the role given to patient autonomy in the current
policy debate. Autonomy of patients is a well established principle of social value
(NICE, 2005). However, although it has been considered one of the central tenets in the
conceptualization of a healthcare system, the extent to which the system responds to this
principle is not unbounded. Society values individual autonomy, insofar as its
consequences do not affect other important objectives of the society, such as other
individuals’ wellbeing or health (Oshana, 2003). Previous sections showed how the
decision of implementing restricted versus unrestricted choices can be supported by a
consideration of efficiency. In other words, the social value judgment required to
implement unrestricted choices (value of individual choices for treatment) is not
normative but positive, i.e. it must take into account the amount of health that is forgone
due to decentralized decisions. However, individualization of care is not only about the
implementation of unrestricted choices. It also requires an analysis of the role of the
individual in the definition of the outcome that the social planner aims to maximise,
which ultimately relies on a normative judgment.
This section develops a categorization that takes into account two perspectives. First, a
microeconomic perspective that considers characteristics of welfarism and extra-
welfarism, and second, a behavioural perspective that takes alternative social value
orientations into account63 (Offerman et al., 1996, Ubel et al., 2000, Messick and
McClintock, 1968). Both perspectives are combined, producing three categories that
will be formalized in the framework presented in the next section.
As defined in Chapter 2, preferences refer to the rational element of judgment that
guides the ranking of health states. They are represented as a set of values elicited from
a particular population whose welfare, utility or health wants to be maximised. The use
of preferences in economic evaluation is founded on the grounds of the neoclassical
welfarist approach, which places the maximization of utility (as the only argument of
63 Social value orientation is a social psychology theory of choice. In healthcare decision-making can be
defined as the judgments and assumptions held by the social planner in terms of the objectives that
members of the society should pursue when they make choices that affect others.
125
the function) in the centre of welfare theory (Hurley, 2000)64. In particular for health
economic evaluation, the stream that assumes QALYs as utilities (also called welfarist)
relies on the assumption that values (utilities) have been revealed by individuals under
conditions of uncertainty, for example, using the “standard gamble” tool (Drummond et
al., 2005). An alternative approach uses health outcomes in monetary terms, for
example with methods of contingent valuation. An element of frequent confusion
relates to who should provide such values, patients or society? From a welfarist
perspective, the benefits should be constructed as utilities of the affected individuals,
i.e. the patients (Gandjour, 2010). If the sum of individual benefits is greater than the
sum of costs (including the disutility of some other patients) the new treatment should
be adopted and no transference of benefits between gainers and losers need to be made
(Greenberg and Weimer, 1996). This view is consistent with an individualistic social
value orientation, where each individual is interested in his/her own welfare/utility only.
Several guidelines of cost-effectiveness analysis have recommended the use of societal
values in the construction of QALYs (Gold et al., 1996, NICE, 2008). One of the main
arguments in favour of this position is that a representative sample of individuals of the
society can express their preferences under the “veil of ignorance” (Harsanyi, 1953,
Harsanyi, 1955, Rawls, 1971), providing the adequate set of values to construct
QALYs65 (Gold et al., 1996, Drummond et al., 2005). A second argument is raised from
the fact that values obtained from patients for one particular health state are greater than
those elicited from the general population (Sacket, 1978; Boyd,1990)66. Subsequently,
using patient (overrated) values would lead to lower estimates of incremental
effectiveness with a subsequent higher incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, which
64 Besides utility as the only argument and preferences on the basis of the utility maximization, the
welfartist approach assumes that individual are the best judges of their welfare or utility and that utility
derives from the consequences (outcomes) and is not related to the process of how the outcome is
obtained.
65 The ‘veil of ignorance’ argument is constructed on the basis of a hypothetical scenario where the roles
of the individuals in the society are redistributed and reassigned (Harsanyi, 1953). Then, the true morality
of an issue can be judged by rational individuals under this state of blindness previous to the new
assignment. Under a later conceptualization given by Rawls, people covered by a ‘thicker’ veil of
ignorance do not have any clue about which talents or personal capacities will be endorsed (or they do not
know the probability of being assigned some specific role in the society) and therefore they would reveal
values taking the position of the worst-off in the society which leads to a more egalitarian distribution of
well-being as a consequence of the decisions they make.
66 Higher values from patients are explained because patients suffer adaptation to their health conditions
(they adjust their expectations to the new circumstances) (Gold, Ubel 2000, Loewenstein 1999) and/or
because of cognitive dissonance, which refer to the fact that patients do not admit how low is their quality
of life (Ubel, 2000 referring Festinger 1959).
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ultimately affects patients (Gold et al., 1996). A third argument states that decisions for
the use of public resources should use public preferences (Gold et al., 1996). It is
fundamental to acknowledge that these arguments do not support QALYs as utilities;
they only claim that the construction of QALYs based on community values is
appropriate.
QALYs based on community preferences have been better defined as “capabilities that
good health brings us” (Brouwer and Koopmanschap, 2000), (page 447). This notion
finds its grounds in the extra-welfaristic approach (Brouwer et al., 2008, Culyer, 1990).
Extra-welfarism has some important roots in Sen’s capabilities approach (Sen, 1993),
especially on the use of outcomes other than utilities. For Sen, the welfarist approach
based on utilities seems too narrow, since it is too focused on the emotional responses
of people to particular valuable states (or dimensions of wellbeing) rather than people’s
actual capabilities of achieving such states (Brouwer et al., 2008). However, in terms of
the interpretation of QALYs, the “extra-welfarist QALY” (also called the “health
QALY”) is not a measure of the whole capabilities set but only their health
determinants67. In addition, the extra-welfarist approach acknowledges that an
indication of preferences is still needed to undertake comparative assessments of health
gains (or capabilities gains) because the maximisation process relies ultimately on a
cardinal outcome index68. Finally, the use of community preferences avoids the problem
of adaptive preferences (i.e. patients value their health state better because they suffer
adaptation). Thus, health outcomes based on community values guaranties that two
individuals with different degrees of adaptation, but with the same capabilities, have the
same priority of access to limited resources69.
67 This contrasts with an alternative view that suggests the QALY as a measurement of the whole
capability set (Cookson, 2005). However, as Cookson acknowledges, the estimation of the “capability
QALY” needs further methodological development: “Until such methods have been developed, however,
standard QALY instruments may be most useful in contexts where the health determinants of capability
are of primary concern to decision-makers” (page 826).
68 This assertion highlights another important difference between Sen’s capability approach and extra-
welfarism; while the latter retains the notion of maximisation of the expected benefit (“health QALY”)
the former imposes supremacy of equity and distributional concerns (Coast et al., 2008).
69 This idea has received some empirical support. Lowenstein and Ubel (2008) reported that while
adapted patients reveal normal levels of happiness they also refer willingness to make big efforts to
recover normal health and therefore there is no reason to categorize them in different levels of access to
healthcare.
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Community based QALYs finds its significance as a socially legitimate set of values
that can be used to make cardinal representation of the HRQoL. QALYs constructed
from this value set are a good example of an outcome adopted by a Paternalist decision-
maker. This is defined on the basis of a cooperative social value orientation, where
individuals pursue increased health for both themselves and the rest. In its translation to
social choice, the paternalist decision-maker imposes an equity judgment in the sense of
not favouring any person over another, which becomes a fundamental normative
judgment for individualization of care. Further, under this approach the social planner
seeks to maximise some outcome that is not individual utility but health, which is
consistent with the grounds of extra-welfarism.
The third value orientation considered is altruism. Altruists seek to maximise the
welfare of others irrespective of the consequences on themselves. In the healthcare
evaluation problem this concept can be applied to a decision-maker who focuses his/her
analysis on the expected health of a particular group of patients. Under this approach,
the decision-maker can also incorporate for example, differences between adapted and
non-adapted patients70 (Dolan and Kahneman, 2008). This approach can be
operationalized using QALYs constructed on the basis of values elicited from a
representative group of patients suffering the condition under assessment, which is a
legitimate set of values for a sub-population (non-individualistic). Therefore, it is more
consistent with the view of maximising health rather than utilities71, which adheres to
the principles of extra-welfarism.
In this thesis, is argued that the definition of using patient versus societal values should
be the result of a normative value judgment. This contrasts with most of the arguments
in favour or against the use of patient values in the literature, which are mainly
pragmatic. For example, Gold et al. (1996) argued that the use of values elicited from
patients might produce results that seem less cost-effective and could result in patients
being denied treatment. Appendix 6 shows the scenario where this statement holds but
70 This idea has been raised in the literature that advocates for the use of experienced utility. According to
Dolan and Kahneman if adaptation is not considered in resource allocation, then patients who have
suffered adaptation will be in advantage because their gains in experience utility will be (by adaptation)
greater. As a consequence they claim: “decisions will then be made as if adapted patients’s gains in
experienced utility count for more than the gains of patients who adapt less” (page 220).
71 These values might be obtained by time trade-off for example. The motivation to use these values
adheres to the idea of having a preference based system (Torrance, 2006), though the assumptions of
utility do not hold and the outcome becomes a measure of patient health.
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also other three cases where patient values do not generate higher ICERs than societal
values. On the other hand, as explained in Chapter 2, if we are interested in considering
heterogeneity in preferences, it is more feasible to implement individualized decisions
based on patient values than with community values.
5.3. Alternative approaches to decision-making: a descriptive
framework
This section presents the description of six alternative approaches to decision-making,
defined on the basis of two dimensions: the level where decisions are made; and the
value orientation of the decision-making approach. The framework assumes a
healthcare system where all costs fall inside the health budget and an economic
assessment follows the rules of cost-effectiveness analysis.
The level of decisions can be centralized or devolved. This definition must respond to a
positive judgment, as presented in section 5.2.2. A centralized process is characterized
by the production of mandatory guidelines where heterogeneity can be taken into
account through the implementation of differential decisions for different subgroups.
Under this approach, the health authority is allowed to restrict the adoption of
interventions that were considered not cost-effective. On the other hand, a devolved
health system is characterized by decentralized decisions made at individual level. It is
expected that patients and doctors consider as much individual information as possible
so that they can make a good prediction of the individual expected benefit. Under this
scheme patients make choices among all available alternatives, something that should
result from the transference of information between patient and health professional in
the context of a shared decision-making model. As explained before, the consideration
of choices in the decentralized process imposes a challenge on the analyst’s task of
characterizing the joint distribution of potential outcomes, which should incorporate
those choices in the estimation.
In the normative domain, this framework focuses on the definition of the maximand of
the function that the decision-maker aims to maximise. Three categories have been
defined on the basis of social value orientations. First, a paternalistic decision-maker
pursues the maximisation of population health, adopting a health metric constructed on
the basis of a socially legitimate set of values, for example, QALYs based on
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community values. Second, an altruistic decision-maker seeks to maximise a health
outcome constructed on the basis of a set of values elicited from a representative group
of patients affected by the disease under evaluation. Finally, the welfarist decision-
maker is consistent with the neoclassical welfare theory, in that the objective is to
maximise total utility as the sum of individual utilities. A summary of the six
approaches is presented in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2. Summary of six approaches for decision-making in healthcare
Solution responds to an efficiency criterion
Centralized
Mandatory guidelines produced at
central level
Restriction to interventions that are
not cost-effective





Devolved decisions at individual
level using as much observable
information as possible
Patients allowed to choose between
all alternatives
Choices are assumed to be revealed




























Patient preference heterogeneity can










Patient preference heterogeneity can
be operationalized in this approach.
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5.4. Alternative approaches to decision-making:
a case study
5.4.1. Base case analysis
In this section, it is shown how the framework proposed in this thesis can be used to
address a decision problem in a real case study. The study RITA-3 presented in detail in
Chapter 4 offers an opportunity to illustrate the concepts developed in this chapter. In
brief, the RITA-3 study compared the efficacy of an intensive versus a conservative
treatment strategy for the early management of patients with non-ST-elevation acute
coronary syndrome. The results on average showed that an invasive strategy is
efficacious but is not cost-effective at a threshold of £20,000 per QALY. Further, the
cost-effectiveness study showed significant heterogeneity between patients, which was
analyzed in Chapter 4 in the context of subgroup analysis. In this chapter, the decision
problem is examined in terms of the alternative approaches that a decision planner could
adopt.
A normative and a positive dimension are considered in this analytical framework,
namely, social value orientation (paternalistic, altruistic or utilitarian) and the level of
the decision (centralized versus devolved). On one hand, the definition of the social
value orientation responds to a purely normative judgment, for example, the comparison
of cost-effectiveness estimates with community values, patient values or patient
utilities. RITA-3 was conducted in the UK and its cost-effectiveness analysis was
consistent with national guidelines that recommend values from the general community,
therefore a paternalist value orientation is taken. On the other hand, in terms of the level
of the decision, individual expected incremental costs and QALYs were estimated from
RITA-3 (see Chapter 4). Thus, the question as to whether to implement a decentralized
decision process is consistent with an appropriate use of limited resources can be
addressed in this case where the average estimate suggests the rejection of the invasive
strategy.
The individual incremental costs and QALYs were estimated from the data described in
Chapter 4. Figure 5.3 shows the cloud that represents the joint distribution of potential
outcomes where each point corresponds to one of the 1,810 patients of the trial.
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According to the methods applied in chapter 4, each point is the average point across
1,000 iterations of a probabilistic sensitivity analysis.
Figure 5.3. Estimated joint distribution of potential outcomes from RITA-3 trial.
In accordance with the method explained in Section 2 of this chapter, the average iNHB
of the NNE quadrant is 0.099 net QALYs and its density represents 58% of the whole
joint distribution (weighted average 0.057 net QALYs). Likewise, the average iNHB of
the NSE area is 0.146 net QALYs and its density is 33.7% of the joint distribution
(weighted average 0.049 net QALYs). As a consequence, the difference between NSE
and NNE, estimated for a relevant population of 556,723 patients for the next ten years
(see Chapter 4), is -4,771 net QALYs (27,454 – 32,225). This amount in monetary
terms corresponds to -£95,423,130 and the result suggests that an approach based on
decentralized decisions cannot be supported, as it produces an expected loss of -
£95,423,130. In other words, decentralized decisions can be considered only if the
additional cost of implementing a guideline based on rejection compared to shared-
decision-making (Cr-Csdm) in the next ten years is greater than £95,423,130, which is
very unlikely. This amount can be plotted for different values of the cost-effectiveness
threshold. The line drawn in Figure 5.4 represents a boundary for centralized and
decentralized decisions. The values above the line can be considered pro decentralized
























As mentioned in section 5.2.2, the expected loss represents the social value (imposed by
a decision-maker) of implementing decentralized decisions. In reality, the true value of
implementing unrestricted choices is not just the difference between NSE and NNE
areas but this difference minus the costs of implementing decentralized decisions (Csdm)
and plus the costs due to rejection (Cr).
Figure 5.4. Minimum cost of restriction to consider decentralized decisions as the best option.
Note: Cr – Csdm represents the additional costs of implementing a guideline based on restrictions
compared to the costs of a shared decision-making process. Results are shown in a logarithmic scale for
different values of cost-effectiveness threshold (λ). The base reference case when λ is £20,000/QALY is 
illustrated.
5.4.2. Extended method
This section analyses the case when a different outcome is maximised at individual
level. RITA-3, as is the case with many emergency health problems, describes a clinical
setting where conducting shared decision-making is unfeasible. Instead, it is very likely
that the intervention will be the one that is prescribed by the doctor, who only takes into
account the clinical evidence. Consistent with that idea and for illustrative purposes, it is
















assumes that doctors have knowledge about the effect of individual characteristics on
the health outcomes, which is tantamount to maximising individualized life years.
The RITA-3 model allows us to estimate the expected individual life years’ increment.
The analysis is focused on finding those individuals who would receive a different
strategy if the rule of maximising life years was applied. According to equation (5.9) the
densities of interest are Ei, Fi, Cj, Aj, Bj and Di. The study showed the incremental life
years to be positive in all patients. Thus, all patients in the NW quadrant (area A) would
receive invasive treatment. More formally, Aj is equal to A. Individuals in the
remaining areas do not change their decisions. In terms of the areas, this can be
expressed as Ei plus Fi is equal to E plus F (NSE) and Di is equal to D (NNE). Bj and Cj
(equivalent to B and C in the previous analysis) are equal to zero.
The average iNHB of the NW quadrant is 0.25 QALYs and its density is 8.23%
(weighted average of 0.02 QALYs). Applying equation (5.11) the results show that a
decentralized process is associated with an expected loss of 16,397 QALYs (NSE –
NNE – NW = 27,454 – 32,225 – 11,626).
5.5. Discussion
Decisions based on cost-effectiveness analysis usually face the conflict derived from
rejecting treatments that are deemed effective but not cost-effective. This conflict is
usually observed and debated in countries where decisions are made at central level,
after an exhaustive assessment of the evidence available. This chapter examined the
individualization of care in two domains: first, the extent to which the implementation
of a decentralized decision-making process (allowing for unrestricted patient choices)
determines health losses in a collectively funded health system and second, the
normative judgments that social planners must make when individualization is being
implemented in the health system.
This chapter developed an analytical approach to addressing the question whether the
implementation of unrestricted choices in a collectively funded health system represents
a good use of limited resources. In the case that unrestricted choices lead to health
losses, the method allows analysts to present the expected health that the society is
sacrificing in order to satisfy such social value. This method contributes to the
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understanding of the potential conflict derived from rejection of new technologies and
provides an important empirical element of judgment for decision-makers.
In addition, a case study has been used to illustrate the practical implication of this
method. This example assumed the structure presented in Chapter 4 to estimate the
individual net outcomes for each treatment (invasive and conservative). However, as
explained in detail in that chapter, the estimation of expected costs and benefits for both
treatments (factual and counterfactual) did not consider individual treatment effects.
Only recently, Basu (2011) has provided some empirical illustration of how to estimate
individual treatment effects applied to health. However, those methods require data
from adaptive trials where individuals are able to reveal choices for treatments,
something that cannot be implemented with the information available for this study.
Further research is needed in the cost-effectiveness field to introduce individual
treatment effects in the analysis, which will offer a potentially better estimation of the
joint distribution and an opportunity to improve the estimations of the method presented
in this chapter. Another limitation of this study is the context of the health problem. As
an emergency problem, patients (and doctors) do not have enough time to reveal choices
according to SDM process. Therefore, emergency is one of the areas where this type of
analysis is limited a priori because of the clinical scenario. However, despite the
context, the example offers an opportunity to illustrate the concepts here developed. As
a matter of fact, the results support restricted choices even though decentralized
decisions could have been implemented.
One important element related to the joint distribution and beyond the challenges
related to its estimation is the assumption that patients and doctors will be able to
predict the position of the patient on the cloud presented in Figure 5.1. It has been
argued that a good prediction depends on the process whereby patients and doctors
share and reveal as much individual level information as possible, or at least, the
information that was used to estimate the joint distribution. Two elements emerge from
this point. First, there is still the need for a centralized agency responsible for the
evidence assessment. Doctors and other health professionals are not expected to have
access to evidence and the skills to undertake an adequate assessment. Therefore, a
decentralized process still relies on the systematic assessment of the available evidence
in order to provide doctors (and patients) with the correct information limiting bias and
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misleading interpretations. Furthermore, the agency is able to gather information that
doctors and patients are not able to access (e.g. early information given by the industry).
In addition, the agency should be equipped with the tools to undertake an assessment of
such information with the highest quality standards of the country or jurisdiction.
Second, it is assumed that health professionals act as perfect agents of the patients.
Given the asymmetry of information between doctors and patients, it is a necessary
condition that doctors can provide the adequate information but also can consider
specific information about the patient (clinical characteristics and preferences) in order
to give proper assistance to the decision of the patient. This has been conceptualized
here as the implementation of shared decision-making (Charles et al., 1997). Any
incentive to health professionals determining behaviour other than that in the interest of
the patient is a failure that might alter this prediction.
Another important assumption of this method is that patients will decide according to
the rule of maximising health. The base case presented in this chapter assumes the
health metric is the same for patients and the healthcare system, for example, QALYs
constructed from community preferences. This assumption is restrictive in the sense that
the decision of the patient might not be based on the outcome defined under (social)
normative judgments72. In response, an extension of the method has been proposed in
order to undertake the same analysis, but considering that patients could choose based
on a different outcome. On the other hand, there is some empirical evidence suggesting
that there are certain patients that could choose those treatments that are cost-effective.
It has been reported that while most patients value “having choices” it is not clear that
all patients are interested in “making choices”(Ogden et al., 2008), relying ultimately on
some expert opinion. Others have referred to certain patients, in particular in some
societies (e.g. Japan), have a stronger sense of social duty when express their choices
which would affect their decisions (Iyengar and Lepper, 1999).
Despite the possibility of considering alternative outcomes for individual decisions, this
approach still has a limitation. The method assumes that individuals make decisions
according to the axioms of expected utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
72 This sentence is written in conditional because patient might (or might not) choose according to
QALYs. Under a shared decision-making process doctors explain the effect of the treatment based on the
information he/she has received from the national agency. In this context QALY is a main part of the
outcome’s assessment and can be very influential on patient’s final decisions.
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1947), i.e. the maximization of the expected value of the outcome73. It has been well
studied that when people make decisions under uncertainty they are, in general, risk
averse to gains and risk-seeking to losses, something that has been formalized in
Prospect Theory74 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Kahneman and Tversky, 1992). In
other words, they do not assume a linear utility function between gains (or losses) and
value. An area of future research should explore how these descriptive elements of
choice can be adapted into the model presented in this chapter.
On the other hand, the definition of alternative approaches to decision-making, such as
the consideration of unrestricted choices, has determined the need for paying attention
to social values. Here, it has been argued that social planners need to make a normative
judgment about the outcome that will be maximised. Individualization of care can be
seen from a classical welfarist perspective to one that is extra-welfarist, depending on
the social value orientation adopted. Thus, three approaches have been defined
(paternalist, altruistic and welfarist). The lack of consideration of other social values in
this categorization is not an exclusion of such values but only a practical approach to
offer a useful conceptualization that we can consider a starting point. Examination of
other social values (e.g. equity) requires special attention and should be studied in future
research.
An important social value explored in this chapter is choice. It has been proposed that
the value of choice can be expressed as the expected health loss due to implementation
of decentralized decisions. This sets out an efficiency-choice trade-off that can be
interpreted as the health forgone in order to implement unrestricted choices. If
autonomy is valuable insofar as individual decisions do not affect other subjects of the
population, the questions faced by the social planner are: what is the magnitude of
73 The expected value is the result of a linear combination of possible outcomes and their probabilities.
74 Prospect Theory has two main characteristics. First, individuals set out a reference point from where
they evaluate prospects in terms of gains and losses. Second, in contrast to EUT where the expected
utility is the weighted average between outcomes and probabilities, PT relies on some value (utility) that
is a function of the outcome and some weighting function that weights the probabilities. Kahneman and
Tversky in their formalization of PT proposed a value function that is concave in gains and convex in
losses. Further, the concave part of the curve is flatter than the convex. This shape is explained by the fact
that patients are risk averse when they face uncertain decisions about gains and they are risk seeking
when face decisions about losses. The weighting function represents the fact that, for example, an
increment of a probability from 0.001 to 0.051 is different that from 0.5 to 0.55. It has been suggested that
subjects overweight small probabilities and underweight higher probabilities. This means that individuals
who face very rare events tend to overreact as well as they tend to underreact to medium or large
probabilities.
137
health that the society should be willing to forgo in order to satisfy the autonomy of
patients? And which patients would deserve this special attention? It seems that these
questions are the ultimate value judgments related to the decision about implementing
unrestricted choices of treatment.
The framework and method developed in this chapter is a consequence of the author’s
interest in the understanding of the value of heterogeneity. Hence, there are important
links with previous contributions in this field. One of these is the relationship with the
metrics of the static value of heterogeneity, such as EVIC. The magnitude of total EVIC
indicates the degree of observable heterogeneity that has an impact on decisions. Thus,
if the total estimated EVIC is high, the (predicted) joint distribution of potential
outcomes is likely to lie widespread on the cost-effectiveness plane. If this is the case
and the new treatment is considered not cost-effective on average, the decision-maker
should ask whether a decentralized decision-making process is as efficient as (or more
efficient than) implementing the rejection. The method presented here is a major
contribution to addressing this question.
Finally, this framework is consistent with a healthcare system that bears all health
related costs. In other systems, for example, when part of the health expenditure relies
on private (individual) pockets or when there is a private market for health insurance,
the solutions provided in this work might not be adequate. The implications of different
market failures on the reimbursement decision of a public health authority will be




6.1. Summary of the thesis contribution
Health has been recognized as the main objective of health systems. In the context of
limited budget, an optimal allocation of resources becomes a central goal of the
decision-making process. Cost-effectiveness analysis has been used to support decisions
about reimbursement of new health interventions to be consistent with the efficiency
goal. These decisions are usually made under uncertainty and with limited knowledge
about heterogeneity. The value of considering future research to resolve current decision
uncertainty has been well established (Claxton and Posnett, 1996). Likewise, the value
of making different decisions across individuals has also been recognized (Coyle et al.,
2003, Basu and Meltzer, 2007). However, the bridge between these two dimensions
within a common framework for decision-making remains to be examined. This was
one of the main motivations of this work. Furthermore, this thesis has identified that
individual choices can be a potential additional source of value for the health system,
raising the need for deeper understanding of choice as part of a decision process in a
collectively funded health system.
The main purpose of this thesis was to contribute to the understanding of the value of
heterogeneity in cost-effectiveness analysis for healthcare decision-making. The
objective was addressed through four main steps. First, a literature review was
conducted to describe the standard approaches in the assessment of heterogeneity in
cost-effectiveness and the methods for realizing its value. Preferences and choices were
also examined, in order to connect the study of heterogeneity with the policy agenda of
the individualization of care. As a result, gaps and requirements for research were
identified. Second, a novel analytical framework was produced to conduct cost-
effectiveness subgroup analysis. This chapter contributed to the toolbox in CEA,
introducing the consideration of several elements is a systematic manner, such as
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criteria for identification, selection and analysis of subgroup specification. In addition,
the value of resolving uncertainty was introduced as one dimension of the value of
heterogeneity. Third, the feasibility of such a framework was assessed through its
application to a real case study. This exercise offered an opportunity to implement a
stochastic approach to estimations at individual level, as well as to connect these
methods with previous contributions in the field. Finally, the thesis addressed issues on
how individualized care can be incorporated in a collectively funded national health
system. In particular, it examined the cases where choices made at individual level can
be implemented and analysed the normative judgments that any decision-maker should
take into account with attempts to implement individualized care. In the remaining part
of this section, further details of each chapter are presented.
Chapter 2 defines total heterogeneity or total variability as the differences in outcomes
between individuals. Observed heterogeneity, also commonly referred simply as
heterogeneity, is defined as the proportion of variability that can be explained by
observable and known characteristics. In particular, for the study of between-patient
heterogeneity, which is the main focus of this thesis, it recognises four sources of
heterogeneity that should be addressed: baseline risk; treatment effect; preferences; and
costs. It points out the concerns raised in the assessment of effectiveness, where the
significance of treatment effects between subgroups is constrained by recommendations
of evidence based medicine, which is anchored in the principles of statistical inference
(i.e. a p-value cut-off point usually set at 0.05). In the case of cost-effectiveness,
adherence to the principles of expected utility theory makes these concerns less
relevant. However, the operationalization of disaggregated decisions implies several
transaction costs that impose constraints in their implementation.
Chapter 2 also describes and analyses the methods proposed in the literature to examine
the value of considering heterogeneity in healthcare decision-making. Most of them rely
on the net benefits framework to express value. In other words, the value of
heterogeneity is expressed as the expected net health (e.g. life years or QALYs) that can
be gained if decisions take into account subgroup or individual level information. It was
observed that no previous literature considers the relevance of parameter uncertainty
when addressing heterogeneity, which motivated important part of the work developed
in Chapter 3.
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One of the elements further explored is the study of heterogeneity in preferences and
choices. Both concepts have been used very broadly, even in the field of CEA, and this
offers an opportunity for a clearer definition. The definition of choice restricts the
concept to decisions for a particular treatment. They can be ex-ante (treatment
preference) or ex-post (revealed choice) depending whether a critical scrutiny process
has been performed (see Chapter 2). The concept of preferences, instead, was
circumscribed to the analysis whereby CEA adheres to the principles of utility and
microeconomic theory. Preferences determine the value of health as a result of an
exercise that forces people to make decisions between alternative health states, causing
them to reveal their preferences. One of the interesting findings provided by the
previous literature is that preferences and revealed choices are not well correlated.
Therefore, the significant progress achieved and still ongoing in the field of patient
preferences in the last few years needs to be complemented with further understanding
of revealed choices. Two areas were identified: one relates to the role of choices in
understanding the joint distribution of potential outcomes; and the second refers to the
understanding of how revealed choices can be implemented without restrictions in a
collectively funded health system. The second area motivated the work conducted in
Chapter 5.
Chapter 2 is an organized synthesis of current knowledge. It is the result of the
identification and understanding of the relevant elements that should be considered in
the study of heterogeneity in CEA, which include the definition and clarification of
concepts, terminology, sources and methods to explore heterogeneity. It is highlighted
the need of considering and revealing heterogeneity, which is claimed in this thesis as
another source of uncertainty of the decision problem. To the author’s knowledge, there
is no published article that has combined all these elements and presented them in the
manner seen in Chapter 2. Therefore, Chapter 2 can be considered a contribution, in
itself, to this field.
Chapter 3 introduces a systematic approach to conducting cost-effectiveness subgroup
analysis. It starts by recognizing that the maximum value of heterogeneity is achieved
when decisions are performed at individual level. This value can be expressed as the
expected value of individualized care (EVIC) when it refers to the decisions based on
the expected NHB. However, it argues that the effort to operationalize individual level
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decisions implies transaction costs such that it is not feasible to implement in a
centralized decision-making process. Therefore, it proposes that subgroup analysis
becomes the best approach to take into account heterogeneity. This motivates the
development of an analytical framework to guide the characterization of partial degrees
of heterogeneity, addressing issues of identification and selection of subgroups
according to the efficiency goals of a health system. Chapter 3 can be considered a
substantial contribution, in the sense that it creates a systematic approach to subgroup
analysis and adds important elements to the understanding of heterogeneity in CEA.
Three elements can be highlighted as important contributions of Chapter 3. They
address issues about the selection of subgroups, the optimal number of subgroups and
uncertainty as an additional source of value of heterogeneity. In terms of selection of
subgroups, Chapter 3 suggests that different specifications should be compared in terms
of the additional expected NHB they provide. As a consequence, an efficiency frontier
for subgroup analysis can be represented from the set of points corresponding to the
specifications with higher expected net benefits for each level of disaggregation. The
additional value given by different decisions in different subgroups, in terms of net
benefits, is termed static value of heterogeneity. Although the concept of static value
has been presented before, for example, as EVIC (Basu and Meltzer, 2007) or
stratification (Coyle et al., 2003), this chapter adds two important elements. First, an
adequate characterization of heterogeneity must be undertaken examining all feasible
specifications at different levels of disaggregation. Second, a frontier can be defined
from the set of points that produce the greatest expected NHB at each level of
disaggregation, which is expected to show diminishing marginal returns of health.
In terms of the optimal number of subgroups, Chapter 3 suggests that the level of
disaggregation that can be implemented (i.e. the number of subgroups that can be
considered) depends on the expected benefits and the transaction costs derived from the
additional level of disaggregation. They include the effort to implement subgroup level
decisions, additional resources to reveal heterogeneity and the effort to enforce the
fulfilment of guidelines. The comparison between these two elements provides a
judgment of efficiency that supports the definition of the optimal number of subgroups
that should be considered.
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A third element presented in Chapter 3 is the incorporation of uncertainty as a
dimension of value of heterogeneity. It argues that the additional value of making
different decisions for different patients is partially achieved by the information
available, but there is also a second source of value, which is the potential gain of
resolving uncertainty. This has been termed the dynamic value of heterogeneity and is
expressed as the additional expected net benefits that might be achieved if conditional
parameters (conditional for the subgroup) are estimated under perfect information. The
dynamic value is a comparison between two adjacent points of disaggregation in terms
of the expected NHB under perfect information. It is expected that this value increases
as more subgroups are considered, which is consistent with the value of considering
conditional parameters estimated with an infinite sample. In contrast, the value of an
infinite sample to estimate the conditional parameters, expressed as EVPI for a
particular specification, can increase or decrease depending on the informative capacity
of each specification. It is expected that the EVPI related to the specifications on the
efficiency frontier (which are, by definition, the most informative) decreases with
higher levels of disaggregation. This is because of the significant increase of static value
at the same time as dynamic value, leading to a lower difference between expected
NHB under perfect and current information. However, the limited information and
knowledge might affect the estimation of the efficiency frontier, i.e. a frontier formed
by specifications with little informative capacity, which leads to higher EVPI.
Chapter 4 is a practical piece of work where methods proposed in Chapter 3 have been
applied. It has used the data of a trial-based cost-effectiveness analysis, showing that a
new invasive treatment for the management of patients with non-ST-elevation acute
coronary syndrome was not cost-effective when compared with conservative
management at a threshold of £20,000 per QALY. It shows how subgroup analysis can
be performed to obtain estimations of static and dynamic value. The method
implemented was based on the estimation of individual cost-effectiveness, i.e. expected
costs and benefits for each treatment for each individual, which represents an estimation
of the joint distribution of potential outcomes. From this point, where total static value
is estimated (EVIC), the analysis aimed to characterize heterogeneity through subgroup
analysis in order to account for most of this value in a feasible manner.
143
The analysis was carried out examining six relevant binary variables, which in
combination led to 64 potential subgroups. One important finding that emerged from
this exercise was that analyses based on a large number of subgroups do not necessarily
imply complex guidelines and they are worth conducting. Another element is the
progressive understanding that can be achieved through the analysis in terms of the
informative capacity of the specifications used. For example, severe angina was
informative at higher levels of disaggregation, but it did not provide any extra value at
lower levels. This allows analysts to guide the selection of specifications for a further
level of disaggregation, which can be limited to the combination of the most
informative specifications. A third fundamental issue is that the decision model must be
able to capture as much heterogeneity as possible and only one model structure should
be used to estimate all outputs (i.e. average, subgroup and individual outputs). Finally,
Chapter 4 has illustrated the relevance of estimating the dynamic value in decisions
about future research. This includes the value of research to make different decisions in
different subgroups in the future and the possibility of prioritizing research in one
subgroup only.
Chapter 5 can be considered a step forward in the examination of the value of
heterogeneity. Previous chapters have been constructed on the basis of a centralized
process where decisions are made in order to maximize the health of the population.
This implies that some effective but very expensive treatments can be restricted to some
groups of patients, a restriction supported by the idea that the reallocation of those
additional resources to other activities of the health system provides more health. This
can, of course, be improved using subgroup analysis where restrictions would apply to
potentially smaller groups of patients. It was also mentioned in previous chapters that
decisions at individual level would produce the highest population health. The
arguments provided in Chapter 5 recognize this idea and suggests that the only manner
for implementing decision-making at individual level, consistent with the aim of a
collectively funded health system, is allowing patients and doctors to make choices
without restriction (individualized decisions). The challenge is then to identify when
unrestricted choices can be considered a policy consistent with the objective of the
health system, or at least acceptable according to certain social values judgments.
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Chapter 5 has developed an analytical approach to address this issue. Basically, gains
and losses for society are analysed as a comparison between decisions undertaken at
central level (with potential restrictions) versus decentralized (without restrictions). The
estimation of the joint distribution of potential outcomes is a basic input for conducting
this analysis. Acting on the assumption that the difference between social planners and
patients is that the latter will maximise health instead of net health, the method provides
an estimate of the net health that the social planner would forgo were he to decide to
implement unrestricted choices. This amount can be conceptualized as the value of
unrestricted choices for treatment. Although some seed of this development can be
found in the earlier work of Basu and Meltzer (2007), this approach can be considered
new in that it uses the whole of the joint distribution for a comparative analysis across
the cost-effectiveness plane. This compares gains and losses under alternative decision
rules, i.e. decisions rules adopted by society and individuals75. This chapter also extends
the analysis to explore different decision rules and incorporates transaction costs that
have not been discussed before in the literature (costs related to rejection and costs
related to implementation of unrestricted choices). Thus, this approach offers a novel
method to address the question of whether unrestricted choices can be implemented in a
collectively funded NHS and therefore it can be considered a substantive contribution to
the decision-making process in healthcare.
The method developed in Chapter 5 provides elements for a positive judgment about the
implementation of individualization of care. Indeed, it is argued that the question of
whether restricted or unrestricted choices should be implemented ought to consider an
estimate of the health forgone associated to decentralization of these decisions.
However, individualization is also about normative judgement, though not related to the
question of restricted or unrestricted choices. Chapter 5 examines the fundamental
normative judgements that should be considered for an agenda of individualization. It
argues that this should consider the type of “individual” values that will be used to
operationalize the maximand of the objective function. Paternalistic, altruistic and
welfarist decision-makers are defined on the basis of three social value orientations:
cooperativism; altruism; and individualism, respectively. They can be operationalized as
75 The closer estimate to this approach is the EVIC without cost internalization (EVIC-noCI). However,
although they are similar in estimating the value on the individual side, EVIC-noCI compares with the
value obtained on average at societal level.
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values of representative individuals of the community (paternalistic), a representative
sample of patients (altruistic) or values obtained directly from individuals (welfarist).
Because the selection between these alternatives does not respond to any empirical
result, either of them can be adopted based on a purely normative value judgment.
6.2. Discussion and opportunities for further research
The contributions generated in this thesis rely on certain assumptions that have been
pointed out throughout the previous chapters. This section summarizes the main
assumptions and discusses the generalisability of these methods in scenarios where they
do not hold. In addition, it highlights areas where further research would be benefitial.
The first condition assumed is that the healthcare system is collectively financed and all
costs fall within the health budget. The notion of a collectively funded system implies
transferences from wealthy people to poor people that makes it possible to offer a
minimum “essential” or “statutory” package of healthcare services according to the
needs of patients, something that has been an objective of many countries (Jost, 2005).
It has been discussed that cost-effectiveness is also a useful tool to define this essential
package in situations when the system allows people to have access to complementary76
insurance (Smith, 2012). It is argued that the methods proposed in this thesis, as an
extension of CEA, are also expected to apply under those scenarios.
Some caveats can be highlighted in terms of the applicability of classical CEA and the
methods proposed here, in health systems where out-of-pocket co-payments are
considered77. It has been argued that direct out-of-pocket expenditure for healthcare
introduces changes in the social welfare function that a social planner aims to maximise.
Hoel (2007) presents the case where the social welfare function is determined by health
and income related utilities, and people only have access to healthcare services covered
in the essential package. In this case a classical cost-effectiveness decision rule applies.
However, when people can buy services not covered by healthcare out-of-pocket, the
welfare function includes the disutility due to the disease (whose treatment is not
76 Complementary insurance refers to partial or total coverage of services that can or cannot be part of the
essential package (Mossialos and Thompson, 2004).
77 This refers to the case where each person has the alternative of buying -out-of-pocket- treatments that
are not covered in the essential package.
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covered) and the additional utility given by the treatments financed out-of-pocket in
those individuals who are able to afford them. Hoel (2007) argued that these
modifications of the social welfare function in presence of out-of-pocket expenditure
lead to a different decision rule, which might limit the application of classical cost-
effectiveness methods. As a consequence, the methods proposed here might also be
limited.
Some countries have implemented substitute private insurance schemes (Sapelli and
Vial, 2003). This type of insurance is an alternative to the public statutory package and
it exempts, at least, part of the taxes or premiums associated to the essential package. In
this case, a risk selection or cream skimming process arises since young healthy citizens
opt out of the public system and move to the private (Roberts et al., 2008). Cost-
effectiveness methods can still be useful in addressing resource allocation within the
public sector. However, their use for decisions at the level of the whole population
might be limited. The extent to which the methods developed in this thesis can be
applied to healthcare systems with substitute private insurance schemes is a limitation
of this work and an opportunity for future research.
Another element that has been highlighted throughout all the chapters is the relevance
of a better understanding of the joint distribution of potential outcomes. Previous
literature has emphasized that these estimates are relevant, since they provide the
evidence needed for individualized care and personalized medicine (Basu, 2009). It has
also been argued that individualized care is more efficient than subgroup analysis (Basu,
2011). This thesis has been developed in accordance with those principles but at the
same time it highlights the role of the understanding of the joint distribution to support
decisions conducted by social planners in socialized health systems.
In Chapter 5 the joint distribution is used to assess whether decentralized decisions can
be implemented in the health system. It assumes that unrestricted choices will follow
predictable rational judgments, based on individual characteristics as suggested
previously (Basu, 2009, Basu, 2011). If the expected loss is considered too high,
decisions based on subgroups provide the best approach. A limitation of the analysis
carried out in this thesis was the estimation of the joint distribution of potential
outcomes which was entirely based on observable characteristics. Future research
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should improve this estimation, accounting for some part of the unobserved
heterogeneity. This can be addressed using new statistical techniques to estimate
individual treatment effects such as marginal treatment effects (Basu, 2011) or person-
centred treatment effects (Basu, 2012). A better estimation of joint distribution is not
only important to conduct the analysis presented in Chapter 5 but also to obtain a better
estimation of EVIC and the proportion of the static value that can be achieved through a
guideline based on subgroups.
Chapter 3 and its application in Chapter 4 have largely discussed the role of parameter
uncertainty when making decisions about subgroup analysis. It has been explained that
the dynamic value is in part the value of an infinite sample to estimate conditional
parameters (value of information) and partially due to the value of estimating
conditional parameters with an infinite sample (value of heterogeneity). Once a
particular level of disaggregation has been defined, EVPI can be used to address the
question of whether further research is worthwhile. This further research aims to obtain
more precise estimates of parameters conditional to specific subgroups. It could be
undertaken in the whole population, but it could also be developed in one subgroup, the
one that offers the greatest value. In addition, in a further stage EVPPI could reveal that
the uncertainty in that specific subgroup is mainly explained by one parameter. It was
discussed in Chapter 3 that the estimation of EVPI presented in this thesis does not
account for the exchangeability between subgroups and might underestimate the real
value. This is a limitation of the methods presented here. However, if the aim is to
compare EVPI across subgroups to prioritize further research, given that the
exchangeability is symmetric, the additional value –per person- should be equal.
Therefore, the difference is ultimately shown by the proportion of the subgroup in the
population. If the bigger subgroup shows the higher EVPI, this should be selected for
further research.
The analytical approach presented in chapter 5 addressed interesting issues around
choice. The assumption of the base case was that social planners and individuals make
choices based on the same maximand, except that for social interests the maximand is
net of costs. An extended approach showed that the maximand of the individual can be
different, though it has to be identifiable and quantifiable. Furthermore, the analysis
assumed that either social planners or patients maximize the expected value according
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to the principles of expected utility theory under risk neutrality. Although this
assumption seems reasonable for the purposes of a social planner (Arrow and Lind,
1970), it might not be the case for individuals who value probabilities and consequences
differentially78 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). Thus,
while the decision rule applied for the social planner is entirely appropriate, the rule of
maximization of an expected outcome might be a limitation of this analysis. Alternative
specifications of the expected utility function to predict individual decisions should
consider attitudes to risk and the individual reference point. This is a challenging field
for future research.
Finally, the idea of predicting individual decisions from an empirical point of view has
been largely addressed in the field of behavioural economics. Ariely (2009) suggests
that people are predictably irrational when they make decisions. In other words, there
are some identifiable elements in people’s behaviour that allow us to predict their
decisions. Those elements include some attributes that are known by a public decision
planner but there are others that have not been considered in public decision-making.
Discrete choice experiments, for example, have revealed that individuals value several
dimensions and not only those related to health (Ryan et al., 2001). The magnitude of
effect of those attributes on patients’ choices for treatments might be used to generate
predictions about individual choices. As a result, a patient-level decision rule based on a
particular set of attributes might be generated for a particular condition and applied to
the current framework. Further research should shed lights on the feasibility of using
health and non-health related attributes in the prediction of individual decisions as well
as their consistency with other decision rules.
6.3. Recommendations for analysts and decision-makers
The research performed in this thesis has produced new knowledge and has improved
the understanding of several elements that are useful for the decision-making process in
healthcare systems. This section presents a number of recommendations that can be
considered by analysts and decision-makers in the future.
78 This argument refers to Kahneman & Tversky’s research on Prospect Theory. For details see footnote
73 in Chapter 5.
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The healthcare system has an opportunity to increase the health gained as a consequence
of their decisions about new interventions if they take heterogeneity into account. In the
context of a centralized decision-making process, the analysis should characterize the
total value of making different decisions for different patients. For this, analysts should
construct decision models through which the heterogeneity between individuals can be
captured, characterized and represented. This model provides the basis to estimate the
joint distribution of potential outcomes, i.e. the distribution of individual expected costs
and benefits for alternative treatments. Whenever possible this should be undertaken
using individual patient data, as shown in this thesis. Further, the structure of the
decision model should not vary for different subgroups, and the conditional parameters
(conditional for each subgroup) should be obtained from the same source of
information. Results of this analysis should show the total static value (EVIC), the
estimated efficiency frontier for subgroups and the proportion of the total static value
they account for.
The consideration of heterogeneity in CEA should not be limited to the number of
subgroups that will be examined or the different specifications that will be examined at
each level of disaggregation. The sources of heterogeneity such as baseline risk,
treatment effect, costs and preferences should also be explicitly considered. In particular
for preferences, there are a number of published studies that have incorporated
heterogeneity in patient preferences. However, from an extra-welfarist perspective,
CEA usually uses societal preferences to construct health outcomes. To the author’s
knowledge, there is only one theoretical paper raising the relevance of considering
heterogeneity in societal preferences (Sculpher and Gafni, 2001). Thus, analysts should
make an additional effort when studying heterogeneity in CEA, which is, to further
understand the factors that can explain heterogeneity in societal preferences.
The estimates of uncertainty for different levels of disaggregation are other important
results that should be presented. They include the dynamic value for alternative
specifications and the EVPI for specific subgroups. Decision-makers should examine
these results to make decisions about further research. They should focus on
specifications that provide high dynamic value and, simultaneously, on the EVPI
associated to that specification and in each subgroup. If the desire is to prioritize further
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research in one subgroup only, decisions-makers should choose the subgroup where
further research offers the highest expected value.
Recommendations based on subgroups might not be easily adopted by decision-makers.
One of the reasons is the concern about the strength of evidence under subgroup
analysis, which leads to a higher probability of spurious findings. A second element is
the transaction costs of implementing a complex guideline, and a third factor relates to
ethical or equity concerns. A judgement based on those elements might lead to the
rejection of a consideration of heterogeneity. This thesis recommends that all these
elements should be considered in the analysis: the former through an adequate
characterization of uncertainty; the second through a formal consideration of transaction
costs; and the third making an explicit consideration of the ethical constraints. The
possibility of rejecting the consideration of heterogeneity in the decision-making
process should be examined in the knowledge of the health that could have been gained
through different decisions for different patients (e.g. EVIC).
In the case where a new technology is expected not to be cost-effective according to
current information, decision-makers have an opportunity to assess the value of
implementing unrestricted choices in the healthcare system. The magnitude of the health
that is expected to be forgone because of a decentralized decision process can be
estimated as in Chapter 5 and presented for public scrutiny. This is especially important
in jurisdictions where individual choice is promoted as one of the central tenets of the
health system. Because individualization of care also raises the discussion about whose
values are being considered to make these decisions, analysts must be explicit in
providing information as to whether a paternalistic, altruistic or welfarist point of view
has been adopted.
6.4. Final conclusion
This thesis has contributed to the understanding of the value of heterogeneity in cost-
effectiveness analysis in the following aspects. First, it incorporates the dimension of
parameter uncertainty into the study of heterogeneity in cost-effectiveness as part of a
systematic approach to conducting subgroup analysis. Second, it demonstrates how this
theoretical analytical framework can be implemented in practice, using individual
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patient data through the estimation of cost-effectiveness estimates at individual level.
Third, it presents a broad conceptual framework aimed at helping social decision-
makers address the policy agenda about individualization of healthcare. This discusses
the normative elements that should be considered when decisions at individual-level
require implementation. In addition, it develops an analytical approach to studying the
conflict between decisions at societal and individual level. This has been conceptualized
in this thesis as the value of individual choices for healthcare treatments. Furthermore, a
set of opportunities for future research have been identified alongside this thesis. They




The expected Value of Individualized Care (EVIC) and the
Expected Value of Perfect Information (EVPI): A source
of confusion
A1. Understanding the source of confusion
Basu and Meltzer introduced the expected value of individualized care (EVIC) for first
time in 2007. It was presented as the difference between the value achieved under an
individualized care model, where values of specific parameters (θ) are elicited directly 
from patients and used to make decisions at individual level, and the value attained
under a paternalistic model, where decisions are based on the expected value of the
distribution p(θ). This was expressed as: 









The authors presented EVIC as a metric to represent the value of individual preferences.
However, they pointed out that although θ initially represented a vector of patient 
preferences, EVIC might be estimated for any other parameter of interest in Θ. 
Furthermore, the expression in A.1 assumes that decisions made under either the
individualized care or paternalistic models are both consistent with the criterion of
maximising expected net benefits. Thus, because costs are considered in the decision
they called this EVIC formulation “with cost-internalization”. Alternatively, EVIC
without cost-internalization (EVIC(NO-CI)) described the same concept but when a
criterion based on maximising expected benefits was applied (disregarding costs). The















Where Bj and Cj are benefits and costs, respectively, for the strategy j, and k is the
strategy that maximizes expected health benefits, k’ refers to k for each level of θ, in 
other words, the strategy that maximises expected health at individual level.
More recently, van Gestel et al. (2012) have conducted a study to explore the feasibility
of the EVIC framework. Because of the apparent similarity between EVIC and EVPI
they show a comparative table explaining that no- correlation exists between these two
metrics: “The value of EVPI does not predict the value of EVIC, nor vice versa” (page
15). This seems to contradict Basu and Meltzer in a methods review paper published in
2010 (Basu and Meltzer, 2010). In this report, the authors provide an alternative
expression either for EVPI and EVIC, expressing the former as:
ܧܸܲܫൌ ඵ ݉ܽݔ{ݕതଵǡݕത଴}݀ܩ( തܻଵǡܻത଴) െ ݉ܽݔ{ܧ( തܻଵ)ǡܧ( തܻ଴)}
This formula expresses the value of having an infinite sample that can resolve the
uncertainty. Indeed, an infinite sample contains all patients; therefore, EVPI can be
expressed in terms of individual patient outcomes estimated from such unsurpassable
data. തܻ௞ (for k strategies; k=0,1) are the average health outcomes of a representative
sample and ݀ܩ( തܻଵǡܻത଴) is the joint distribution that contains the whole uncertainty
around തܻ௞. The pair (ݕതଵǡݕത଴) is one particular realization from the joint distribution
݀ܩ( തܻଵǡܻത଴). Subsequently, the first part of the formula (affected by the integral)
corresponds to the expected per patient outcome consequence of the decision under such
perfect information (infinite sample) and the second part is the expected outcomes under
current information.
Next, Basu and Meltzer (2010) offer an alternative expression for EVIC as an extension
of EVPI:
ܧܸܫܥ ൌ ෍ ൤ඵ ݉ܽݔ{ݕതଵ௦ǡݕത଴௦}݀ܩ௦( തܻଵ௦ǡܻത଴௦) െ ݉ܽݔ{ܧ( തܻଵ)ǡܧ( തܻ଴)}൨
௦
which can also be written in its extended form,
A.3
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ܧܸܫܥ ൌ ෍ ൤൬ඵ ݉ܽݔ{ݕതଵ௦ǡݕത଴௦}݀ܩ௦( തܻଵ௦ǡܻത଴௦) െ ݉ܽݔ{ܧ( തܻଵ௦)ǡܧ( തܻ଴௦)}൰
௦ + (݉ܽݔ{ܧ( തܻଵ௦)ǡܧ( തܻ଴௦)} െ ݉ܽݔ{ܧ( തܻଵ)ǡܧ( തܻ଴)})൨
A.4
They explain that the first rounded parenthesis corresponds to the EVPI for each
subgroup (s) and the second part represents the value of making specific decision for
subgroups, what in this chapter has been called static value of heterogeneity. Thus, Basu
and Meltzer (2010) formally expand their previous definition of the concept of EVIC. In
addition, the idea that EVPI is part of EVIC was not denied in the authors’ former paper
(Basu and Meltzer, 2007) because in the example they provided in this report, EVPI
was implicitly zero. In their example, EVIC was estimated to reflect the value of elicit
patient preferences, which can be argued as perfect information.
According to the latter definition, EVIC is a function of EVPI and both metrics are
perfectly correlated. This is the source of confusion with the statement provided by van
Gestel et al. (2012). In this section it is argued that this confusion is more apparent than
real and depends on the conceptualization of what perfect information represents and
how it can be measured in practice.
A2. Resolving the confusion
One of the important conditions of the latter definition of EVIC provided by Basu and
Meltzer (2010) is the assumption of an infinite sample for the subset “s” so that the true
value of (ݕതଵ௦ǡݕത଴௦) can be estimated. According to this condition, EVIC actually contains
EVPI and reflects either the static or dynamic value of heterogeneity. However, because
the idea of having an infinite sample is practically unachievable, it is not feasible to
estimate this “super” EVIC proposed by Basu and Meltzer. Instead, we can only attempt
to estimate a more modest EVIC from (ݕത෠ଵ௦ǡݕത෠଴௦) where (ݕത෠௞௦) is an estimate of (ݕത௞௦).
Perfect information is usually estimated as the mean of the maximum NHB across many
possible realizations simulated through a probabilistic sensitivity analysis. Each
realization represents one potential scenario of the reality, on average. Thus, EVPI is
estimated in practice from propagating the uncertainty around the average and not from
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individual patients. As proposed in this chapter, EVPI can also be estimated for
subgroups in order to represent the uncertainty of the parameters only, i.e. the
uncertainty around (ݕത෠ଵ௦ǡݕത෠଴௦).
EVIC, as estimated by van Gestel et al. (2012) and also by Basu and Meltzer (2007) in
their case-study example, results in a useful metric to represent only the value given by
the heterogeneity of the population. If we consider that EVIC is not estimated with an
infinite sample, and the (uncertain) average effect of the treatment and other covariates
considered in the decision model are taken as unbiased estimates, then EVIC only
reflects differences between patients. In addition, because the magnitude of EVPI
depends on the size of the sample from which average effects were estimated and EVIC
depends on the different characteristics of patients, it is very likely that both metrics are
not correlated in practice.
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8. APPENDIX 2:
Clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of
RITA-3 trial
A2.1. Clinical background
Coronary heart disease (CHD) is one of the main health problems in healthcare systems
and a field in which most clinical research has been developed. As a consequence, it is
one of the areas that has concentrated a vast amount of research and where most
innovation has been produced. These technologies are potentially beneficial to the
whole target population, though it is highly unlikely that every individual would receive
the same magnitude of these benefits (mostly assumed to be the average benefit)
because the population is heterogeneous in nature. This has led manufacturers,
researchers and policy makers to be increasingly interested in exploring how the
treatment effect and cost-effectiveness vary across subgroups of patients with CHD
(Griffin et al., 2007).
Non-ST-elevation acute coronary syndrome (NSTE-ACS) is one type of CHD that is
associated with a high incidence of complications and mortality (Anderson et al., 2007).
The standard management of NSTE-ACS includes anti-platelet (aspirin), anti-
thrombotic (heparin) and anti-ischemic therapy (beta-blockers). Angiography with
intent to perform revascularization is usually recommended for high risk patients, to be
delivered as promptly as possible. This therapeutic strategy has been termed “invasive
strategy” which contrasts with the “conservative strategy” characterized by medical
management only79 (Anderson et al., 2007). In the UK, NICE has recommended an
invasive strategy for patients with high and moderate risk (predicted 6-month mortality
above 3% according to the GRACE risk score system) and conservative treatment for
patients with low risk (NICE Guideline 94, 2010).
The third Randomised Intervention Trial of unstable Angina (RITA-3) is one of the
trials undertaken to compare the efficacy of an intensive versus a conservative strategy
in patients with NSTE-ACS. It was a multicentre study that recruited 1810 patients from
79 Conservative strategy has also been called “selective invasive management” to express the fact that
invasive interventions are also considered when patients develop rapid impairments in the following few
hours after being admitted in the emergency.
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45 centres in the UK (Fox et al., 2002). Of those recruited, 895 patients were
randomized to the intervention and 915 were allocated to the conservative strategy.
After a five-year follow-up, the study demonstrated that an intensive strategy was able
to reduce the risk of the composite outcome of death and myocardial infarction (MI)
(primary outcome: OR 0.78; 95% CI 0.61 to 0.99) (Fox et al., 2005).
The study also conducted a subgroup analysis defined on the basis of their predicted
probability of experiencing the primary outcome (baseline risk score). A set of nine
covariates were selected to specify a logistic regression predictive model of the primary
outcome80. Patients were categorized into four quartiles according to their baseline risk
score. In addition, the highest risk subgroup was divided into two in order to obtain
more detailed information about high risk patients. The treatment effect was reported
for these final 5 subgroups, showing a significant effect concentration on high-risk
patients (Table A2.1). These positive results for treatment effect were supported by a
second study that showed improvement in Health Related Quality of Life (HRQoL)
(Kim et al., 2005).
Table A2.1.Treatment effect by baseline risk subgroup in the trial RITA-3. Treatment effect
estimated upon the combined primary outcome and expressed as Odds Ratio (OR) and 95%
confidence interval (95% CI).
Risk group OR (95% CI)
1st quartile 0.96 (0.44 – 2.10)
2nd quartile 1.10 (0.62 – 1.95)
3rd quartile 0.8 (0.49 – 1.30)
4th quartile, lower eight (4a) 0.76 (0.44 – 1.35)
4th quartile, upper eight (4b) 0.44 ( 0.25 – 0.76)
Total 0.78 (0.61 – 0.99)
*Interaction test (p=0.0039)
Note: Primary outcome is the combined rate of death and non-fatal myocardial infarction. Risk groups
were defined on the basis of a (baseline risk) score estimated from a predictive logistic model for the
primary outcome (1st quartile is the lowest risk and 4b is the highest risk). Source: Fox K.A., Poole-
Wilson P., Clayton T.C. et al. Lancet 2005;366:914-20.
80 The covariates were selected from a larger predefined set of variables collected at baseline using
stepwise technique. They included demographic characteristics, co-morbidities, symptoms and signs
recorded at baseline and electrocardiographic signs of coronary heart disease.
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A2.2. Cost-Effectiveness
Henriksson et al. (2008) report in a subsequent study, a cost-effectiveness analysis
performed alongside the RITA-3 trial. This is the only study available for this decision
problem using the UK NHS perspective. The study was primarily based on the
individual patient data of the trial which were used to populate a decision analytic
model. Costs were expressed in pounds Sterling and outcomes in quality adjusted-life
years (QALYs). QALYs were constructed using the set of values of the health states
defined by the EQ-5D instrument for the UK population (Dolan et al., 1996). Both costs
and QALYs were discounted using a rate of 3.5% per annum and uncertainty was
characterized using probabilistic sensitivity analysis.
The decision model consisted of two parts: first, a short-term decision tree representing
the index hospitalization, i.e. the period of time between the admission and the
discharge. Second, a Markov model characterising the long-term period after
hospitalization. The model is shown in Figure 4.1.
A set of four statistical equations were used to estimate the transition probabilities
during the index hospitalization as well as between Markov states. Equation 1 was
specified to estimate the probability of occurrence of the combined outcome (death or
MI) during the index hospitalization. This outcome was categorised as death or non-
fatal MI. The latter led the patient to the “Post-MI” state. This categorization was
defined based on the conditional probability of dying given the combined outcome,
estimated by Equation 4. Both models, 1 and 4, were estimated using logistic
regression. Thus, the decision tree originated three states that defined the starting point
of the Markov structure. These states were: no event, post MI and death, the latter being
represented twice in the Markov model in order to distinguish between cardiovascular
and non-cardiovascular etiologies.
For the Markov model, Equation 2 was specified to estimate the transition probability
between “no event” and the combined outcome (death or MI) in a subsequent period.
Each period had the same length of one year. A Weibull proportional hazards model was
used to estimate the transition probability, which was calculated considering time-
dependency for the following periods. An immediate categorization between
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cardiovascular death and post-MI was done for those patients who achieved the
combined outcome. Thus, the box (MI/CVD) in Figure 1 does not represent a health
state but rather an intermediate virtual classification that has to be categorized in death
or MI using Equation 4, similar to that in the decision tree. The hazard estimated from
Equation 2 was increased every ten years by updating the age covariate. This variation
was implemented using tunnel states for the first 5 years, after that, the hazard was
assumed constant. Next, the transition between the Post-MI state and death or a new MI
was estimated through Equation 3, also using a Weibull model. Similar to Equation 2,
Equation 3 also considered decreasing risk with respect to the time from the previous
MI. Thus, time dependency was incorporated for the first five years after MI. Once
again, Equation 4 was used to categorize patients in either death or post-MI health state.
Non-cardiovascular death was estimated using UK lifetime tables. Finally, two
equations were specified to estimate costs, one at index admission and one at follow-up,
and two other equations to estimate the Health Related Quality of Life (HRQoL) values,
also called utilities or QALY weights, at randomization and follow-up. Equations 1 to 4
are presented in Table A2.2. Equations to estimate costs and health utilities are
presented in Table A2.3. and Table A2.4. respectively.
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Table A2.2. Estimated short-term and long-term risks of the composite endpoint of cardiovascular



































Age (for every 10 years over 60) 1.731 1.262 2.374 1.777 1.499 2.108 0.699 0.520 0.941
Diabetes 1.905 1.359 2.672
Previous Myocardial Infarction 1.471 1.087 1.990 0.492 0.286 0.847
Smoker 1.651 1.207 2.258
Pulse (for every 5 beats per minute) 1.062 1.012 1.114
ST depression 1.423 1.067 1.913
Angina (grade 3 or 4) 1.893 1.086 3.299 1.323 0.988 1.771
Male 1.372 1.007 1.869
Left bundle branch block 1.977 1.169 3.344
Randomized to early interventional
strategy
1.520 0.864 2.675 0.621 0.464 0.830
Ancillary parameter 0.579 0.505 0.664




Table A2.3. Estimated costs during the index hospitalization and the first year after index
hospitalization
Explanatory variables Costs during the index
hospitalization
Costs first year after the index
hospitalization
Cost SE Cost SE
Constant 1778 295 2735 248
Age (for every 10 years over 60) 878 153
Previous MI 724 262
ST depression 1224 268
Angina (grade 3 or 4) 1034 247
Male 1035 264 586 242
Randomized to early interventional strategy 5654 256 -1106 233
Non-fatal MI during the index hospitalization 6221 972
Dying during the index hospitalization 7947 1229
MI during year 5467 804
Table A2.4. Estimated HRQoL values (utilities) at randomization and changes in HRQoL values
Explanatory variables Utility at randomization Change in utility at follow-up
Utility SE Utility SE
Constant 0.692 0.015
Diabetes -0.051 0.021
Previous MI -0.044 0.016 -0.010 0.016
ST depression -0.066 0.015
Angina (grade 3 or 4) -0.074 0.015
Male 0.073 0.015
Randomized to conservative
strategy (4 months follow-up)
0.044 0.013
Randomized to interventional
strategy (4 months follow-up)
0.038 0.017
Randomized to conservative
strategy (12 months follow-up)
0.038 0.008
Randomized to interventional
strategy (12 months follow-up)
0.018 0.015
Myocardial infarction during year -0.035 0.022
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9. APPENDIX 3:
Cost-effectiveness subgroup analysis of the RITA-3 trial:
details per subgroup
Table A3.1. Cost-effectiveness subgroup analysis of RITA-3: The case of two subgroups.





Diabetes Weighted average 7.90 (4,403,199) 7.92 (4,412,177) 0.0161 (8,978)
Diabetes (0.13) 5.78 (433,793) 5.79 (434,958) 0.0155 (1,165)





Weighted average 7.90 (4,400,926) 7.92 (4,411,501) 0.018 (10,574)
PMI (0.27) 6.07 (935,981) 6.10 (940,334) 0.028 (4,353)
No PMI (0.72) 8.6 (3,464,945) 8.62 (3,471,167) 0.015 (6,221)
ST depression Weighted average 7.90 (4,398,950) 7.92 (4,411,199) 0.022 (12,248)
ST depression (0.36) 6.61 (1,343,732) 6.65 (1,350,399) 0.032 (6,666)




Weighted average 7.90 (4,399,530) 7.92 (4,410,850) 0.020 (11,320)
LBBB (0.035) 5.83 (114,895) 7.97 (115,152) 0.013 (256)
No LBBB (0.965) 5.84 (4,284,635) 7.99 (4,295,698) 0.020 (11,064)
Smoker Weighted average 7.90 (4,399,896) 7.92 (4,411,278) 0.020 (11,382)
Smoker (0.32) 8.63 (1,555,901) 8.66 (1,561,304) 0.029 (5,404)
No Smoker (0.68) 7.55 (2,843,995) 7.57 (2,849,974) 0.015 (5,978)
Angina (degree
3 or 4)
Weighted average 7.89 (4,397,388) 7.92 (4,410,526) 0.023 (13,138)
Severe Angina (0.35) 6.21 (1,243,495) 6.24 (1,247,858) 0.021 (4,363)
No Severe Angina (0.65) 6.24 (3,153,893) 8.86 (3,162,668) 0.024 (8,775)
Note: NHB for current and perfect information per person are presented with two decimals places. EVPI
per person are presented with three decimals places. Differences between population values for the same
number per person are explained by differences in decimals places that are not shown.
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Table A3.2. Cost-effectiveness subgroup analysis of RITA-3: The case of four subgroups.







Weighted average 7.91 (4,403,714) 7.92 (4,413,271) 0.017 (9,556)
Diabetes and PMI (0.05) 4.69 (126,915) 4.70 (127,214) 0.011 (300)
Diabetes and No PMI (0.08) 6.39 (306,873) 6.40 (307,802) 0.019 (928)
No diabetes and PMI (0.23) 6.36 (809,099) 6.41 (813,570) 0.035 (4,470)




Weighted average 7.90 (4,403,199) 7.92 (4,412,897) 0.017 (9,698)
Diabetes and ST depression (0.05) 4.61 (140,737) 4.62 (141,113) 0.012 (376)
Diabetes and No ST depression (0.08) 6.57 (293,285) 6.59 (294,122) 0.035 (837)
No diabetes and ST depression (0.31) 6.98 (1,204,659) 7.01 (1,209,941) 0.019 (5,282)
No diabetes and No ST depression
(0.56)




Weighted average 7.90 (4,400,929) 7.92 (4,412,673) 0.021 (11,746)
previous MI & ST dep (0.08) 4.66 (212,209) 4.68 (213,086) 0.019 (876)
previous MI & No ST dep (0.2) 6.66 (723,771) 6.69 (727,424) 0.033 (3,652)
No previous MI & ST dep (0.28) 7.19 (1,132,595) 7.19 (1,137,661) 0.032 (5,066)




Weighted average 7.90 (4,400,214) 7.90 (4,411,976) 0.021 (11,762)
ST dep and LBBB (0.01) 4.01 (22,203) 4.01 (22,246) 0.007 (44)
ST dep and No LBBB (0.35) 6.69 (1,321,529) 6.72 (1,328,339) 0.034 (6,810)
No ST dep and LBBB (0.03) 6.55 (92,692) 6.56 (92,925) 0.016 (233)





Weighted average 7.91 (4,404,566) 7.92 (4,412,841) 0.014 (8,275)
Diabetes and LBBB (0.006) 3.94 (13,356) 3.95 (13,370) 0.004 (15)
Diabetes and No LBBB (0.129) 5.86 (420,437) 5.88 (421,641) 0.016 (1,204)
No diabetes and LBBB (0.029) 6.22 (101,539) 6.24 (101,828) 0.017 (289)
No diabetes and No LBBB (0.836) 8.31 (3,869,233) 8.32 (3,876,002) 0.014 (6,767)
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Table A3.2. (cont) Cost-effectiveness subgroup analysis of RITA-3: The case of four subgroups.







Weighted average 7.90 (4,402,052) 7.92 (4,412,169) 0.018 (10,117)
Previous MI and LBBB (0.01) 3.78 (26,788) 3.79 (26,855) 0.009 (67)
Previous MI and No LBBB (0.27) 6.18 (909,193) 6.21 (913,623) 0.030 (4,430)
No Previous MI and LBBB (0.02) 6.98 (88,108) 7.00 (88,314) 0.016 (207)
No Previous MI and No LBBB (0.7) 8.66 (3,377,963) 8.67 (3,383,377) 0.013 (5,413)
Previous MI
and Smoking
Weighted average 7.90 (4,400,926) 7.92 (4,412,664) 0.021( 11,738)
Previous MI and smoking (0.01) 6.45 (271,865) 6.46 (272,505) 0.015 (640)
Previous MI and No smoking (0.27) 5.93 (664,116) 5.96 (668,150) 0.036 (4,035)
No Previous MI and smoking (0.02) 9.30 (1,284,792) 9.33 (1,289,241) 0.032 (4,449)
No Previous MI and No smoking
(0.7)
8.24 (2,180,153) 8.25 (2,182,768) 0.009 (2,614)
LBBB and
Smoking
Weighted average 7.90 (4,401,288) 7.92 (4,412,090) 0.019 (10,802)
LBBB and smoking (0.007) 6.76 (27,054) 6.77 (27,075) 0.005 (22)
LBBB and No smoking (0.028) 5.59 (87,842) 5.61 (88,104) 0.016 (262)
No LBBB and smoking (0.317) 8.67 (1,528,847) 8.70 (1,534,381) 0.031 (5,534)
No LBBB and No smoking (0.648) 7.64 (2,757,545) 7.65 (2,762,530) 0.013 (4,984)
Diabetes and
Smoking
Weighted average 7.91 (4,403,455) 7.92 (4,413,444) 0.017 (9,988)
Diabetes and smoking (0.03) 5.78 (106,816) 5.79 (106,995) 0.009 (178)
Diabetes and No smoking (0.1) 5.77 (326,977) 5.79 (328,022) 0.018 (1,045)
No diabetes and smoking (0.29) 8.95 (1,449,084) 8.99 (1,454,691) 0.034 (5,606)
No diabetes and No smoking (0.58) 7.87 (2,520,578) 7.87 (2,523,736) 0.009 (3,159)
ST depression
and Smoking
Weighted average 7.90 (4,400,939) 7.92 (4,412,249) 0.020 (11,310)
ST dep and smoking (0.11) 7.17 (452,414) 7.19 (453,589) 0.018 (1,175)
ST dep and No smoking (0.25) 6.38 (893,307) 6.41 (897,311) 0.028 (4,004)
No ST dep and smoking (0.21) 9.42 (1,104,529) 9.45 (1,108,093) 0.030 (3,564)
No ST dep and No smoking (0.43) 8.24 (1,950,689) 8.25 (1,953,256) 0.010 (2,567)
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4,405,519 4,414,587 0.016 (9,068) Diabetes Previous
MI
Smoking p
0.005 (29) 1 1 1 0.009 13,193
0.013 (292) 1 1 0 0.039 15,423
0.012(167) 1 0 1 0.024 14,792
0.023 (810) 1 0 0 0.062 17,266
0.018 (667) 0 1 1 0.067 16,569
0.026 (2,396) 0 1 0 0.162 21,515
0.026 (3,285) 0 0 1 0.224 21,389




4,404,566 4,413,820 0.016 (9,254) Diabetes LBBB ST depress
0.002 (4) 1 1 1 0.003 10,780
0.006 (12) 1 1 0 0.003 12,349
0.013 (397) 1 0 1 0.052 15,374
0.019 (850) 1 0 0 0.077 16,677
0.013 (55) 0 1 1 0.007 14,692
0.019 (238) 0 1 0 0.022 15,867
0.029 (4,984) 0 0 1 0.303 20,889




4,402,052 4,413,387 0.020 (11,335) Previous MI LBBB ST depress
0.004 (7) 1 1 1 0.003 12,866
0.011 (64) 1 1 0 0.009 14,351
0.020 (896) 1 0 1 0.079 17,095
0.036 (3,719) 1 0 0 0.186 19,867
0.009 (39) 0 1 1 0.007 13,441
0.021 (188) 0 1 0 0.015 16,122
0.030 (4,609) 0 0 1 0.276 20,854
0.007 (1,808) 0 0 0 0.425 27,527
Note: NHB and EVPI are presented in QALYs (net of costs) for a threshold value of £20,000/QALY. The
ICER is presented in sterling pounds per QALY gained.
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4,404,566 4,413,892 0.016 (9,326) Diabetes Previous MI Smoking p
0.002 (3) 1 1 1 0.002 10,735
0.012 (316) 1 1 0 0.046 15,204
0.006 (13) 1 0 1 0.004 12,149
0.020 (949) 1 0 0 0.082 16,783
0.013 (81) 0 1 1 0.011 14,984
0.021 (220) 0 0 1 0.019 15,960
0.036 (4,391) 0 1 0 0.218 20,070




4,404,566 4,414,198 0.016 (9,632) Diabetes Smoking LBBB
0.002 (2) 1 1 1 0.001 9,970
0.011 (195) 1 1 0 0.032 14,609
0.006 (15) 1 0 1 0.004 12,382
0.019 (1,063) 1 0 0 0.097 16,684
0.009 (29) 0 1 1 0.006 13,475
0.020 (272) 0 0 1 0.024 16,111
0.034 (5,494) 0 1 0 0.285 20,080
0.008 (2,558) 0 0 0 0.551 26,798
Note: NHB and EVPI are presented in QALYs (net of costs) for a threshold value of £20,000/QALY. The
ICER is presented in sterling pounds per QALY gained.
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4,406,788 4,415,294 8,505 Diabetes LBBB Previous MI Smoking
1 1 1 1 10,393
1 1 1 0 11,127
1 1 0 1 9,135
1 1 0 0 12,965
1 0 1 1 13,708
1 0 1 0 15,608
1 0 0 1 15,050
1 0 0 0 17,611
0 1 1 1 13,480
0 1 1 0 15,182
0 1 0 1 13,473
0 1 0 0 16.929
0 0 1 1 16,639
0 0 1 0 22.184
0 0 0 1 21,666
0 0 0 0 29,421
Table A3.3. Cost-effectiveness subgroup analysis of RITA-3: The case of forty-nine subgroups.
Specification Subgroup ICER
All covariates Diabetes Previous MI LBBB smoker ST depress angina
1 1 0 1 0 0 11,483
1 0 0 0 0 0 18,296
1 1 0 0 0 0 14,690




1 1 1 0 0 0 11,127
1 0 0 1 0 0 15,258
1 0 0 0 1 0 14,834
1 1 0 0 1 0 13,652




1 0 0 1 1 0 12,512
1 1 0 1 1 0 9,135
1 1 1 1 1 0 10,393
1 1 0 0 0 1 16,842
1 0 1 0 0 1 18,063
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Table A3.3. (cont) Cost-effectiveness subgroup analysis of RITA-3: The case of forty-nine subgroups.
Specification Subgroup ICER
All covariates Diabetes Previous MI LBBB smoker ST depress angina
1 0 0 1 0 1 17,516
1 1 0 1 0 1 14,583
1 0 0 0 1 1 17,570
1 0 1 0 1 1 13,109
1 1 0 0 1 1 17,518
1 0 0 1 1 1 15,400
1 1 0 1 1 1 14,779
1 0 0 0 0 1 21,743
0 1 1 1 0 0 12,305
0 0 1 0 1 0 12,789
0 1 1 0 0 0 12,946
0 0 1 1 0 0 13,152
0 0 1 1 0 1 13,966
0 1 0 1 1 0 14,136
0 1 1 1 1 1 14,650
0 1 1 0 1 1 15,645
0 1 0 1 1 1 16,127
0 1 1 0 0 1 16,376
0 0 1 0 1 1 16,426
0 1 0 1 0 0 16,892
0 1 0 0 1 0 17,596
0 0 0 1 1 0 17,753
0 1 0 1 0 1 18,574
0 0 1 0 0 1 19,022
0 0 1 0 0 0 19,181
0 0 0 1 1 1 19,845
0 1 0 0 1 1 21,575
0 1 0 0 0 0 22,180
0 1 0 0 0 1 23,355
0 0 0 1 0 0 23,817
0 0 0 0 0 1 24,037
0 0 0 1 0 1 24,828
0 1 0 1 0 1 26,066
0 0 0 0 0 0 32,644
0 0 0 0 0 1 37,831
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10. APPENDIX 4:
Estimation of the Expected Value of Individualized Care
(EVIC) and parameter-specific EVIC
The total EVIC can be estimated as the difference between the mean of the
maximum expected individual NHB and the maximum between the average
iNHB. Table A4.1 shows the estimation of total population EVIC for the case
study presented in Chapter 4. It shows the iNHB for each strategy and the
maximum between them. Population estimates were calculated multiplying the
average per person value times the expected present value of the population
(556,723 patients) for the next 10 years.






























Average (per person) 7.87 7.89 7.92






4,411,737– 4,397,267= 14,349 net-QALYs
According to Basu and Meltzer (2007), the parameter-specific EVIC
corresponds to the difference between the total EVIC and the EVIC for the
remaining parameters other than θi.
ܧܸܫܥఏ೔ൌ ܧܸܫܥ െ න ݌௜ܧܸܫܥ(ߠ௜ൌ ݔ)݀ߠ௜.
௫ఢఏ೔
In this expression, pi corresponds to the marginal probability distribution of the
parameter of interest (θi). The integral represents EVIC estimated when θi is
170
fixed at any constant value x and then averaged across all possible values that
θi can take. When the difference between total EVIC and the second expression
of the equation is calculated, the result expresses the expected value of having
individualized information about the parameter θi. The above expression has
been simplified by van Gestel et al. as:
ܧܸܫܥఏ೔ൌ ܧܸܫܥ െ ൬݉ ݁ܽ ఏ݊೔൤݉ ݁ܽ ఏ݊೎൜௝
iNHB௝(ߠ௖ ߠ௜⁄ )ൠ൨െ ݉ ݁ܽ ఏ݊೔൤௝ ൛݉ ݁ܽ ఏ݊೎iNHB௝(ߠ௖ ߠ௜⁄ )ൟ൨൰
With θi being the parameter of interest and θc a vector of the remaining
parameters. Following this idea, Table A4.2 shows the parameter-specific
EVIC for diabetes.
Table A4.2. Estimation of the diabetes specific Expected Value of Individualized Care (EVICdiabetes)
max expected in patients with no diabetics





expected max in patients with no diabetics






EVIC for diabetes 14,349 – (4,411,745-4,403,199)
14,349 – 8,546
5,803
The diabetes-specific EVIC (5,803 net-QALYs) is almost the same as the static
value of heterogeneity in this example (5.811 net-QALYs). It is argued that
these values are the same and the small differences are explained by
approximations along the estimation process. A demonstration is presented in
Box A4.3.
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Box A4.3. Demonstration of the equivalence between EVIC for specific parameters
and static value of heterogeneity
Static value is estimated from individual NHB as in Chapter 3 (equation (3.8)):
ܵܽݐ ݅ݐ ܿܽݒ ݈ݑ݁ൌ ෍ ݓ௦
ௌ
௦ୀଵ
൫݉ ܽݔ௝ܧఏiNHB௦൯െ ݉ ܽݔ௝ܧఏiNHB
According to van Gestel et al. (2012) EVIC for parameter i (θi) that defines s subgroups (where
s=1,2,…,S) can be expressed as











However, the expected value across the maximum individual net benefits is the same as the
weighted average of the averages of the maximum individual net health benefits for each
subgroup
ܧఏ max୨ ൌ ෍ ݓ௦ௌ
௦ୀଵ
൫ܧఏ݉ܽݔ௝iNHB௦൯













which is equal to the static value of heterogeneity.
172
11. APPENDIX 5:
Stylized example of the extended method
This appendix presents a stylized example to illustrate an extension of the method
presented in section 5.2.2. The aim is to examine when at individual level doctors and
patients make choices according to an argument that differ from the social planner’s
maximand. It is assumed that the social planner applies a decision rule in order to
maximize QALYs net of costs. The base case assumes that patients and doctors choose
the treatment that provides the maximum expected QALYs. This does not restrict the
analysis to QALYs, the only constraint is that the metric has to be the same for patients
and social planners. The extension of the method relaxes this restriction.
Table A5.1 shows the individual level data of six subjects. Incremental costs,
incremental benefits and incremental net health benefits are presented for each
individual. It also presents the area of the cost-effectiveness plane where each subject is
located. In addition, it shows a hypothetical set of numbers that represents incremental
gains in a second outcome. This alternative outcome could have been estimated through
the decision model used for the cost-effectiveness study, though this is not a
requirement for the analysis. Indeed, the only relevant piece of information is whether
the individual makes the same choice as he/she would have chosen according to
QALYs. Figure A5.1 shows the distribution of the points in the cost-effectiveness plane.
The ICER for this population is £71,666 per QALY (£11,466 / 0.16 QALYs), which
means that the new intervention should not be considered cost-effective for a reference
threshold of £20,000 per QALY. Table A5. 2 shows the results of the base case analysis
and the extended analysis. The base case analysis shows that there is a positive value in
decentralizing decisions (for simplicity let us assume that transaction costs are zero). It
is estimated, for a hypothetical relevant population of 10,000 people, in 200 QALYs or
£4,000,000 (Table A5.2). The extended analysis shows that were a second decision rule
considered, one individual would change his decision. Subject 1 in Table A5.1, who lies
on the NW quadrant, would decide in favour of the new intervention. The individual net
benefits of this subject were not a matter of conflict under the previous decision rule,
because it was assumed that he/she would reject the treatment. However, given the
change of the decision, his/her net benefits now represent a
the new scenario, the value of decentralizing a decision is negative. For the same
relevant population the expected loss of decentralized decisions (assuming zero
transaction costs) is 1,80
Table A5.1. Illustrative example of a hypothetical population of six individuals and their joint
distribution of potential outcomes. Individual net health benefits are estimated for a cost










Figure A5.1. Graphical representation of the joint distribution (hypothetical example).
individuals. The line in the NE quadrant represents the cost
gained.
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loss for the society. Under









-0.98 -1.35 NW -0.61
-0.56 -1.25 NW 0.54
0.57 -0.26 NNE 0.66
0.34 -0.34 NNE 0.47
0.96 0.43 NSE 0.86
0.63 0.29 NSE 0.79
0.16 -0.41 NNE
-effectiveness threshold of 20,000/QALY
-effectiveness











Table A5.2. Results of the base case and extended analysis.
Area Average iNHB Density Expected iNHB
Base case
analysis
NNE (Subjects 3 & 4) ½ x (0.26 + 0.34) = 0.3 1/3 0.1
NSE (Subjects 5 & 6) ½ x (0.43 + 0.29) = 0.36 1/3 0.12
Result:
E + F – D  0 (assuming Csdm – Cr =0)
In this case: F = 0 ; E =NSE ; D = NNE
NSE – NNE = 0.12 – 0.1 = 0.02 net QALYs







Ei + Fi + Cj - Aj - Bj - Di ≥  0     (assuming Csdm – Cr =0)
In this case: Cj = Bj = Fi = 0 ; Aj = NW* ; Ei = NSE ; Di = NNE
NSE – NNE – NW* = 0.12 – 0.1 – 0.208 = -0.18 net QALYs
For a relevant population of 10,000 people is 1,800 QALYs or £36,000,000
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12. APPENDIX 6:
Societal versus patient values
Table A6.1 shows four scenarios comparing ICERs for societal and patient values.
Treatment 1 corresponds to standard care and is assumed to maintain the patient in the
same health state, which is valued as 0.4 and 0.6 by the society and patients
respectively. Treatment 2 provides improvement of quality and/or quantity of life. For
simplicity, costs remain the same (£1,000 and £50,000).
Scenario 1 is similar to the example in Gold et al. (1996). Here treatment 2 is assumed
to see patients recover to full health. Consequently, the ICER based on societal values is
lower. Scenario 2 presents the case where treatment 2 gives a partial improvement in
quality (0.4 versus 0.7 for social values and 0.6 versus 0.9 for patient values). It is
assumed that there is proportionality between social and patient values for each
treatment, i.e. in both cases the difference between treatments is 0.3. In this case, the
ICER is the same for both cases. Scenario 3 shows a similar situation but assumes that
the value a patient attaches to a better health state is higher (0.4 versus 0.7 for social
values and 0.6 versus 0.95 for patient values). In this scenario the ICER based on
patient values is lower. Scenario 4 presents the case where there are not only quality
improvements but also quantity increases (10 years with treatment 1 and 15 years with
treatment 2). Assuming the same weights as in Scenario 2, the ICER in this case is also
lower with patient values. Finally, Scenario 5 illustrates the case where there are
improvement in length and quality of life, but the quality increment is higher for
patients than social values. In this case, the ICER estimated with patient values is even
lower than Scenario 4.
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Scenario 1 1000 50000 10 10 0.4 1 4 10 8,166
Scenario 2 1000 50000 10 10 0.4 0.7 4 7 16,333
Scenario 3 1000 50000 10 10 0.4 0.7 4 7 16,333
Scenario 4 1000 50000 10 15 0.4 0.7 4 10.5 7,538
Scenario 5 1000 50000 10 15 0.4 0.7 4 10.5 7,538
PATIENTS
Scenario 1 1000 50000 10 10 0.6 1 6 10 12,250
Scenario 2 1000 50000 10 10 0.6 0.9 6 9 16,333
Scenario 3 1000 50000 10 10 0.6 0.95 6 9.5 14,000
Scenario 4 1000 50000 10 15 0.6 0.9 6 13.5 6,533
Scenario 5 1000 50000 10 15 0.6 0.95 6 14.25 5,939
Note 1: Scenario 1 assumes no improvement in quantity of life but full recovery of quality of life.
Note 2: Scenario 2 assumes no improvement in quantity of life but partial and proportional recovery in
quality of life
Note 3: Scenario 3 assumes no improvement in quantity of life and partial recovery in quality of life. In
this case the gains in quality are overrated by patients.
Note 4: Scenario 4 assumes improvement in quantity of life as well as proportional gains in quality of life.
Note 5: Scenario 5 assumes improvement in quantity of life and greater incremental gains in quality of
life in patients than society.
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13. List of Abbreviations
CBA Cost Benefit Analysis
CEA Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
CER Comparative Effectiveness Research
EVPI Expected Value of Perfect Information
EVPPI Expected Value of Perfect Information for parameters `
EVSI Expected Value of Sampling Information
ENBS Expected Net Benefit of Sampling
EVIC Expected Value of Individualized Care
HRQoL Health Related Quality of Life
HTA Health Technology Assessment
IC Individualized Care
ICER Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratio
iICER Individual Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratio
INB Incremental Net Benefits
NB Net Benefits
iNB individual Net Benefits
NHB Net Health Benefits
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NHS National Health Service
NICE National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence
NST-ACS Non-ST Acute Coronary Syndrome
PM Personalized Medicine
PSA Probabilistic Sensitivity Analysis
QALY Quality Adjusted Life Year
SDM Shared Decision-making
TINB Total Incremental Net Benefits
UK United Kingdom
VoI Value of Information
VoH Value of Heterogeneity
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